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HOLMES, MARSHA, Ph.D. Reuniting Word and Deed: Negotiation for 
Real Peacemaking and Authentic Classroom Writing. (1995) 
Directed by Dr. Hephzibah Roskelly. 242pp. 
The issue at stake in this dissertation is the relationship 
between word and deed. The problem it addresses is the way in which 
categories of discourse undermine that relationship. It argues that 
discourse taxonomies divide word from deed because they categorize 
persuasion and deliberation as characteristics of some uses of language 
but not others. This splitting of word and deed Informs and 1s informed 
by other divisions—between writer and reader, meaning and consequence, 
form and content, text and context. As a result, it silences the second 
part of each of these hierarchies—reader, consequence, content, and 
context. These divisions, this dissertation illustrates, represent an 
inaccurate and destructive theory and practice of language. 
The first chapter discusses differences in a theory of rhetoric as 
all language use and of rhetoric as one use of language. It argues in 
favor of Kenneth Burke's dialogical philosophy of language as symbolic 
action and against dlchotomous theories of rhetoric as a singular 
category of discourse. The second chapter analyzes the contemporary 
theory of one category in particular—epideictic—as evidence of the 
erroneous and debilitating effects of the dichotomy of 
deliberative/epideictic created by discursive categories. 
Chapters three and four investigate epideictic practice. Chapter 
three studies the war eulogy by providing a reader's response to 
Pericles' "Funeral Oration" in order to illustrate the persuasive and 
deliberative nature of the most ceremonial of traditional epideictic. 
Chapter four studies the deliberative classroom essay through an 
analysis of questionnaires completed by university students in three 
composition classrooms in order to illustrate the traditional ceremonial 
tendencies 1n discourse categorized as persuasive and deliberative. The 
final chapter draws the eulogy and essay together for a comparison of 
the similarities 1n these two rhetorical situations occasioned by 
ceremony and school, suggesting Implications of perceiving rhetorical 
theory and practice as negotiation of deeds enacted in words 1n all uses 
of language and pointing to the consequent ability for moving farther 
along toward real peacemaking and authentic classroom writing. 
DEDICATION 
This dissertation is dedicated to peacemakers—past, present, and 
future—who in their rhetorical occasions encourage us to make real our 
dreams of peace through the deeds of our words. 
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PREFACE 
"You shall not kill." 
Exodus 20:13 
Over the course of my life, many voices have whispered 1n my ear, 
nudged my conscience, Inspired my convictions, and shaped my actions for 
peacemaking. 1 can Identify some of the Instances, circumstances, and 
influences that nurtured me Into padfistlc beliefs, although as I move 
from day to day the development has seemed and seems gradual, sometimes 
invisible. In some ways, pacifism feels as if 1t has always been a part 
of me and as if, without a design of my own, I continue to recognize 
more fully Its fundamental place in what I say and do. 
The occasion of writing a dissertation has given me the 
opportunity to explore the relationship between peace and language. I 
have come to see that theories and practices of language can be peaceful 
or they can be violent, whether their explicit subjects happen to be 
about peace and war. When the subject is about peace and war, 
consequences of the way language 1s conceptualized and engaged are the 
most crucial of all. The matter of words as deeds becomes literally a 
matter of life and death. Pacifism and rhetoric, then, have become 
forever woven studies for me. 
In this dissertation, I have added my voice to the voices that 
have and will persuade me to work for peace. In turn, I hope that my 
readers will be persuaded to add or strengthen their own voices by 
joining choruses or taking leads in whatever ways their lives occasion 
vi 
for them in the matter of negotiating words that make a more peaceful 
world. 
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CHAPTER I 
CATEGORIZING IN RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION STUDIES 
What Are We Doing With Categories? 
When I was a little girl, my grandmother kept a glass bottle of 
buttons in her middle dresser drawer. My very favorite pastime was to 
sit at her dresser, pour out the buttons on its top, and sort them into 
piles. Sometimes I would put them together according to color, other 
times by size and, as best I remember my seemingly endless fascination 
with this activity, into numerous other categories for making bigger and 
smaller piles of buttons, mini-collections of buttons that pleased me 
and made sense to me at the time. I don't remember anybody ever telling 
me how to organize the buttons; I don't remember ever holding forth to 
myself or other potential button organizers about a particular way those 
buttons had to be arranged every time. I do remember loving the way the 
buttons looked rolling and bouncing out of their container, the way they 
gathered into smaller groups. I remember how much fun it was pushing 
them all together in a big pile and sorting again. I remember loving 
making meaning with those buttons. 
Years later, I sat in a University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
graduate seminar on classical rhetoric. My professor, Dr. Patricia 
Roberts, brought in a box of buttons and asked each student to sort them 
and to explain why we sorted as we did. Being the h1gh-sp1r1ted 
graduate students that we were, we tried to sort 1n unique and 
Impressive ways according to colors, materials, sizes, functions, and 
2 
other criteria I no longer recall. When we finished, the number of 
sortings equaled the number of sorters. (I was the most egocentric, 
dividing them according to buttons I Hked and buttons I didn't like, 
arguing that the two categories would facilitate efficient button 
selection. Should I need a button, I'd already gathered the ones most 
likely to meet my needs. Well ... I was in heaven, back in my old 
playtime again.) 
Dr. Roberts' point was to introduce a discussion of Aristotle's 
categories of rhetoric by helping us see how arbitrary categories are. 
Nothing was right or wrong about anybody's button piles, just like my 
childhood creations. We sorted according to the moment's context—what 
we needed and who we were as button-sorters. We all provided rationales 
for our systems, which would serve us 1n our connections with these 
buttons. Similarly, Aristotle's rhetorical categories—forensic, 
deliberative, and epldeictic—made sense and were useful to him at the 
time. He saw and heard rhetors in legal, political, and ceremonial 
settings. Therefore, his categories reflect his particular perspective 
on those public occasions for discourse. Actually, his categories did 
not make complete sense to him. Epldeictic was slippery, but being a 
great lover of categories, he nevertheless asserted his trio with their 
defining characteristics. And they work almost so neatly that 
rhetoricians have been willing to accept them or at least to build with 
them ever since 1n studies of language use. Whether classical or 
modern, one of the common features of traditional taxonomies 1s the 
category of deliberation and Its defining characteristics of persuasion, 
context, and action—features that are somehow more real, powerful, 
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and/or important 1n "deliberative" as opposed to other kinds of 
discourse. Deliberation is sort of super-discourse 1n rhetorical 
taxonomlsts' eyes. It is this separatist notion of deliberation and, 
more importantly, the limits it places on other supposedly non-
deliberative discourse that exercise my concern with ep1de1ct1c theory 
and practice. 
From childhood to graduate school, my love of button play has 
helped me know that categories are human constructs created to enlighten 
the moment. More particularly, 1t has sparked my curiosity about, and 
ultimately my complaint with, people who Insist on their own categories 
of discourse. What are the consequences of keeping all the deliberation 
in one pile? What are the outcomes of deliberation circulating 
throughout all the piles? What happens when we assume no deliberation 
exists, although 1t does? What do we get when we assume deliberation 
will occur, yet it does not? How quickly does taxonomy move from toy to 
tool to tyrant 1n theory and practice? Although my grandmother's button 
bottle was my favorite toy, and its use gave me great pleasures and 
lessons, I would not want to force 1t on anybody else and thereby 
destroy their play or work, especially knowing that the most famous 
taxonomist of all could not master the "perfect" categories. 
My admonishment of dogmatic taxonomlsts 1s not, of course, a new 
argument. Women. Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal 
about the Mind. George Lakoff's commanding discussion of recent 
transformations within the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science, 
significantly revises the traditional concept of category itself. 
According to this conventional view, which Lakoff terms "objectivism" 
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(xii), "things are 1n the same category if and only 1f they have certain 
properties in common. Those properties are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for defining the category" (xiv). In the new view, 
"experientialism" (xv), categorizing things according to their similar 
characteristics turns out to be only one way the mind might categorize. 
By presenting case studies as well as empirical research from multiple 
disciplines, Lakoff argues that the structure of thought and its 
categories are characterized by not one but four "cognitive models": 
1) the propositional model defines categories by degrees of membership; 
2) the metaphor1c (traditional) model defines by necessary and 
sufficient conditions; 3) the metonymic model by a prototype part 
representing the whole category; and 4) an image-schematic consisting of 
a central category with many categories radiating from it (153-54). The 
assumption that the second, metaphorical model is the way to categorize 
illustrates the strength and comfort of two-thousand-year-old-plus 
intellectual roots in ancient Greek philosophy: 
From the time of Aristotle to the later work of Wittgenstein, 
categories were thought [to] be well understood and unproblematic. 
They were assumed to be abstract containers, with things either 
inside or outside the category. (6) 
Lakoff's work overturns this "truth." 
Another crucial aspect of Lakoff's cognitive models theory 1s its 
valuing of both reason and experience as shapers of humans' conceptual 
systems. Thus categories do not exist only "out there" beyond but 
discernible by the knower, as the traditional view of cognition has 1t. 
Categories also live "in here" within and shaped by the knower, as new 
work in cognition demonstrates. This dialogic between knower and known 
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remains untarred by the brush of relativism because 1t shares, Lakoff 
points out, objectivism's commitment to reality, truth, and knowledge, 
although with an invigorated notion of what constitutes them. 
By calling into question conventional wisdom about categories and 
the stronghold 1t has had and still has on inquiry and metainquiry, 
Lakoff's work points to the futility of constructing categories that 
claim to explain once and for all the discourses that human beings 
create. Finally, his overarching goal to replace the traditional view 
with "ideas that are not only more accurate, but more humane" (9) 
resonates in the two concerns that my analysis of the epideictic 
category addresses—that its theories are inaccurate and their 
consequences destructive. It is no coincidence, then, that my argument 
confronts the ancient notion of categorization Itself. 
Studies in the relationship between thought and language also 
provide important insights about categories. A. R. Lurla's research 1n 
child development indicates that categories constitute cognitive 
processes that children develop 1n order to understand reality; they are 
not cognitive products whereby children learn to define reality. 
Evidence of a child's cognitive development lies in the ability to 
construct categories in a variety of patterns. Development also has 
occurred when children progress from forming small, discrete categories 
based on differentiations to forming larger, more inclusive categories 
based on generalizations (55-70). In A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric. 
Frank D'Angelo describes the inter-related processes of categorizing in 
thinking and writing. In accordance with Lurla's emphasis on dynamic 
process rather than static product, his theory aims to develop a 
6 
generative composition pedagogy rather than to determine what the 
categories for all thinking and writing are or should be. These studies 
put rhetorical theory on the path toward understanding language, rather 
than placing a classification system at the end of the theoretical path. 
Similarly, my own argument speaks for the benefits In recognizing 
categorizing as a process that initiates investigations of language, and 
it points out liabilities in a concept of categories as products that 
serve as the results of those explorations. Lakoff's cognitive model, 
for instance, prompts more thinking about thinking rather than concludes 
it; therefore, it is a generative instrument for inquiry. The pragmatic 
spirit of this dissertation, then, 1s embedded 1n chapter one's 
question: "What are we doing with categories?" and its argument for 
seeing categories as tools to think with rather than objects to think of 
in the service of more humane communication. 
Numerous disciplines are currently accelerating their questions 
about the ways in which categories serve as heuristics or hammer locks. 
In composition studies, Kate Ronald and Hephzlbah Roskelly collect a 
group of essays, Farther Along: Transforming Dichotomies in Rhetoric 
and Composition, that aims to transform into dialogics the numerous 
categories constraining pedagogy. Their argument speaks to the 
destructive tendencies in taxonomies, given their often quick move to 
rigidity. Reviewing categories that divide composition theorists into a 
variety of competing camps, Ronald and Roskelly conclude that 
taxonomies don't permit argument [and] aren't designed for 
dialectic, despite assurances from all the taxonomlsts about the 
flexibility of the categories or their interdependence. Just as 
restrictive and more destructive to dialectic is the way 
taxonomies create hierarchies as they position methods and 
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theories. Any hierarchy Invites, maybe even necessitates, a power 
struggle. (3-4) 
James Berlin, for example, does not "recognize the danger inherent when 
a profusion of slippery theoretical categories can too easily become 
rigid labels," nor does Stephen North accomplish the purposes of his 
taxonomizing when "the very act of labeling solidifies rather than 
dissolves the separations it explores" (3). My study joins the spirit 
of these such as Lakoff's and Ronald and Roskelly's in warning about the 
dangerous tendencies in classification systems, and in recommending 
"looking beneath the surface of apparently conflicting ideas to discover 
oppositions transformed—not merely synthesized—into new conceptions" 
(Ronald and Roskelly 7). 
In rhetorical theory, answers to my question "What are we doing 
with categories?" spring from the large categorical question at the core 
of rhetoric's perpetual self-examination: What Is rhetoric? Is 
rhetoric all language use, or is it one use of language? Theoretically, 
is it the whole enchilada or one taco on the combination plate grande? 
Practically, do rhetorical studies interpret any use of language, or is 
its field of inquiry a closed set of discourse? How big or small a 
category does rhetoric as the Aristotelian study of the available means 
of persuasion bring to mind? While rhetorical theory argues about 
whether rhetoric is the whole or a part of language use, rhetorical 
practice implicitly or explicitly posits one answer or the other and 
then develops arguments from Its premises. Critical interpretations of 
war eulogies, for instance, can either elucidate or obfuscate these 
texts' persuasive natures. Composition pedagogy can teach deliberation 
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as essential to all communlcation or as a particular and for only some 
of it. My own study of epidelctic is grounded in theory that argues 
"Rhetoric is all language use," and it critiques the argument "Rhetoric 
is one use of language." The choice is an important one to make and to 
understand because the answer to the question "What 1s rhetoric?" 
informs the analysis, teaching, and practice of all language. 
Especially considering that rhetoric and persuasion are synonymous terms 
for practically all theorists and practitioners, a concept of rhetoric 
has essential relevance for thinking about how people are—or assume 
they are not—using language to move each other. Definitions of 
rhetoric shape expectations of writers and readers, texts and contexts, 
form and content, and meanings and consequences. The theoratical 
differences between rhetoric as all language use and rhetoric as one use 
of language are laid out in the next two sections—a sketch of Kenneth 
Burke's philosophy of language followed by a critique of Walter H. 
Beale's theory of rhetoric. 
Rhetoric as All Language Use 
Transformation of the deliberative/nondeliberative dichotomy 
created by categories of discourse compartmentalized according to 
difference requires a philosophy of language to facilitate such a move. 
Kenneth Burke's philosophy, of ubiquitous influence in rhetorical theory 
throughout the better part of this century, serves such a purpose for 
this study of epidelctic. Foss, Foss, and Trapp provide a helpful 
assessment of the wide range of critical responses invoked by Burke's 
deep and diverse project. The very reasons that Burke's detractors 
offer as weaknesses in his work, they note, are also the ones that his 
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advocates claim as Its strengths. What some see as un-systematic, 
eclectic, and obscure, others favor as characteristics of a philosophy 
that is human- rather than system-centered, inclusive rather than 
exclusive, and respectful of its readers' abilities to negotiate the 
meanings of his ideas and Illustrations (183-88). In their 
bibliographies, neither William H. Rueckert nor Richard H. Thames 
attempt to compile a comprehensive guide to the Influence of Burke's 
thinking. Thames' checklist is limited to direct critical responses to 
Burke that "exhibit quality, address significant Issues, create or 
resolve controversy, exemplify interdisciplinary influence, and reflect 
international recognition" (305). Rueckert, who has been writing on 
Burke since 1951, explains the near impossibility of listing all direct 
and indirect applications of Burke's thinking. The task, he writes, is 
"beyond my knowledge, patience, and talents. For such a listing, I 
substitute the flat, declarative statement that Burke's Influence is 
massive" (515). My own argument, then, is one among hundreds in 
rhetorical studies that make their cases from a Burkean point of view. 
He is the consummate thinker to represent the essentially dialogical 
concept of "rhetoric as all language use." Several key Burkean tenets 
help in envisioning a concept of language and of rhetoric that Includes 
all discourse: dramatism and language as symbolic action (including 
incipient action), identification and addressedness, form and appeal, 
and the pragmatic ideology and moral Implications of his theory.1 
Dramatism and Language as Symbolic Action: In its broadest view, 
Kenneth Burke's philosophical project explores human relations and the 
worlds human beings create. Dramatism, his foundational metaphor for 
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how people shape reality, casts all aspects of life as a doing, not a 
being, in the world. This metaphor Illustrates life—or living, I 
should say, to put it more dramatlstlcally—as people doing things with 
and to each other. Focusing on a topic a little less broad than life, 
dramatlsm studies language as the primary way 1n which people shape 
their worlds, construct their realities, engage in their dramas, do to 
and with each other. Burke's philosophy "treats language and thought 
primarily as modes of action" (Grammar xxii). As "a species of action, 
symbolic action . . . Its nature is such that 1t can be used as a tool" 
(Language 15). In a dramatistic world of words, the being of life 
transforms into the doing of living, and language becomes languaglng. 
All language, then, is a living act. 
If language is doing, Burke argues, then we must ask of it "What 
1s involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing 
it?" (Grammar xv). Burke's philosophy advocates a method appropriate 
for answering the question. The pentad, his profound and now popular 
heuristic, illuminates the five essential elements to be analyzed in any 
symbolic action: Act (what), Agent (who), Agency (how), Scene (where 
and when), and Purpose (why). The terms operate in dlaloglcal pairs 
with a pliancy that enables any pair to be foregrounded. In literary 
criticism, for instance, one interpretation of James Russell Lowell's 
Civil War eulogy "Ode Recited at the Harvard Commemoration" might 
emphasize Agent and Act—the warrior as performer of heroic deed. 
Another reading could analyze Agency and Purpose—the means of murder in 
order to achieve superiority over other human beings, or the use of 
praise in order to justify war killings. Still another might 
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investigate Scene-Agent, comparing the attitude and expectations of 
Lowell's 1865 audience to a 1995 one, who read with two world wars and 
scores of other conflicts across the globe between them. In any case, 
Burke's philosophy requires readers to approach Lowell's eulogy—because 
it is an instance of language use—as a symbolic act. "Man 1s the 
symbol-using animal"; language, therefore, Inescapably symbolizes 
(Language 3). The pentad enables symbol-users to ask: Who is doing 
what, how, where, when, and why? The pentad also works provocatively 
for interpreting symbolic acts 1n the composition classroom. Who are 
the Agents of classroom discourse and how, where, when, and why are they 
doing what? Rhetorical critics and teachers must ask the pentad's 
questions because the answers, Burke's philosophy insists, make a 
difference for human relations. 
Language as symbolic action means much more than a narrow notion 
of a call to action with an actual physical outcome, often a 
characteristic of rhetoric as one use of language. Qeneral Mills, for 
instance, produces a commercial 1n order to persuade me to buy Cheerios 
on my next trip to the grocery store. I do; therefore, their use of 
language 1s rhetorical. Or, my student writes an argument about 
violence in which he calls for his class colleagues to write General 
Mills and demand that they not sponsor violent cartoons. Therefore, I 
as teacher judge his essay persuasive, even though his readers do not 
fulfill the essay's call. In addition to seeking overt, prompt change— 
however serious or frivolous, however likely or unlikely—symbolic 
action 1s also attitudinal. Attitude 1s an "incipient act" in Burkean 
terms (Rhetoric 50), and "[t]he realm of the incipient, or attitudinal, 
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1s the realm of 'symbolic action' par excellence" (Grammar 243). Thus 
Burke treats every Instance of discourse as a union of a word and a 
deed. Words are deeds, all of them; they are not entities different 
from one another according to whether or what kind of action they seek 
from their readers. Burke often argues, for Instance, that poetry has 
the "power to induce or communicate states of minds to readers" and 
therefore 1s discourse entirely within the scope of rhetorical analysis 
(Rhetoric 50). 
This concept of attitude as action informs my study's argument 
against the traditional notion of deliberative rhetoric as the only 
discourse that moves readers to action. The "incipient act" advances 
rhetorical study's sense of what an act can be and therefore what 
language can do. It helps expose the crassness of discourse categories 
that characterize a business conglomerate's advocacy of their product as 
deliberative discourse, but a war eulogist's conflation of courage and 
bayoneting strangers as nondellberative. It points out the reasons for 
teachers' and students' frustrations in trying to distinguish the way in 
which a "deliberative" essay does not ask for reflection and a 
"reflective essay" does not ask for deliberation. Counter to this 
antithesis of deliberative/non-deliberative categories, Burke's 
Incipient acts have several functions. They can be acts, substitutes 
for other acts, or first steps toward future acts (Grammar 236). For 
instance, a war eulogy might persuade Its reader to resist military 
duty, or to pray for government and military leaders, or to resolve 
never to kill another person for any reason. (Conversely and more in 
the spirit of most war eulogies, the reader might be persuaded to join 
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the Army, to vote for Increased military spending, or to promise to kill 
and die for his or her convictions.) Equally in all of these reader 
responses—not one more than the othei—the war eulogy is an act with 
consequences. 
Likewise in the composition classroom, writers can persuade 
readers to change what they do and think and feel. Variations 1n what 
the actual changes are and/or when they actually occur make no one of 
these acts more or less persuasive or significant in their world-shaping 
influence. Typical "deliberative" and "reflective" essays Illustrate. 
One student writes a "deliberative" essay in order to persuade her 
readers to write letters to the major television networks protesting 
violence in their programming. Another student writes a "reflective" 
essay in order to convince his readers to feel the painful consequences 
of his brother's death as a result of gang violence. Would the first 
essay necessarily do more than the second one to change readers' actions 
because Its call to action is more overt and immediate? Answering "yes" 
and thereby pre-determlning a discourse hierarchy runs counter­
productive to each essay's persuasive intent and need for deliberation. 
Conversely, the "region of ambiguous possibilities" that incipient acts 
constitute underscores the need for investigating them all (Grammar 
242). All language is a living act—overt or incipient—warranting 
rhetorical analysis. 
Identification and Addressedness: Identification 1s Burke's term 
for persuasion, and unpacking that term explains the writer-reader 
relationship in symbolic acts. To state 1t overslmply, rhetors speak to 
audiences in terms that aim to create identity between themselves and 
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their listeners. When this identification is effective in Its 
persuasiveness, they are united. Consubstantlality, as Burke calls it, 
is achieved. Addressedness Is the term Burke uses to indicate the 
reader's essential role 1n identification. Rhetoric is "addressed"; 
"persuasion implies an audience," self or other (Rhetoric 38). Writers 
and readers, Burke is saying, collaborate in their persuasions. Their 
interchange, however, should not be confused with a collapse into one 
identity. Identity cannot be sameness because identification Implies 
division. "If men were not apart," Burke notes, "there would be no need 
for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity" (Rhetoric 22). The goal of 
identification is not to erase division by obliterating difference, but 
to negotiate division through acknowledging difference. In this way, 
similarity and difference work together in transforming both writer and 
reader, rather than working separately in widening the wedges of human 
division. As a result, meaning is negotiated. 
Identification is not a classical concept of the writer-reader 
relationship, which is too Incomplete to account for the Infinite "ways 
in which members of a group promote social cohesion by acting 
rhetorically upon themselves and one another" (Rhetoric x1v). 
Traditional rhetoric emphasizes overt appeals to common ground in order 
to explain a rhetor's persuasion of his or her listeners. It can be as 
simple as my niece Kaitlin advising her babysitter that "My Mommy 
doesn't want me to eat spaghetti." in order to get out of eating her 
dinner or as sophisticated as Martin Luther King, Jr. weaving scriptural 
references 1n order to gain the political advocacy of his Birmingham 
Jail readers. Classical rhetoric interprets these manipulations of 
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Mom's word and God's word as means for the end of manipulating readers, 
and the slipperiness of the ethics involved is evident 1n Kaitlin's 
little lie. 
Identification, however, indicates transformation, not 
manipulation. Kaitlin and her babysitter, King and his fellow ministers 
all become more similar yet retain their differences as freedom from 
dinner and freedom from oppression are negotiated. Likewise, the values 
(motherly and Godly) are transformed. They are not just a means to an 
end; they are themselves advocated 1n the communlcation. They are, as 
the metaphor of transformation suggests, re-born. Of course, 1t is not 
so simple and clear-cut as this. Writers or readers do not always 
recognize the ways in which they identify. A writer, "having woven a 
rhetorical motive so integrally into the very essence of his conception, 
[] can seem to have ignored rhetorical considerations" (Rhetoric 37). 
Readers can impose "the persuasiveness of false and inadequate terms 
. . . upon [themselves] in varying degrees of deliberateness and 
unawareness" (Rhetoric 35). Language cuts both ways, representing 
division where there is similarity and similarity where there 1s 
division 1n the advocacy of values (Rhetoric 45). Therefore, the study 
of language use as well as its practice bear a moral responsibility if 
discourse is to be understood for its seen and, more Importantly, unseen 
identifications and therefore divisions. Burke imagines a "wavering 
line" between identification and division and by Implication between 
"socialization and faction" and "peace and conflict" (Rhetoric 45). A 
rhetorician's mission 1s to transform these ever-negotiable lines 
through collaborations respectful of both similarity and difference. 
16 
Otherwise, rhetorical study does nothing to keep people at their most 
extreme from uniting with those who are similar in order to kill those 
who are different. This paclfistic commitment in which "the rhetorician 
and the moralist become one" (Rhetoric 26) grounds Burke's study of 
rhetorical motives: 
We do not flatter ourselves that any one book can contribute much 
to counteract the torrents of 111 will into which so many of our 
contemporaries have so avidly and sanctimoniously plunged. But 
the more strident our journalists, politicians, and alas! even 
many of our churchmen become, the more convinced we are that books 
should be written for tolerance and contemplation. (Rhetoric xv) 
Nearly a half-century after they were written—in this age of Rush 
Limbaughs, Oliver Norths, and Jerry Falwells—Burke's words make an even 
more poignant pronouncement. 
Burke unites the terms that have divided discourse and its study. 
Identification signals that all symbolic action—all language use—is 
persuasion: 
All told, persuasion ranges from the bluntest quest of advantage, 
as 1n sales promotion or propaganda, through courtship, social 
etiquette, education, and the sermon, to a 'pure' form that 
delights in the process of appeal for itself alone, without 
ulterior purpose. And identification ranges from the politician 
who, addressing an audience of farmers, says, 'I was a farm boy 
myself,' through the mysteries of social status, to the mystic's 
devout Identification with the source of all being. (Rhetoric 
xiv) 
Kaitlin and King's discourses persuade; so do proposals, poems, and 
prayers. Likewise, rhetoric is as broad a term as persuasion. It is 
"the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in 
beings that by nature respond to symbols" (Rhetoric 43). In a 
discussion of the range of rhetoric, in which he transposes classical 
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into modern theory, he concludes: "[T]here is no chance of our keeping 
apart the meanings of persuasion, identification ('consubstantiality'), 
and communication (the nature of rhetoric as 'addressed')" (Rhetoric 
46). Burke's point is not to mince terminology but to stress the 
importance of studying rhetoric as a "linguistic function," meaning a 
real doing of something through language (Rhetoric 44). Whatever the 
particulars of their discourses, writers and readers act as co-Agents 
negotiating relationships with each other and with language's meaning. 
Form and Appeal: As the language philosopher who declares "form 
is the appeal" (Counter 138), Burke cares little about taxonomies of 
form. This de-emphasis results from the dialoglcal relationship between 
means and end—the form and the appeal (or the content)—manifest in his 
famous declaration. Form is the intrinsic means or Agency of persuasion 
because "a yielding to the form prepares for [the reader's] assent to 
the matter identified with it" (Rhetoric 58). He describes five ways in 
which discourse creates for readers "an arousing and fulfillment of 
desire" (Counter 124; literature is the particular discourse he 
discusses here). These forms, however, cannot be reduced to ends in and 
of themselves. The form of repetition, for example, is a way of gaining 
the reader's assent, but it is highly unlikely that the writer's aim is 
to repeat. Burke discusses formal appeals in figures of speech and 1n 
the overall structure or organization of a piece of writing as features 
that any discourse incorporates, and he coins 1t convenient to group 
texts according to "generalizations" as classical rhetoricians did in 
order to manage the cumbersome task of analyzing structure of lengthy 
texts (Rhetoric 70). Although he acknowledges four "linguistic 
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dimensions" (poetics, logic or grammar, rhetoric, and ethics), he argues 
not for their division but for their union; for instance, as he 
prescribes analysis of poetry's rhetoric (Language 28). In the 
concluding essay of Language as Symbolic Action. Burke argues against 
generic constructs. Again discussing rhetoric and poetics, the two 
categories that have been erected and disassembled throughout the 
history of language, he describes efforts to separate them as confusing 
and lackluster, given the "large area which they share in common" (302). 
Responding to Wilbur S. Howell, who had recently criticized Burke's 
blurring of categorical lines, Burke concludes: 
My 'Dramatlstic' theory of 'symbolic action' does not permit me to 
use categories that draw the lines at precisely the same places 
where he [Howell] would prefer me to have them drawn. Also, 
frankly, I am much more interested in bringing the full resources 
of Poetics and Rhetorica docens to bear upon the study of a text 
than in trying to draw a strict line of demarcation between 
Rhetoric and Poetics, particularly in view of the fact that the 
full history of the subject has necessarily kept such a 
distinction forever on the move. (307) 
Burke's philosophy of language, then, can hardly be accused of 
marginalizing form, yet it does not privilege discursive taxonomy. At 
its deepest level, form unites all language. Any lines drawn serve to 
shape just so many temporary button piles. As his rhetorical analyses 
of numerous and multifarious "forms" attest (Oresteia. Coriolanus. 
"Kubla Khan," Mein Kampf. the United States Constitution, to name a 
few), a conception of all language as rhetoric enables rather than 
inhibits lessons about how readers and writers succeed or fail in their 
symbolic acts. 
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Pragmatic Ideology and Moral Implications: To Insist that human 
beings do things with language leads to crucial follow-up questions 
which, Burke knows, can provoke some people to avoid admitting 
language's reality-constructing power. Nevertheless Burke asserts the 
pragmatic question of purpose: To what end do we perform our symbolic 
acts? Or, in short, why? Choice is central to Burke's question. 
Symbol-users make choices in how they shape their worlds through 
language. They can choose what a eulogy or an essay does. This is not 
to suggest, of course, an unrestrained human will over language. The 
relationship between symbol-users and their symbols is always 
dialogical, not hierarchical, as Burke sees it. But language is action, 
and action "'implies the ethical, the human personality'" (Language 11). 
Human beings are not machines 1n motion, and they are not without 
ideological influences—social, economic, political. Therefore, context 
(the Scene of his pentad) is also central to Burke's pragmatics. When 
and where symbol-users have been shaped as well as when and where their 
symbols are enacted always inform discourse. Context and text work 
inseparably toward the pragmatic outcome of constructing reality. Burke 
illuminates this Interaction through the example of scientific 
discourse, language commonly misconstrued as a-ideological and therefore 
nonpersuasive: 
The dramatistic view of language, in terms of 'symbolic action,' 
is exercised about the necessarily suasive nature of even the most 
unemotional scientific nomenclatures. . . . Even if any given 
terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as 
terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent 
it must function also as a deflection of reality. (Language 45) 
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Reflection's selection and deflection (terministic screens, he calls 
them) are persuasive choices. In treating rhetoric and persuasion 
synonymously, then, Burke does not merely restate Aristotle's definition 
of rhetoric as the study of the available means of persuasion. He 
reinvigorates it to include the universe of discourse. In other words, 
language use equals symbolic action equals identification equals 
persuasion equals communication equals rhetoric. In common parlance, 
unfortunately sometimes used to denigrate a philosophy of language as 
comprehensive as Burke's, "It's all rhetoric." 
Always the dialogical thinker unwilling to make an either/or 
choice, Burke requires that rhetoric hold both its symbols and its 
symbol-users accountable for the making of their worlds. The crucial 
moral question asks: How do we think and feel about the results we get 
from our symbolic actions? This question directs rhetorical theory and 
practice to investigate the outcomes—the Purposes—of symbolic actions. 
Rather than scrutinize the kinds or genres or end-products of discourse, 
Burke Investigates discursive consequences: "By its fruition, we should 
judge it" (Rhetoric 14). The "'consummation'" accomplished through the 
formal appeal should occupy the rhetorician's concern, he claims 
(Language 305). Words are deeds. Burke's philosophy brings into full 
view the responsibility writers and readers must take for these material 
effects of their language. 
As briefly sketched here, Burke's philosophy of language 
establishes the approach to rhetoric and its study informing my analysis 
of epideictic. His philosophy requires observation of what human beings 
do and interpretation of what they have done through language. In a 
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world characterized through the metaphor of dramatism, this philosophy 
defines language as symbolic action, which can be analyzed for Its 
motives through a pentad of intrinsically related components. It 
emphasizes language's effects in the mind by defining attitude as 
incipient action, thereby more clearly illuminating the union of word 
and deed. It characterizes all language use as intentional, addressed, 
and consequential, thereby uniting all language use under the rubric of 
rhetoric. It treats form as the method of persuasion Inseparable from 
the matter to which someone 1s being persuaded. Finally, 1t seeks to 
move human beings toward a clearer understanding and therefore a more 
humane utilization of their symbols. Always the pragmatist-Idealist, he 
seeks a rhetorical theory and practice that treats "empirical things-
here-and-now in terms of a Beyond" (Language 299). The image of a 
project in "bevonding" (Language 298) resonates in Ronald and Roskelly's 
belief that rhetoric and its study can get us "farther along." Burke's 
philosophy inspires rhetoricians to look at words as deeds, as acts 
occurring between real human beings at real occasions in time and place 
and always with real consequences. Rhetorical study cannot separate 
writer, reader, meaning, consequence, form, content, text, context, 
word, deed (or, in Burke's terms, Agent, Purpose, Agency, Scene, and 
Act) for individual analysis if 1t is to understand what discourse—any 
and all of it—means. 
Rhetoric as One Use of Language 
Since James L. Kinneavy and his 1971 landmark book A Theory of 
Discourse, nobody has presented a classification system for language use 
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as widely considered and applied by theorists and practitioners as has 
Walter H. Beale. His work in A Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric, following 
Kinneavy's by eighteen years 1n 1989, has been praised by fellow 
taxonomists, including long-time admirers of Kinneavy's approach to 
language. Timothy W. Crusius, for instance, who has recently analyzed 
and amalgamated several discourse theories in order to formulate his 
own, calls Beale's argument "a major contribution to thought 1n our 
field" (53). He accurately and favorably characterizes it as "a 
semiotic theory—which is to say, a structuralist theory" (55), an 
"ahistorical, essential 1st mode of thought" (57), "intensely 
conservative" and therefore new in its approach (59); a theory that 
rightly aims "to enjoy the prestige of scientific inquiry" (58). Its 
emphasis on mature, written discourse can inform the teaching of college 
writing, Crusius asserts, although Beale claims his primary aim is to 
facilitate rhetorical criticism (67-68). For my own argument, Beale's 
theory aptly serves as a chief representative of the "rhetoric as one 
use of language" view in its definition of rhetoric as one of four 
categories of all discourse: Scientific, Instrumental, Poetic, and 
Rhetorical. Acknowledging the social constructivist view that through 
language human beings construct reality, his system categorizes all 
discourse and therefore all reality. "My contention will be that this 
model," Beale says of his theory, "constitutes a comprehensive and 
illuminating guide to the aims and substance of human discourse and to 
the 'kinds of reality' that human beings discover in experience" 
(Pragmatic 11-12). He modifies his claim by adding that "[i]t 1s not my 
purpose to announce an elegant formula and then, like Newton, to deduce 
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all possible worlds from it" (Pragmatic 12). His disclaimer expresses a 
modesty common among modern taxonomists, yet alerts readers to observe 
what a "comprehensive and illuminating guide" of four categories for the 
word and the world will do for uses of language. 
Motivational Axes: Beale's theory begins with two "motivational 
axes" that divide discourse into four equal kinds (see Figure 1). At 
the poles of the vertical axis are "Contemplation" and "Action," 
illustrating the extremes of discourse as either a "reflection-on-
experience" or a "participant-in-experience." The horizontal axis 
separates "reference" and "non-reference," by which discourse is about 
either "designation-of-experience" or "symbolization-of-experience." 
Although Beale sometimes refers to these axes as "continuums" (Pragmatic 
64), his other common term "dichotomies" (Pragmatic 11, 60) is a more 
appropriate one for pairs of concepts that reflect the old oppositions 
of objectivity/subjectivity (Action/Contemplation) and 
absolutism/relativism (reference/non-reference). He calls the ends of 
the axes "paradoxes" (Pragmatic 63); they function as binary 
oppositions. Taken together, Action, Contemplation, Reference, and Non-
Reference constitute what Beale terms the "quadrad" of his "semlotlc" 
theory (Pragmatic 10). It is similar in scope to Burke's pentad and 
dramatistic theory, Beale points out, but a stronger one because his 
work "draws upon what [he] believe[s] to be a more precise and 
sophisticated approach to the problem of language as symbolic action, 
namely that of contemporary speech-act theory" (Pragmatic 10-11)—a 
theory, like Beale's own, that values taxonomy as a theoretical 
necessity.2 
Contemplation 
utterance as reflection-on-experience 
nonreference reference 
symbolization-of-
experience 
designation-of-
experience 
Action 
utterance as participant-in-experience 
Figure 1. Motivational Axes and Discourse Aims (Pragmatic 11). 
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Discourse Categories: Beale connects the points of the 
motivational axes with a circle, thereby dividing discourse into the 
four categories of Instrumental, Scientific, Poetic, and Rhetorical (and 
I capitalize their names, as he sometimes does, in order to be clear 
when I am using Beale's terms). By choosing the Image of an axis, the 
theory implies movement. But how do the categories move? Looking at 
Figure 1, can Scientific discourse, for instance, framed by 
referentiality and contemplation, ever be primarily non-referential and 
active? If such a change were possible, 1t would require Rhetorical 
discourse to change also. In effect, Scientific and Rhetorical 
discourses would have to switch places each by rotating 180 degrees. 
Otherwise, how could the model keep the categories separate and orderly 
and maintain the theory's symmetry? Alternatively, 1f a category's 
flexibility occurs only within the parameters established by the axes, 
then this system defines Scientific and Instrumental discourse as always 
more referential than Poetic and Rhetorical, Rhetorical and Instrumental 
as always more active than Scientific and Poetic, and so on because each 
category can at best move along one-half of each axis. One end of an 
axis can never describe discourse marked at the other end. 
I am calling the circle's quadrants categories of discourse, 
although Beale's dominant term for them is "aims of discourse" (see 
especially chapter 4, 55-80). He describes his model in this way: 
It is a map of the motives and not necessarily the forms of 
discourse. In fact, the principle of asymmetry that governs the 
form/meaning relation in speech acts argues against attempting to 
map both of these dimensions at a single stroke. (65) 
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Rather than talk about form and content as the same stroke, then, Beale 
forges the form/content split by painting them separately in an 
"unresolvable and energizing dichotomy" (160). His explanation of form 
for which he constructs a "Discourse Hierarchy" (see especially 
Pragmatic chapter 1, 13-29) occurs separately from the discussion of 
meaning in discourse, which the motivational axes are intended to 
represent. Yet his defining criteria for the "alms" of discourse, which 
I will discuss momentarily, attempt to typify formal elements. 
Therefore, the form/content split divides word (as a form) and deed (as 
a content) with the net effect of form drowning meaning. An aim of a 
discourse, to my mind, means the end toward which a discourse strives. 
Aim in Beale's sense means what discourse looks like in the end, which 
explains his Insistence on the need for "more empirical identifications 
and descriptions of the aims of disccurse" (Pragmatic 67). He directs 
attention to a static text, just as the "text itself" exercises 
Kinneavy's "aims" of discourse theory (Klnneavy 49). All in all, 
Beale's use of the word "aim" falls to convince that the theory 1s 
anything other than about kinds, categories, and ultimately forms of 
discourse.3 
Beale defines the Instrumental, Scientific, Poetic, and Rhetorical 
categories according to six criteria: purpose, subject or field, 
author-audience relation, conditions for success, occasion and context, 
and language and strategy (Pragmatic 93-94). Several of the 
differentiations his theory makes among discourse according to these 
criteria illustrate a few of the questions his system raises. 
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Purpose is the "strongest of the defining features" by which these 
categories are constructed (Pragmatic 95). The Purpose or "primary 
motive" of each is outlined accordingly: 
Instrumental: "direction and control of human activities" 
Scientific: "the establishment and organization of knowledge" 
Poetic: "the construction of an object of enjoyment and 
reflection" 
Rhetorical: "the formation and information of opinion" 
(Pragmatic 95-96) 
While Beale emphasizes that these primary motives do not preclude a mix 
of motives within a text, he also is clear that mixing motives can 
quickly put a text at risk of becoming "disharmonious" (Pragmatic 95). 
Yet real discourses quickly call to mind any number of poets or fiction 
writers who would argue that the aims of directing human activity 
(Instrumental), establishing knowledge (Scientific), and/or forming 
opinion (Rhetorical) are equally if not more important to their language 
use as 1s constructing a pleasurable object (Poetic). Toni Morrison did 
not write her novel Beloved primarily in order to create a beautiful 
thing; something more meaningful than a good read can come from its 
reception. Neither would it be difficult to identify scientists who are 
increasingly aware of the power to direct human activity as well as to 
form and/or inform opinion. What scientist researching, say, AIDs or 
breast cancer, can remain unaware of the influence that his or her 
reported findings will have on personal and interpersonal human behavior 
and thought? How mindful must they be in choosing the ways in which 
they report findings, especially considering the diverse and numerous 
audiences who will respond to them? To categorize Morrison's novel 
primarily for its poetry and not for its politics undermines the story's 
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significance. To categorize scientific revelation primarily for Its 
knowledge and not its persuasion hides the ways in which science 1s 
deeply controlling and ideological.4 
The differences assigned to discourse according to the author-
audience relations criterion are equally troubling. Instrumental and 
Scientific discourse are indistinguishable here. Their author-audience 
relations are 
typically static, governed by the norms and constraints of 
disciplines, by statute, or by the subject matter Itself. In fact 
the dynamics of the relationship play virtually no role in the 
substance or success of the communication. (99) 
The presence of so many entrenched conventions, however, illustrates 
that an author-audience relationship does significantly shape the 
success of the communication. If it does not, then for what purpose are 
the conventions? Is Scientific discourse convention for convention's 
sake? The Poetic author-audience relation, on the other hand, "does 
very often come into play, but usually in a spirit of play" (Pragmatic 
99). Beale patronizes playfulness as often "out-right fabrications," 
proving that "whatever relationships emerge are ultimately less the 
constraining factors of a communicative enterprise than elements of the 
aesthetic unity itself." Thus communication and aesthetics become an 
either/or choice. Readers do not listen to Sethe's narrator in Beloved 
and deliberate about their attitudes and actions having heard her; 
rather, they appreciate her. Furthermore, marking Poetic discourse as 
the singular category with authorial "projection" or "fictional1ty" 
presumes that discourses in other categories bear no pertinent 
distinctions between flesh-and-blood authors and authorial personas. 
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Rhetorical discourse is the only category with "a dynamic and open-
ended" relation between Its author and audience, one that 1s "discovered 
or established by a successful author and 1s developed or exploited as a 
strategy of persuasion." Although Beale places none of the power in the 
hands of the reader for shaping this relationship, at least 1n 
Rhetorical discourse there is some acknowledgement of a real audience, 
unlike the static or pretend relations in the other three categories. 
The criterion of occasion or context also makes Rhetorical 
discourse different from the other three-quarters of language use. 
Whereas Rhetorical discourse arises in response to its real context, the 
other three categories "freeze, as it were, the element of immediate 
context, reaching out for contexts that are ultimate and enduring" 
(Pragmatic 101). To illustrate, he contrasts Scientific and Rhetorical 
occasions: 
As a norm of scientific discourse, the only significant element of 
context 1s what may be designated as the 'state of the question': 
What knowledge has been established as opposed to what remains 
unexplained or controversial? In rhetoric the 'state of the 
question' exists alongside or is actually embedded in a context of 
social action, evaluation, or understanding. (Pragmatic 102) 
The slipperiness of this difference becomes evident in any number of 
scientific questions (the beginning of human life, the creation of the 
universe, sources of healing). The ways 1n which "knowledge" in each of 
these examples might be construed as "established" or "unexplained" 
and/or "controversial" depends on the scientific community—the 
context—in which their questions are raised. In order to explain 
Instrumental discourse's a-contextual nature, Beale refers to technical 
information and its goal "to produce a document that can stand up to 
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novel elements of situation." Anybody who has ever written 
instructions, however, can attest to the intense focus on context that 
such writing requires in an effort not to transcend occasions as much as 
to enter into them. Anybody who has ever failed or succeeded in 
understanding the instructions they read can attest to the contextual 
assumptions that technical writers make. Finally, in Poetic language, 
Beale's criterion for occasion pits text against context: 
Even when works of literature respond in a direct way to 
immediate, temporal contexts, moving along the continuum toward 
rhetoric, they typically develop these contexts into a pattern of 
ultimate or traditional thematics, transcending whatever is 
immediate. To the extent that they fail to do so, they fail to 
endure as works of art. (Pragmatic 102) 
What Beale attributes to non-contextuality in enduring literature (a 
privileging of the universal over the particular), Wolfgang Iser would 
explain as the textual construct of an implied reader through which the 
text can be read with revised relevance for times and places other than 
its original.5 
Of the remaining three criteria for Beale's classification system, 
the subject (or field) criterion differentiates the kinds of things that 
each discourse can talk about and the way they can be talked about— 
their "aspect" and "reference" (Pragmatic 96-99). Conditions for 
success depend on each category's "conventions," primarily degrees of 
audience accommodation (Pragmatic 101). Language and strategy are 
rhetorical choices, although Beale avoids that term by calling them 
"methods" (Pragmatic 102-04). He recognizes this criterion as "not the 
most reliable" for determining a category (Pragmatic 102). Indeed, at 
this most local level of discourse the arbitrariness of categorical 
31 
distinctions becomes most obvious. Although he assigns the strategies 
of logos, ethos, and pathos to Rhetorical discourse, they certainly 
occur in others. The strategy of narrative by which he characterizes 
Poetic is receiving increasing analysis in non-Poetic texts. This 
blurring of categorical boundaries, which Beale disclaims by relegating 
the language and strategy criterion to a minor status, exposes 
similarities across all discourse, despite his theoretical insistence on 
difference.6 
Rhetorical Discourse: Because Beale's project is particularly 
interested 1n Rhetorical Discourse, he further dissects this "aim" into 
four more categories—Informative, Performative, Reflective/Exploratory, 
and Deliberative—and defines their differences according to "purpose," 
"form," and "type" (Pragmatic, see especially chapter 5, 107-59). His 
Rhetorical sub-categories mirror his quartet of Discourse categories: 
Informative — Scientific; Performative:: Instrumental; 
Reflective/Exploratory: .-Poetic; and Deliberative:: Deliberative. These 
categories are, as Beale states, a reworking of Aristotle's forensic, 
epideictic, and deliberative trio. Epideictic is now Performative 
Rhetoric, similar to the larger Instrumental division. 
Persuasion falls under the purview of Deliberative Rhetorical 
discourse, as evidenced by the purposes of each category. Deliberative 
Rhetoric's "normal purpose is to support specific conclusions or 
opinions about questions of action, value, and understanding" (Pragmatic 
117), whereas the information of Informative Rhetoric 1s not secondary 
to a purpose other than itself (Pragmatic 130); the performance of 
Performative Rhetoric is "neither to substantiate theses nor to 
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communicate information but to perform public acts" (Pragmatic 141); and 
the reflection or exploration of Reflective/Exploratory Rhetoric is "to 
stimulate and entertain an audience, while sharing and reflecting upon 
experience" (Pragmatic 152). "Suasory" 1s a discursive "type" in all 
the non-Deliberative categories, a name that half-reveals and half-
disguises the persuasive nature of all discourse. Nevertheless, the 
more the theory dissects discourse, the more the symmetry of Beale's 
wheel, as he calls it, seems impeccable; indeed, mesmerizing. Just like 
Aristotle's triad, 1t gives the impression that there 1s a place for 
everything, and that rhetorical theory can put everything in its place. 
Pragmatics as Practical Act and Theoretical Need: In order to 
understand the assumptions and intentions of Beale's theory, his two 
foundational reasons for calling it pragmatic are instructive. The 
first reason is that his theory is "concerned primarily with what human 
beings do with discourse" (Pragmatic 1). Therefore, it focuses on "acts 
of discourse." By acts, Beale means what got written—the texts 
themselves—not how they got written cognitlvely, linguistically, or 
contextually. The emphasis is decidedly on the "what" not the "human 
beings" or the "do" in his theory. His theory also foregrounds text by 
characterizing rhetoric (meaning Rhetorical discourse) as "first and 
last, a study of human accomplishment," and its aim as one "to account 
for the nature and variety of such products in the realm of 'rhetoric'" 
(Pragmatic 2). If people create products from discourse, reason 
suggests, then it must have some use, function, or practical 
application. In a simple sense of pragmatics as practicality, then, 
Beale's theory is pragmatic, but its emphasis on text-as-act turns a 
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study of language use Into one of language used. There 1s something 
dead or static rather than alive or dynamic in this structuralist 
approach. It does not illuminate what the text did pragmatically as 
much as it shows what the text was substantially, which makes the theory 
far more empirical than pragmatic. This sense of deadness also 
permeates his contrast of oral and written discourse. Unlike oral 
language, the written word is characterized by the structural "absence 
of a definite situational context, by the removal of the author from 
audience in space and time, and by the absence of literal voice" 
(Pragmatic 4). He depicts the writer's and reader's absence—their 
"'not being there'"—and the text's presence—of "having 1t 1n writing'" 
as advantages of written discourse (Pragmatic 5). Again, it is not what 
people are doing with language but the artifact that remains as evidence 
of something having been done that concerns this pragmatic theory. Its 
assumption is that discourse has to be dead-done in order to study it. 
Beale's second and more "principal" justification for naming his 
theory pragmatic is its response to "the critical need to develop a 
system of explanations and characterizations that are at once rigorous 
and nonreductive" because rhetorical theory has neither clear-cut names 
nor criteria for its categorizing: 
Discourse theory, criticism, and pedagogy have inherited a 
bewildering array of confusing and overlapping terminology, with 
Inconsistent and contradictory descriptions of various entities, 
under such promiscuously used rubrics as 'genre,' 'mode,' 'style,' 
and haziest of all, 'form." Clearly one of the first tasks of the 
theorist ought to be that of finding ways to organize, stabilize 
the meanings, and test the validity of such concepts. (Pragmatic 
3) 
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The assumption—that the first order of need is organized, stabilized, 
validated categorical terms—echoes the old modes of discourse's 
rationale (narrative, description, comparison/contrast, cause-effect, 
problem-solution, report, and argument). Still living dinosaurs in some 
writing classrooms, the modes direct writers to write narrative for 
narrative's sake, description for description' sake; in short, form for 
form's sake. Yet Beale criticizes the modes: 
The rhetorical lore, while it has no doubt served as vehicle for a 
great deal of productive pedagogy, has never had much theoretical 
cogency and has fostered from the beginning a number of 
debilitating confusions among form, strategy, and purpose 1n 
discourse. It has contributed virtually nothing to criticism, and 
it seems odd that teachers of literature should be primarily 
responsible for keeping alive for so long a particularly arid 
tradition of critical concepts. That tradition's preoccupation 
with form and style has tended to divorce rhetorical pedagogy from 
its vital intellectual and cultural moorings, even among teachers 
who have no interest in such a separation. (Pragmatic 4) 
Beale's theory plans to circumvent the Inadequate and sometimes harmful 
modes with 
a fully adequate rhetoric of the written word, a rhetoric that 
comprehends and builds upon the major kinds and situations of 
writing as determinants of form and style, capable of casting 
critical and historical light upon the various orders of 
nonfiction prose that thrive in the contemporary world. 
(Pragmatic 4) 
His disparagement of the modes, accurate as 1t is, does not square 
with his own pedagogy as advocated in his composition textbook Real 
Writing, which trains students to write three essay forms: 
deliberative, Informative, and reflective. This practice is evidently 
an example of the "great deal of productive pedagogy" sans "theoretical 
cogency" for which Beale credits the modes—pedagogy worthwhile for the 
35 
composition classroom, although it impoverishes the teaching and 
learning of literature with its "particularly arid tradition of critical 
concepts." Consequently, the composition classroom essay is deadlocked 
by form without meaning. How can, say, the "Scientific aim" (or the 
"informative essay") be anything other than form, given the a priori 
determinations that the writer intends to direct and control human 
activities; the reader will be a static audience; the context is frozen 
or nonexistent? How can the war eulogy as an instance of Performative 
discourse be analyzed for Its argument, given Its theoretical fixation 
as a performance void of thesis or information? Beale faults Burke's 
dramatistic theory for emphasizing "'action' itself" and credits his own 
semiotic theory for emphasizing "discourse itself" (56). In fact, his 
focus divorces deed from word rather than perceiving discourse and 
action dialogically, as Burke's does. Consequently it makes rhetorical 
theory a study of what Mikhail Bakhtin calls "the naked corpse of the 
word"—language stripped of its living context and intentionality (292) 
—a deadly image common to the structuralist Impulse. 
Beale would likely hear my questions and criticisms as a voice in 
the opposition argument to genre or discourse theory that he addresses 
in his book's introduction. "[T]here is a general impatience with 
generic studies," he acknowledges, "born of the feeling that they are at 
best inconclusive and at worst damaging to the comprehension and 
appreciation of individual works" (Pragmatic 7). He counters that 
even though theories of discourse acts may 'leak' even worse than 
grammars, some constructs are nevertheless clearly more adequate 
than others; the study can be conducted in a sensible and 
nonreductionist fashion, and it may have great intellectual and 
practical value. (Pragmatic 8) 
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While it is believable that some taxonomies could account for more 
discourse than others, it is unclear what "great intellectual and 
practical value" would come from the more thorough-going models. Beale 
points generally to the significance of language and its study, but he 
does not identify any particular benefit of language categorization: 
The human use of language is the center of the liberal arts, the 
starting point for our various understandings of reality, and the 
practical art on which the health of civilization depends. 
Because it affects the ways in which we view ourselves as 
individuals and as communities, and because it affects the way we 
teach the arts of language, we need the best rhetorical theory we 
can get. (Pragmatic 8) 
His argument speaks eloquently for excellence in rhetorical studies; 
however, his defense of genre or discourse theory does not demonstrate 
the ways in which a taxonomy is the best that rhetoricians can do. 
Genre theory is capable of working heuristically in the teaching 
and analysis of discourse although, as John M. Swales argues, rarely in 
the hands of a deductive taxonomist. Unlike the work of Kinneavy, which 
Swales criticizes as a "top-down" approach to language (42) and which I 
have noted is similar to Beale's, genre theorists such as Karlyn Kohrs 
Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson work inductively with a keen 
sensitivity to the text-context relationship (42-43). More recently, 
Carolyn R. Miller also aims "to illuminate rather than to classify" 
discourse (43). She articulates the pragmatic view that "a rhetorically 
sound definition of genre must be centered not on the substance or the 
form of discourse but on the action it is used to accomplish" (Miller 
"Genre" 151). Her theory of genre "suggests that what we learn when we 
learn a genre is not just a pattern of forms or even a method of 
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achieving our own ends. We learn, more Importantly, what ends we may 
have ..." (HUler "Genre" 165). In other words, writers and readers 
learn what communication can do within its contexts. Swales' research 
advances the heuristic power of genre thus conceived, and it anticipates 
that rhetoricians such as Jamieson, Campbell, and especially Miller 
"finally destroy the myth—or so [he] hope[s]—that genre analysis 
necessarily has something to do with constructing a classification of 
genres" (44). 
Overturning the theoretical necessity of taxonomy, Swales notes, 
would in turn dismantle unhelpful teaching practices associated with 
modes and aims of discourse that have dominated composition pedagogy: 
[G]enre remains a fuzzy concept, a somewhat loose term of art. 
Worse, especially in the US, genre has in recent years become 
associated with a disreputably formulaic way of constructing (or 
aiding the construction of) particular texts—a kind of writing or 
speaking by numbers. This association characterizes genre as mere 
mechanism, and hence is inimical to the enlightened and 
enlightening concept that language is ultimately a matter of 
choice. (33) 
A reduction of rhetorical choice to rhetoric-by-number, then, compounds 
the problems of classifications systems when they are put into 
practice.7 
Pragmatics as A-Ideology: Although he insists on his theory's 
pragmatics, Beale perceives its scope to be a-ideological. He likens 
his project to Burke's dramatism because they are both theories "of 
rhetorical substance without Ideological or psychological commitments" 
(Pragmatic 10). His system is "not in itself a construction of reality 
but an objective model for talking about human constructions of reality" 
in the same way that Burke in A Grammar of Motives envisions his pentad 
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as '"a philosopher's stone for the synopsis of writings that have sought 
the philosopher's stone'." What Burke intends with his pentad, however, 
is a speculative instrument for metadlscourse suitable for the Inductive 
work of rhetoricians, not a disavowal of ideology. Indeed, neither 
Burke nor Beale nor anyone would bother with rhetorical studies if they 
did not operate from some philosophical stance shaped by their conscious 
and subconscious ideologies. Beale's emphasis on the "what" rather than 
the "how" of discourse as well as his belief that an "objective" model 
is not in itself "a construction of reality" give him away. How can a 
theory that advocates "discourse itself" as the primary thing for 
rhetoricians to observe and that defends taxonomy as the primary way in 
which to interpret observations be anything but ideological? (Just as a 
theory privileging actions and similarities is undeniably ideological.) 
Beale is engaged in a mission for realism and empiricism with a theory 
that sets out to categorize "the achievements of creatures who are 
themselves contradictory, paradoxical" and to help said creatures 
maneuver through "the thicket of terminology" of a "very deep jungle, in 
which one can get quickly lost without proper instruments" (Pragmatic 
12). Echoing a New Critical rage for order, Beale's distancing from 
ideology is an ideologically-drenched stance. Or, as Lev Vygotsky puts 
it, "Deliberate avoidance of philosophy 1s Itself a philosophy" (41). 
Theoretical Self-Pestruction: Beale's theory threatens its own 
destruction in its efforts to at once account for all discourse and to 
revere Rhetorical discourse (and more particularly Deliberative 
Rhetorical discourse) as the superior use of language. Cruslus also 
notes this "tension between Beale's semiotic [structuralist] commitment 
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and his equally strong commitment to rhetoric as the central discourse 
aim" (58), observing that "his thesis about rhetoric cannot be 
extrapolated from his semlotic base, but constitutes a special argument 
that his semiotics can help to justify but not to generate" (59). As a 
fellow taxonomist, Crusius allows the inconsistency. "I suppose this 
makes his theory less tight and less pure, but rigor, for a healthy 
mind, is not an end in itself," he comments, adding further supposition 
that "[m]ost of us would rather be right than rigorous" (59). Crusius' 
willingness to let a taxonomist erect a system and then skew its 
principles widens the gap between theory and practice. What is given as 
inherent 1n discourse with one hand is taken away as exception with the 
other. Structuralism usually equates Tightness with rigor; Beale's 
theory intends to be right through its rigor. To suddenly choose one 
over the other provides an escape valve for the basic contradiction that 
threatens to explode Beale's theory. Over and over again, the wheel's 
symmetry is thrown out of round with privileging descriptions of the 
"rhetorical aim." Deliberative Rhetorical discourse, Beale claims, 1s 
"the basic, centripetal rhetorical genus"; it is "the one toward which 
the others gravitate" (Pragmatic 117, 120). Its parent Rhetorical 
category is the only discourse with a "dynamic and open-ended" audience; 
the only one that "comes into being as a direct response to context" 
(Pragmatic 101). In discussing the principle and value of "openness and 
centralitv" in Rhetorical discourse, his comments praise Rhetoric for 
its consistent moves "toward the common interests, the common 
capabilities, and the common norms and values of communities" (Pragmatic 
105). In the image of "Zeno's metaphor, the method of rhetoric is the 
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'open hand,' as opposed to the 'closed fist' of scientific 
demonstration." Moreover, Rhetorical discourse evidences 
a contextual 1st or ethical/pragmatic dimension of activity and 
consciousness, operating as a centripetal force, with 
predilections toward diversity, pluralism, balance, civility, and 
the recognition of limits. These are norms of rhetoric. . . . 
They are also norms of culture and of the liberal arts. . . . 
(Pragmatic 106) 
The merits of such a living, humane use of language imply a wish that 
the other categories were more like Rhetorical discourse. In his 
argument's concluding remarks, Beale admits that they are: 
Rhetoric 1s the least specialized art of discourse; it is in fact 
the central art of discourse, reflecting in Its own subsystem of 
alms all the larger aims (rhetorical, scientific, Instrumental, 
poetic). As such, rhetoric has a stake in all perspectives and 
all modes of discourse. The other aims of discourse are 
historical specializations which achieve success by restricting 
both scope and method. They are centrifugal forces, both of 
language and culture. Rhetoric is the centripetal force. 
(Pragmatic 163) 
This statement splinters the perfectly ordered world of language and 
reality constructed in Beale's theory and illustrated by its 
circumference of multiple quartets. If Deliberation is irresistible, 
then how do other categories keep in their places? What accounts for 
its irresistibility? How can the non-Rhetorical alms be "historical 
specializations" if they are universal in their frozen contexts and 
static audiences? If Rhetoric is staked in all discourse—1f it 1s the 
"centripetal force" of all language use—then why does it occupy only 
one quarter of Beale's model? Why is it not the center from which all 
discourse radiates? What keeps Beale's theory from explicitly 
acknowledging the rhetorical nature of all language use? Of what use is 
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rhetoric when it is contained as the abstracted Rhetorical discourse 
category? What would happen if Rhetorical values of "diversity, 
pluralism, balance, civility, and the recognition of limits" (Pragmatic 
106) also shaped Scientific, Instrumental, and Poetic categories, 
thereby opening all the hands of discourse? I believe with Walter Beale 
in the primacy of rhetoric. I also share his deep conviction to 
facilitate relationships between fellow human beings through language. 
His rhetorical theory, however, reduces rather than expands theoretical 
and practical ability to act on that commitment. 
Contrasting Rhetorics 
Whereas Burke's philosophy of language provides a way of looking 
at the world as shaped by language, Beale's rhetorical theory outlines 
the way the world looks after language has been shaped. Burke's 
dramatism studies words in action; Beale's semiotics stabilizes words as 
static objects. Burke's explanation of identification and addressedness 
reveal interaction between writers and readers; Beale's motivational 
axes limit the ways they may interact. Burke's concept of form and 
appeal illustrates persuasion as the essential similarity of all 
language use; Beale's Rhetorical discourse category treats rhetoric and 
its persuasion as something different from other language used. 
Persuasion, author-audience relation, occasion—indeed, all the shaping 
ingredients in language use—become things that should and do occur in 
some discourse but cannot or ought not occur in others. Therefore in 
Beale's theory, rhetoric occupies the awkward position of being at once 
the supreme form of discourse and the discursive form that poisons other 
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language use. Of their pragmatics, Burke's emphasizes consequences of 
language use; Beale's isolates language from consequence. 
These two approaches also set in motion different practices. 
Burke's theory provides the pentad, a heuristic for inquiry that works 
in any arena of speculation, especially as writers create and critique 
discourse. Beale's theory supplies the quadrad in which rhetorical 
criticism can Identify kinds of arguments and by which composition 
pedagogy can teach kinds of essays as ends for writing. The pentad uses 
the process of categorizing aspects of the motive in using language— 
Agent, Purpose, Agency, Scene, and Act—in order to go into the universe 
of discourse and describe relationships among these motivational 
elements. The quadrad, however, uses the products of categories— 
Scientific, Instrumental, Performative, and Rhetorical—1n order to 
bring discourse into its universe and define typification and variation 
among categories. The next step in practice with the pentad is to 
negotiate future relationships; for the quadrad, to prescribe future 
texts. Whereas the pentad is a speculative instrument for inquiry as I. 
A. Richards and Ann Berthoff envision heuristics, the quadrad is an 
example of the limits of traditional objectivism as uncovered by 
Lakoff's research. In my childhood analogy, Burke's theory encourages 
thinking about what people are doing with their buttons, whereas Beale's 
calls for decisions about which pile to put their buttons in. At best, 
Beale's theory provides a close study of one aspect of language use. To 
gaze on the "act" or "discourse itself" for long, however, puts 
rhetorical study at risk for failing to discover and understand answers 
to the question: "What is involved when we say what people are doing 
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and why they are doing 1t?" With the scope of Its focus, the pentad 
helps rhetoric and composition studies get farther along in tooling 
answers to that question. The choice of heuristics 1s an Important one. 
Burke's pentad also helps point out the contrast 1n theorizing 
rhetoric as all language use or as one use of language. For Burke, 
Agents—writers and readers—are real human beings inseparable from 
their words and each other; therefore, the word 1s human. For Beale, 
writers are detached from what they have done, and readers do not do 
anything; therefore, the word 1s a-human. Burke conceives of Agency and 
Purpose dialogically. The word appeal at once denotes by what means 
language appeals (Agency) and for what end it appeals (Purpose). Beale, 
on the other hand, opposes these terms in dichotomy with a resultant 
hierarchy of form over content. The dynamic, persuasive Purpose of all 
language inextricably weds meaning and consequence in Burke's project. 
Static and nonpersuasive words in Beale's represent discursive meaning 
as a-consequential. Language's Act and Scene—text and context—also 
are dialogical for Burke, but dichotomous for Beale in an Act/Scene 
hierarchy. Therefore, Burke's word is in the world; Beale's word is a-
worldly. 
Serious consequences, then, result from classification systems of 
language. As words are divided from each other Into so many categories, 
they ultimately become separated from humanity, from their own outcomes, 
and from the world. Once rhetoricians start dividing, 1t is hard to 
stop. The more we look for difference, the less we see similarity. The 
more we separate, the less we synthesize. The more we look at the 
little pictures, the less we see the big one. The more we categorize 
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discourse according to necessary and sufficient conditions, the more we 
separate writer from reader, meaning from consequence, form from 
content, text from context, word from deed. The more we taxonomize, the 
less we transform. 
The projects of Kenneth Burke and Walter Beale are representative 
of two fundamentally different approaches to rhetoric: Rhetoric as all 
language use and rhetoric as one use of language. Contemporary 
epideictic theory is deeply embedded in the taxonomist's point of view 
as it seeks to define the ways in which epideictic is different from 
other rhetoric and particularly from deliberative discourse. Chapter 
two examines the inaccurate and destructive outcomes of this choice as 
it is currently made in theories of what people are doing and why with 
their epideictic words. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONTEMPORARY EPIDEICTIC THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF MOTIVES 
From Categorizing to the Epideictic Category 
When we move from the meta-level of categorization to one category 
in particular—the epideictic category—what do we discover about 
epideictic writers and readers, meanings and consequences, forms and 
contents, texts and contexts, words and deeds? In answering this 
question, I mean to do something more than a "review of literature" as a 
traditional summary preceding main counter-argument. Epideictic 
theorists aim to define and differentiate this category of discourse 
from other discourses. My aim is to blur those categorical boundaries. 
Therefore, my argument in this chapter is its analysis of what 
rhetorical studies currently theorize about epideictic discourse. It is 
a study of the borders they draw around epideictic. 
Nobody, my research indicates, has conducted such an inquiry into 
contemporary epideictic theory, although a resurgence of interest in 
epideictic over the past decade has created a small but vigorous cottage 
industry. Contemporary epideictic theorists cite modern predecessors 
with near uniformity, emphasizing the work most supportive of their own. 
They always locate their arguments according to degree of Aristotelian 
proximity, yet they rarely take into account other contemporaneous 
scholarship. A colleague might be cited here and there, but no 
rhetorician has composed the large view of what rhetorical theory 
currently construes for epideictic practice. Several arguments have 
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been published nearly simultaneously, which would have impeded their 
mutual evaluation. Occasionally, however, references erroneously 
represent the current state of epideictic affairs. Scott Cons1gnyf for 
instance, characterizes R. C. Jebb's 1876 study of ancient funeral 
orators as the work of one of our "modern scholars" (283), and he cites 
Richard Chase's 1961 classical argument 1n order to support the 
conclusion that "[m]ost scholars accept [a] construal of the epideictic 
as a display of skill" (295). The inaccuracy of these statements 
suggests that rhetorical theory is not Investigating closely enough its 
current hypothesizing. If epideictic is as important to human beings' 
lives as these theorists argue, and I agree with them that 1t 1s, then 
rhetorical theory needs to understand where it currently aims epideictic 
practice. As Ann Berthoff often reminds, how we construe 1s how we 
construct (Making 10). 
I employ Burke's pentad to conduct this analysis of contemporary 
epideictic theory, and the eight scholars whose theories I investigate 
are Bernard K. Duffy, Celeste Michelle Condit, Takis Poulakos, Jeffrey 
Walker, Michael P. Sipiora, Michael F. Carter, Scott Consigny, and Dale 
L. Sullivan. All of these rhetoricians have published work on 
epideictic since 1983. Before further explanation of this analytical 
method and scholarly grouping, however, a cryptic historical summary of 
epideictic followed by a fuller explication of modern theories is 
necessary in order to provide the theoretical context from which 
contemporary epideictic evolves. 
From Classical to Modern Epideictic: Aristotle's triad of 
discourse—deliberative, forensic, and epideictic—as chapter one 
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Indicates, 1s the most widely known and Influential of discourse 
taxonomies. Its definitions are attractively parallel: Deliberative 
discourse argues about what should happen 1n the future, as politicians 
make policy; forensic discourse argues about what happened in the past, 
as lawyers prove crimes were or were not committed; ep1de1ct1c discourse 
argues about what is happening 1n the present, as eulogists praise 
persons being burled. The verb "to argue" does not fit quite as well 
with epideictic as it does with deliberative or forensic, as these 
simple, 1-2-3 definitions Indicate. It 1s harder, evidently, to imagine 
how rhetors "argue" about what is happening right now, as opposed to 
what has or will happen—especially when 1t 1s about something as 
seemingly inarguable as eulogizing the dead. "What's to argue?" one 
might ask. "Where's the need for a writer's persuasion or a reader's 
deliberation?" Aristotle's rhetorical treatise does not provide a clear 
answer. His descriptions of epideictic contradict themselves. It is 
discourse for the present; it is discourse for the future. It does not 
aim to persuade its audience; it aims to persuade its audience to future 
action. The audience observes the discourse; the audience judges the 
discourse.8 Despite its slipperiness (or maybe because of 1t) 
epideictic has fallen 1n and out of the rhetorical limelight across the 
centuries from classical to modern rhetorical theory. It pervaded the 
pedagogy of the Romans, embodied the didacticism of the Renaissance, 
suffered intentional neglect during the scientism of the Enlightenment, 
recouped partial favor amid America's nineteenth century romanticism, 
and sustained the disdain of twentieth-century empirical objectivism. 
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Epideictic's current renaissance 1s Influenced by postmodern 
constructivism and Interdisciplinary studies.9 
During the first half of the twentieth century, epldeictlc did not -
greatly exercise rhetorical study.10 The standard contemporary content 
endnote pays primary attention to four theories advanced 1n the 1960s 
and 1970s by Chaim Perelman, Walter H. Beale, Christine Oravec, and 
Lawrence Rosenfield. Each of these theories alms to recover epidelctic 
from its inferior status among other categories of discourse. 
Of these four dominant theories, Perelman's is most often cited. 
His argument centers on epldeictlc function. This discourse should 
sustain a culture's "universal" values that have been pre-determ1ned 1n 
other, deliberative discourse through "rational argumentation" 
("Rhetoric" 134). Epldeictlc texts are radically nonpersuaslve because 
they "deal with topics which are not an object of controversy to [their] 
audiences" (New 52). Likewise, they are nondeliberate because "it 1s 
Improper [for readers] to pose questions, to raise doubts, to ask for 
explications, or to rebel" about the values laden 1n them ("Rhetoric" 
132). Equating an epldeictlc orator with an educator, Perelraan 
constructs the writer-reader::teacher-student relationship in this way: 
Since what he [the writer or teacher] is going to say does not 
arouse controversy, since no immediate practical interest is ever 
Involved, and there 1s no question of attacking or defending, but 
simply of promoting values that are shared 1n the community, the 
speaker, though he 1s assured 1n advance of the goodwill of his 
audience, must nevertheless have a high reputation. (New 52) 
Through a writer's ethos and a reader's silence, then, epldeictlc 
maintains shared values. Contemporary theories often emphasize values 
as universally shared in epideictic in a way that excludes differences 
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among writers and readers and also transcends their particular contexts. 
Employing Perelman's paired notions of an absence of controversy and a 
presence of pre-deliberated values, these theories share his vision of 
epideictic as a curative discourse for Its society's moral and ethical 
111s.11 
Beale defines epideictic through the lens of J. L. Austin's speech 
act theory, although he builds on the constat1ve/performat1ve speech act 
categories (language that describes/language that does) that Austin 
himself abandoned as he moved toward a philosophy of all language as 
doing. Epideictic, according to Beale, is the "performance of or 
participation 1n an action" rather than discourse designed to "maintain 
or argue something about the world of action" ("Rhetorical" 225-26). It 
is the Rhetorical Performative discourse of his large theoretical 
project. There are four sub-categories of epideictic performance 
("celebrative," "suasory," "instructive", and "experiential") each of 
which presents cultural dogma. For instance, in experiential 
epideictic, its "points of Interpretation and reflection are suggested 
and controlled by the established concepts and traditions of a 
particular community" (Pragmatic 146). The three defining features for 
sorting an epideictic text into one of these sub-categories are its type 
of illocutionary act, choosing from among five kinds of performative 
speech acts ("Rhetorical" 235); its "setting," of which there are three 
("Rhetorical" 239); and its "origin," choosing from a "tentative 
typology" of four orators ("Rhetorical" 241). The significance of the 
multiple combinations that these features and categories elicit 1s not 
explained. Like Perelman, Beale treats epideictic as a genre of 
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reaffirmation rather than persuasion because it "has the effect of 
intensifying or reaffirming propositions rather than of establishing 
them" (Pragmatic 142). Theorizing epldeictic as discourse that 
"participates in the reality to which it refers" ("Rhetorical" 226) 
cements these "propositions" in the present and renders their reality 
unchangeable. Several contemporary theorists cite Beale in order to 
justify similarly a de-emphas1s on future action and an elevation of 
ceremony in epldeictic. 
Christine Oravec studies the function of the epldeictic audience, 
arguing that rhetorical studies have not completely understood what 
Aristotle means by "observation." Emphasizing his comments about a 
listener's judgment, she argues that epldeictic 1s "a genre which 
includes the functions of judgment and education" that require 
"comprehension as well as the perception of theatrical display" (163). 
In studying readers at all, Oravec's theory was innovative at the time 
of its writing. The "comprehension" and "perception" it assigns 
readers, however, turn out to be a small job with a meager lesson. 
Summarizing the process of observation, notably from the writer's rather 
than reader's point of view, Oravec concludes: 
Thus the rhetor receives common values and experiences from his 
audience and, by reshaping them in artistic language, returns 
these experiences heightened and renewed. The process of 
'observation' which begins with perception and functions through 
judgment finally ends in heightened appreciation and Intellectual 
insight. (171) 
As appreciators, then, readers becomes judges of a writer's display 
skills, or the performance of Beale's epldeictic. Their "intellectual 
insight" is a recognition of that-which-they-already-have-seen, now 
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viewed through the rhetor's linguistic magnifying glass. This 
epideictic reader pales alongside a construct1vist concept of meaning-
making. Nevertheless, contemporary theorists who argue for a 
deliberative quality in epideictic or who counter criticism of 
epideictic as writer-centered discourse often cite Oravec's work. 
Finally, of the four theories that dominate modern epideictic, 
Lawrence Rosenfield's argument treats epideictic as the occasion for 
"beholding reality impartially as witness of Being" (133). In order to 
participate in "beholding," a reader acknowledges, then appreciates, and 
finally understands the "radiance" of the occasion's reality or Being as 
represented by the writer (133). This theory contrasts understanding 
and cognition. Understanding engages celebration, emphasizes what 1s, 
and develops from Internal experience. Cognition, on the other hand, 
engages thought, emphasizes what was and/or might be, and develops from 
external data (148-50). Unlike cognitive acts of mind which "act on the 
world" (148), epideictic beholding is an act of understanding that 
"annihilates the dimensions of time and space themselves, and thereby 
demolishes the commonsense foundations needed for judgment" (149). Thus 
Rosenfield's theory divorces epideictic from deliberation, emotion from 
reason, and the present from the past and future. These awesome moments 
of transcendental commemoration make epideictic a rarefied genre, a 
construct invoked by contemporary theories working toward an epideictic 
of the Ideal. 
From Modern to Contemporary Epideictic: The modern epideictic 
theories of Perelman, Beale, Oravec, and Rosenfield differentiate 
epideictic from other discourse in several ways. Epideictic is 
52 
nonpersuasive, nondellberatlve discourse because writers and readers 
unquestionably share the values presented through ep1de1ct1c language. 
A writer does not need to persuade because a reader will not deliberate. 
Rather, epideictic writers display or perform values, while epldeictlc 
readers appreciate them with emotion sans reason. Epideictic contexts 
are universal, although what happens 1n their present occasions does not 
affect future ones, unlike the categories of forensic or deliberative 
discourse. The resultant rhetorical situation is replete with 
hierarchies: writer/reader, meaning/consequence, form/content, and 
text/context. These power struggles persist 1n contemporary epideictic 
theory. 
In current rhetorical criticism, arguments commonly posit a 
definition of epideictic and then apply 1t for analysis of a particular 
text.12 In his discussion of Renaissance epic and epideictic, Brian 
Vickers makes a convincing case for interpreting epideictic practice 
according to epideictic theory in the air at the time of the discourse's 
writing. Conversely, other critics mix-and-match, employing a modern 
epideictic theory in order to interpret an ancient epideictic text, or 
vice-versa. 
Whatever the case, while rhetorical critics posit theories through 
which they interpret texts, rhetorical theorists revise the epideictic 
theories that can be posited. Since the early 1980s, eight scholars 
have asserted an epideictic theory. Listed in publication chronology, 
they are: Bernard K. Duffy (1983), Celeste Michelle Condlt (1985), 
Takis Poulakos (1987, 1988), Jeffrey Walker (1989), Michael P. Slpiora 
(1991), Michael F. Carter (1991), Scott Conslgny (1992), and Dale L. 
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Sullivan (1988, 1991-93).13 It 1s possible that one or more of these 
rhetoricians might not perceive their work as an evolution of epldelctic 
theory. Jeffrey Walker's study, for instance, clearly is one about 
lyric poetry. In the process of making his case for the lyric as 
argument, however, he asserts an epldelctic different from earlier 
theories that separate epldelctic and argumentation. Therefore, he 
presents an epideictic theory that other critics can posit in their 
rhetorical analyses. In one way or another, all eight discussions 
revise Aristotle's hand-me-down category and explain the things people 
do with language—things that just will not squeeze into the forensic 
and deliberative categories, yet often slip out of the epideictic niche. 
Testing their epideictic theories with analyses of texts ranging from 
Plato's dialogues to C. S. Lewis' children's literature, these scholars 
aim to persuade rhetorical studies of epldeictlc's usefulness for a 
much-needed shoring up of late twentieth-century values. 
An Analysis of Motives 
What does contemporary epideictic theory say is Involved when 
writers and readers are "doing" epideictic and why they are doing it? 
The question springs, of course, from Burke's master query about all 
language use: "What is Involved when we say what people are doing and 
why they are doing it?" (Grammar xv). The logical heuristic for 
answering the question 1s the Burkean pentad, described earlier 1n 
chapter one. This speculative instrument illuminates relationships 
among epideictic's Act (what), Agent (who), Purpose (why), Agency (how), 
and Scene (when and where) as they are constructed in contemporary 
epideictic theory. Unlike the taxonomist's fixation on the Act or text 
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itself, the pentad requires rhetorical theory to see the text 1n 
relationship with the other elements involved in Its motivation or 
creation or "doing." The text is not the whole epideictic occasion; it 
is part of it. Chapter two's analysis of motives, as Burke would call 
it, of contemporary epideictic theory begins with the Agent-Act 
relationship. This first pair requires the greatest detail in part 
because 1t begins the analysis, but more Importantly because it 
investigates the human relations of writers and readers, which is a 
primary concern of this project. 
Agent-Act: Who is doing what 1n epideictic? According to eight 
contemporary theories and the weight of rhetorical theory's history that 
they bear, the epideictic Agent is the writer or the orator of the 
discourse. The Agent is riot the reader or listener of the discourse. 
Not just any writer-Agent can do epideictic; neither can an Agent do 
just any epideictic Act. Epideictic writers must be authoritative, 
powerful, intelligent, wise, and eloquent because their Acts are to 
instruct, define, shape, display, lead with beliefs and/or memories, 
reflect, generate knowledge, build community, and model celebration. 
Epideictic readers, on the other hand, must be subservient, Impotent, 
uneducated, naive, and silent because they receive Acts. They are to be 
instructed, accept the ways 1n which writers define and shape meaning, 
be captivated by their rhetoric, follow writers' beliefs and/or 
memories, gaze at the writer's reflections, be Imbued with knowledge, be 
encapsuled in the writer's community, and learn what invokes permissible 
celebration. Whereas the writer 1s the subject, the reader 1s the 
object of the Act. Meaning is not negotiated between writer and reader 
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as co-Agents. It 1s handed down from writer to reader; reader 1n turn 
1s thankful for what he or she has received. Ep1de1ct1c writers do to 
epideictic readers; they do not do with each other through a text. The 
more complete question 1n analyzing the relationship between epideictic 
Agent and Act, then, 1s "Who is doing what to whom?" 
Condit's theory illustrates well the subject/object relationship 
between epideictic writers and readers. Her argument 1s probably the 
most often cited contemporary concept because of its organization of 
several Acts under the rubric of epideictic as the "speech of communal 
definition" (284). Three pairs of "functions" or Acts, she argues, 
occur in epideictic; the paradigmatic text would Incorporate all three. 
Although each pair assigns the writer and reader their respective Acts, 
the writer 1s always the superior Agent doing something for or to the 
inferior reader. In the Acts of "definition/understanding," which occur 
when a community is troubled by an event, the writer has the "right" and 
"power" to define what has happened, and the reader receives "a sense of 
comfort" (288). Quite similar to "definition/understanding," the Acts 
can be "shaping/sharing," in which the writer gives meaning to a 
particular change and its effects on the community, and the reader then 
accepts that rendition (289). Emphasizing rhetorical form, the third 
pair of functions 1s "display/entertainment," 1n which the writer 
demonstrates eloquence and the reader 1s pleased (240). In defining 
"shaping/sharing," Condit warns about the potential inequity for the 
reader in these pairs of Agent-Acts: 
Definitions of community are often advanced by contrast with 
'others' outside of the community. Hence, a sharing of community 
may not include all individuals who, territorially, might live 
within the boundaries of the community. In giving a speaker the 
56 
right to shape the definition of the community, the audience gives 
the speaker the right to select certain values, stories, and 
persons from the shared heritage and to promote them over others. 
Such a selection implies exclusion and there will never be 
complete unity about the values selected, or about how those 
values might be applied. (289) 
In the face of this disagreement about communal values, Condit 
nevertheless enfolds her definition of epldeictlc 1n the absence of 
controversy, arguing: 
[T]he promotion of individual values in the abstract is generally 
seen to be noncontrovers1al because we are trained to accept a 
wide range of values, and to see conflicts only in their 
relationship to each other and to specific decisions (only the 
ideologically aware might object to praise of 'order' or 'family' 
or 'tolerance'). Consequently, there 1s usually no overt conflict 
of ideas and values internal to an epideictic speech. (289-90) 
If a reader should actually disagree, the consequence would be "a sense 
of [the reader's] alienation from the community," making the 
shaping/sharing function "not-ent1rely-benign" (290). Condlt 
understates the problems created by privileging abstract agreement over 
particular disagreement. To carry her "benign" medical metaphor 
further, she describes the epldeictlc Act as one of excising the 
reader's deliberation and then of discarding it as disease somewhere on 
the margins of the community. The theory does not treat the 
consequences of this extraction of a reader's willing ability to raise 
questions about the ideologies of his or her community's values. 
Instead, it blames readers for putting the scalpel in the writer's hand. 
In a refutation of epideictic as a writer's "propaganda," Condit 
concludes: 
The constraints of the audience's needs, its willingness to call 
for a speaker and to listen, its demands that the orator speak for 
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all the people and use the people's values and heritage place 
powerful limits on how far the speaker can take the audience, and 
how events can be explained. (297) 
Given its acknowledgement that epideictic writer-Agents do not speak for 
all their community's members, this theory fabricates a reader co-Agent 
who does not really exist. 
Sullivan, who has published the largest number of arguments on 
epideictic, characterizes the writer who is capable of being an 
epideictic Agent. This rhetor's ethos arises from four major qualities. 
"Authority," meaning the reputation that the rhetor brings to the 
epideictic occasion, enables him to speak from experience and with a 
spaciousness allowing more assumption than proof (Rhetoric 129-32). 
"Vision," an ability to see more than his audience, arises from his 
genius and inspiration (Rhetoric 132-35). "Presentation of good 
reasons" is a key marker of this rhetor's discourse. Although 
epideictic writer-Agents, like teachers, "may have the authority simply 
to tell students [or readers] the way things are," these authorities 
"choose instead to support generalizations with good reasons out of 
respect for the students' rationality" ("Ethos" 125). They also 
recognize logos as a dominant value in Western culture, which makes them 
smart enough to treat assent as if it were reasoned assent (Rhetoric 
135-37). "Creation of consubstantiality" is the power through which the 
epideictic writer "enfolds participants" into his or her ethos ("Ethos" 
114). 
If this authoritative, visionary, reasoned, creator of unity 
sounds like quite a match for an epideictic reader, he 1s. Although 
Sullivan, like Condit, purports to construct a "collaboration between 
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the author and the reader" (Rhetoric 165), real negotiation of meaning 
1s inhibited by the theoretical expectation of reader's agreement. For 
Instance, in countering concerns that epideictlc is authoritarian, 
Sullivan argues: "[T]hough epideictlc may appear authoritarian when 
viewed by someone who does not share the values being lauded, the 
participants view it rather as a form of communion" (Rhetoric 77). This 
response seems strange for a theorist who alms to cure the problems of 
the Western world by strengthening universal values. How can an 
attitude of "It's only authoritarian if you don't agree" create unity? 
This question does not surface in Sullivan's project because the 
corollary to expectation of agreement is, of course, no expectation of 
disagreement. "The audience," Sullivan argues, "brings to the discourse 
a willingness to accept the speaker's assertions because of the 
speaker's generally perceived ethos" and because they celebrate "the 
same vision of reality" ("Ethos" 123, 128). 
An anti-theory, anti-reader-response stance further denies the 
reader the status of Agent who interprets meaning. Arguing that readers 
should read from the "author's framework, rather than some critical 
perspective from the outside" (Rhetoric 159), Sullivan quotes C. S. 
Lewis, whose The Chronicles of Narnia he analyzes as epideictlc: 
"'When we 'receive' it [the text] we exert our senses and imagination 
and various other powers according to a pattern invented by the artist. 
When we 'use' it we treat 1t as assistance for our own activities'" 
(Rhetoric 162). To be caught "using" rather than "receiving" a text's 
meaning 1s to commit the crime of "misreading" (Rhetoric 161). The 
reader is demeaned for having any pragmatic aim. A footnoted disclaimer 
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that epidelctic can be both a rhetoric of "unvellment" (which uncovers 
the meaning 1n reality) and a rhetoric of "adornment" (which adorns 
reality by creating meaning) 1s overridden by a privileging of 
unveilment through the words of Rosenfield: "'The epideictlc rhetor 
lets reality reveal (aletheia) Itself, so that the audience may behold 
the 'radiance of Being' and be overcome with joy (thaumadzein)'" 
("Epideictlc" 342). Epideictlc is the "rhetoric of orthodoxies" through 
which values and beliefs are transferred from writer to reader (Rhetoric 
232, "Ethos" 117). 
This power of writer over reader is illustrated in a variety of 
epideictic occasions. In children's literature, epidelctic "attempts to 
inculcate time-proven values" (Rhetoric 78, my emphasis). In public 
ceremony unlike pragmatic discourse, it "create[s] consensus at a deeper 
level by reinforicina [sic]—through celebration—the common assumptions 
and values of the culture (Rhetoric 79, my emphasis). The verbs that I 
have underlined ("to inculcate" and "to reinforce") connote the clearly 
hierarchical and potentially violent relationship that his theory 
creates between writers and readers. Children must agree to be 
instilled; adults to be forced again. Whereas in children's literature 
and public ceremony Sullivan's theory admits a persuasive writer, 1n 
arguments about rhetorical criticism and scientific experimentation 1t 
reverts to nonpersuasive, nondeliberative epidelctic. Rhetorical 
criticism is a praise-or-blame genre in which a critic "is able to 
engage in criticism only when he thinks his view of reality is closer to 
the Totality than 1s the view of his opponents" ("Epideictlc" 344). 
Sullivan calls his own argument an "act of celebration" of the 
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ritualistic display whereby critics engage in "battle" for "power" to 
shape academla ("Epideictlc" 345, 346). In contrast to this agonistic 
relationship, the reader of scientific experimentation 1s Impotent. 
Science reports its results demonstratively, in a way that "transforms 
the audience from critics into witnesses" who are "spectators rather 
than judges" ("Science" 238). If these witnesses are students of their 
teachers' experiments, they are not allowed to think until they have 
been duly inculcated into dominant scientific discourse. "[C]rit1cal 
thought is considered legitimate only after the student has been 
initiated into the tradition," accomplished once "the teacher 
establishes the authority of the present orthodoxy, makes use of praise 
and blame in various forms of criticism, creates an apprenticeship, and 
teaches uniformity of methods" ("Science" 237). In Sullivan's theory, 
then, rhetorical critics are encouraged to "Enjoy the battle," and 
scientists are told "Think when and as I say think." Readers of 
children's literature and public ceremony are similarly advised, "Don't 
change a thing." 
The theories of Duffy, Sipiora, Walker, and Carter also construct 
writers as Agents and readers as non-Agents at the receiving end of 
others' Acts. Duffy and Sipiora's theories assume that readers will 
agree with everything they hear. Duffy's funeral orator, for instance, 
"reviews and celebrates the history of actions and commitments with 
which the current generation 1s to be imbued [by] the instilling of 
philosophically correct values" in a discourse that 1s "uncontroversial" 
(79, 85). This speaker has unchecked power to Inscribe his listeners 
because the definitional absence of controversy erases the possibility 
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of disagreement. The ep1de1ct1c Act for Duffy, then, is a one-way move: 
"It cannot take the place of dialectic as a means of arriving at truth" 
(89). Siplora's discussion of ep1de1ct1c as a powerful mode of 
"meditative reflection" (251) vacillates among three definitions of the 
reader: observer (240), observer and judge (246), or judge, but only 
toward the end of "an increased adherence to commonly held values" 
(248). If the reader is persuaded by the writer's representation of the 
moment occasioning the discourse, then the reader may share in that 
moment. Slpiora's theory, like Duffy's, does not account for a reader 
who judges unfavorably. 
Walker's theory more overtly relegates the epidelctic reader to 
the status of passive object. Making his case for lyric poetry as 
"discursive argument in verse" through his concept of epidelctic, he 
claims to construe writer and reader as co-Agents (17). He argues 
forcefully for poets as writer-Agents who are "singers of arguments" 
(11). His reader-Agent, however, is less convincing. For Instance, 
Walker criticizes Charles Bernstein's recent discussion of poetics as 
rhetoric (Walker's own argument generally) because 1t describes poetry 
as "call[ing] upon the reader to be actively involved in the process of 
constituting its meaning'" (21). He disparages Bernstein's Idea of a 
reader as an "Emerson with a veneer of Marxist and modern/postmodern 
literary theory" (21). 
Carter's work, through the lens of anthropology, defines 
epidelctic as "ritual" (211). It foregrounds appeals to pathos at the 
expense of critical thinking in order to re-state other contemporary 
definitions of its Acts: It generates knowledge, constitutes community, 
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and educates its participants (213). When, for example, 1n a war eulogy 
such as Plato's Menexenus. words come from the mouths of dead warriors 
to the ears of living children exhorting them "to live up to and even 
surpass those [warriors'] reputations and pass them on to their 
children," these words exemplify epldelctic's "powerful pedagogy" (229, 
230). The lesson of this emotional exhortation, which Carter describes 
as "extraordinary knowledge that extends beyond logic—and beyond the 
deliberate falsifications of history" (223) is the perpetuation of these 
same non-reasoned Acts 1n the future. Carter shuts down critical 
thinking as Walker shuts out writer-reader collaboration, then, with 
their Agent-Acts. 
Unlike the Agent-Acts in these six theories, Foulakos and Consigny 
construct reader-Agents who actually deliberate about that which writer-
Agents attempt to persuade them of. These readers and their 
deliberative Acts, however, have serious restrictions. 
Poulakos' theory is, as I read it, the most exciting and 
innovative of contemporary epideictlc theories because 1t recognizes 
epideictic as an occasion for deliberation—a concept, as he notes, 
largely ignored by rhetorical theory: 
Typically, generic analyses of a work made up of various forms 
credit epideictlc formal elements with the general persuasive 
function of unifying auditors. But the rhetorical mission to move 
audiences to a place they are not, or to propel them toward a 
specific course of action, is still attributed to the deliberative 
elements of the work under consideration. What rhetorical mission 
epideictic can accomplish by means of its own formal texture, 
rather than its combination with other forms, 1s not considered. 
As a result, the potential of epideictic discourse to constitute 
the social 1s limited to a realm devoid of practical action, a 
realm where general standards of knowledge and belief-systems are 
communicated. ("Towards" 148) 
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In his analysis of Evagoras. Poulakos discerns two Acts in the two 
formal elements of Isocrates' eulogy ("Towards" 153). In the text's 
epalnos (praise of character), Isocrates praises the deceased Evagoras, 
an Act that represents an elitist society's creation of hierarchy among 
its more and less praiseworthy members. In the encomium (praise of 
accomplishments), Isocrates persuades Nicocles, Evagoras' son, to study 
philosophy 1n order to govern wisely. This Act, contrary to the elitist 
praise, represents an egalitarian society's advocacy of education for 
political purposes. This pair of Acts, then, provides both a criticism 
of and a Utopian alternative to the "socioeconomic relations that 
prevailed in the Athenian society during the early part of the fourth 
century B.C." ("Towards" 153). Isocrates the writer-Agent does not 
transform this critical/utoplan opposition, Poulakos insists. Such 
transformation is the reader's Act, which at first glance looks very 
good for re-dressing discourse that historically has marginalized the 
reader as Agent. It is not, however, the deliberation and 
interpretation of the real, present epideictic reader that Poulakos 
theorizes. Co-Agent status belongs instead to the potential, future 
epideictic critic with the following advice: 
When cultural artifacts are interpreted as sites of social 
conflict over affirmation or challenge of existing structures of 
social relations, interpretation becomes a political gesture. It 
designates, that 1s, a realm hospitable to debates and disputes 
among the participants of our own society over valuations and 
beliefs. Making social relations an object of human 
consciousness, and therefore an object of potential 
transformation, interpretive experience [the critic's] enhances 
our understanding of values as things about which we [critics] 
must deliberate. In this manner, 1nterpreta1on [sic] 1s put in 
the service of creating a democratically secure space for conflict 
and a debate among participants regarding the values, alms, and 
aspirations each proposes for our own society. ("Towards" 161) 
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This statement asserts the sociopolitical aim of much postmodern 
criticism. It fails, however, to extend this aim to readers living in 
the Scenes of their culture's epideictic discourse. By theorizing an 
epideictic critic but not an epideictic reader. Poulakos as academic 
intellectual enacts the very elitism he critiques. His argument that 
epideictic critics should deliberate in order to re-th1nk and literally 
re-vise the values to which they are being persuaded—in short, to be 
political—is just as important an Act, and certainly a more timely one, 
for the intended epideictic reader-Agent. 
If Poulakos' prescriptive for Nlcocles is any Indication, this 
theory implies a weak intended epideictic reader. According to 
Poulakos, Nicocles should be persuaded of the writer Isocrates' 
egalitarian argument. Therefore, he must "suspend his own prejudices 
and bracket his own desires. To enter into dialogue with the past world 
of his father, he must first suspend his world" ("Isocrates" 325). How 
a reader imprisons his own world view, and how a son divorces himself 
from his father's world, and what happens if and when he removes the 
brackets are issues that remain unexplained for Poulakos' epideictic 
reader. This bracketed reader sounds very much like the reader in 
Condit's theory who represses ideological awareness and acquiesces to 
the will of the writer-Agent under the pretense of noncontroversy. 
Whereas Poulakos limits the epideictic reader-Agent to future 
generations' academic intelligentsia, Consigny narrows the reader's Acts 
to either the vapid work of judging "rhetorical skill" (281) or to 
nondeliberated compliance with the writer's "deception" (287). The 
theory and practice of Consigny's epideictic do not inform one another. 
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Theoretically, and according to Gorgias, he defines epideictic as 
"'display' rhetoric ... a genre devised expressly to display 
rhetorical skill" (281-82). The writer and reader are reciprocal Agents 
as the rhetor who "displays his rhetorical skill" and the audience 
members who "observe and judge that skill" (281). In other words, 
epideictic is rhetoric for rhetoric's sake. It is different from 
"pragmatic rhetoric," a term synonymous with persuasion: 
Whereas the pragmatic rhetor is constrained by a practical 
exigence, the epideictic rhetor is [] at liberty to advocate any 
position whatsoever, regardless of how frivolous, as long as it 
affords him an opportunity to exhibit his rhetorical prowess. 
(281) 
Consigny analyzes Gorgias' four major extant orations in order to 
re-dress critical judgments of the Sophist's failure to live up to his 
own definition of epideictic. Gorgias, he argues, turns his epideictic 
occasions Into pragmatic opportunities for instructing his audiences 
about the deceptive, relativistic nature of rhetoric. "By showing his 
audiences how they are being deceived by his own arguments," Consigny 
concludes, "Gorgias's epideictic orations are in this sense parodlc 
'imitations' of pragmatic rhetoric, wherein he playfully depicts the 
strategies of adaptation and deception" (292). Although Consigny proves 
here that epideictic is pragmatic in the Gorgian corpus, not its 
antithesis—indeed it is argument about argument itself—he never loops 
back to his and Gorgias' definition of epideictic as "display" 1n order 
to investigate what theoretical revisions his analysis calls for. In 
practice, Gorgian epideictic 1s clearly more than display, and it 
illustrates the inaccuracy of the "epideictic rhetoric" and "pragmatic 
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rhetoric" (or "persuasive" rhetoric) categories on which Consigny's 
theory depends. 
Even 1f Consigny were to re-defina ep1de1ct1c 1n light of his 
textual analyses, the Agent-Act he points to in Gorglan pragmatic 
rhetoric would not permit a negotiation of meaning between writer and 
reader co-Agents. By definition their relationship 1s agonistic: "The 
essence of Gorglan rhetoric [is] a struggle for domination or victory 
over one's adversary" (286). The writer's Act 1s to deceive the reader 
into believing that her version of "truth" is the version of truth. 
Furthermore, the reader is encouraged to be "deceived" by the writer's 
version in order to show his own open-mindedness to points of view other 
than his own (292-93). Thus Gorgias "exposes" rhetorical manipulation, 
but then advises readers to be manipulated. 
In the end, Consigny's theory routs epldelctic with determinism as 
Poulakos' marks it with elitism. Their theories promise more but 
deliver as little for epidelctlc writers and readers as do Condlt's 
communal definition, Sullivan's rhetoric of orthodoxies, Duffy's 
philosophical correctness, Sipiora's mental reflection, Walker's lyrical 
force, and Carter's transcendental emotion. In all eight formulations, 
the Agent-Act is a power struggle of writer's persuasion over reader's 
deliberation in which meaning is not negotiated and the writer always 
wins. Given the pre-determlned outcome for the reader's response—full 
assent to the writer's argument—persuasion seems a misnomer or a false 
image for the writer's Act. Coercion would be a more accurate term for 
such a propagandized discourse. Furthermore, the reader's absence of a 
deliberative Act also is an Inaccurate construct. Studies in cognition 
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prove the impossibility of keeping a reader from making meaning. Frank 
Smith's research explains reading as an Act characterized as purposeful, 
selective, anticipatory behavior that 1s based on comprehension arrived 
at through prediction-making and grounded in the reader's prior 
knowledge of the world. In this way, reading 1s congruous to any other 
Act of thinking (the introduction and first chapter of Understanding 
Reading develop this explanation). The harm 1n enacting a hierarchical 
writer/reader relationship manifests itself in two primary ways—as a 
violation of the reader as meaning-maker and 1n the potential violence 
with which oppressed readers might retaliate. Smith also critiques the 
damaging results to literacy programs that Inaccurate theories of 
reading produce. 
Purpose-Act: According to these contemporary theories, what is 
the relationship between the Act as meaning and Purpose as consequence? 
Why do Agents enact or "do" epideictic? They do it, in a nutshell, 
either to avoid change or to invite it. The clue to discovering which 
of these Purposes an epideictic theory embraces lies in its concept of 
the reader. If the reader 1s a nondellberatlve, passive object (a 
recipient, an agreer, a receptacle of values and beliefs) while the 
writer 1s a persuasive, active subject (a giver, an arguer, a depositor 
of values and beliefs), then the Purpose of epideictic discourse is to 
avoid change. As the analysis of Agent-Act Implies, epideictic Purpose 
for the majority of contemporary theories is the avoidance of change. 
This static aim is encapsuled in the goal of maintaining tradition—the 
beliefs, morals, ethics, philosophies, and ideals valued by culture, 
society, world. 
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Condlt's epidelctlc maintains tradition as Its participants seek 
occasions "for expressing and reformulating [their] shared heritage" 
(289). In a discourse in which nobody disagrees (or 1s allowed to 
express disagreement), this reformulation concocts the same old formula. 
With no innovating perspectives informing these noncontroversial 
occasions, with what would writers and readers develop anything new? In 
fact, this theory does not aim for discovery because epidelctic works 
"to maintain community values (a conservative function perhaps)" (297). 
The second Purpose assigned to epidelctlc appears at first glance 
dynamic—"to accomplish the progressive function of adapting our 
community to new times, technologies, geographies, and events" (297). 
Scene rather than Purpose, however, commands the change here as people 
react to their changing world rather than create its change. Agents 
"explain a social world" (288), working as spin doctors who gloss the 
changes for anyone who wants or needs to participate 1n reactions to 
them. Given the obligation to maintain tradition, epideictic readers 
can expect the same old stories. 
Whereas Condit's epideictic aims to help people keep up with the 
times as they change, Sullivan's theory intends to change the times by 
reverting them to an earlier Western tradition. "In the West," Sullivan 
believes, "objective moral standards were generally agreed upon during 
the Christian era of the Middle Ages" (Rhetoric 7). In order to 
recapture this stability, this theory assigns to epidelctlc discourse 
the Purpose of "preserving traditional values" (Rhetoric 270). Such 
preservation can occur, for Instance, when children's literature 
transmits traditional values to young people. Because "the master is 
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already human, the pupil a mere candidate for humanity," an epldeictic 
orator-teacher trains children to be human (Rhetoric 208). Sullivan 
would humanize them with the ancient virtues of "justice, courage, 
temperance, and wisdom" (Rhetoric 44), a quartet posited as if they are 
unquestionable values in the West's current "ongoing moral tradition" 
(Rhetoric 275). Yet these virtues are open to deliberation. What might 
be the difference in humanity, for Instance, if children were educated 
to the virtues of mercy, forgiveness, love, and intuition rather than 
justice, courage, temperance, and wisdom? Sullivan furthermore 
advocates the educational Purpose of epideictic in the way that C. S. 
Lewis perceived education: '"men transmitting manhood to men'" 
(Rhetoric 215). This patriarchal thread running throughout Sullivan's 
argument gives little assurance to women and persons of color who have 
lived on the margins of Western tradition that their values will be 
included in those his theory intends to reinforce through epldeictic 
Acts. 
His project orchestrates the epideictic Purpose of maintaining 
traditional values by assigning categorical tasks to epideictic and 
deliberative rhetoric. Because, Sullivan asserts, Westerners do not 
share the same knowledge and morality anymore, they have seriously 
diminished their ability to deliberate. They have no standards by which 
to measure their judgments. In order to recover effective deliberation, 
they must first solidify the common ground that will be put in service 
of deliberation. This job belongs to epideictic: 
The alternative I suggest is that the old consensus [of the 
Western world] be rebuilt, modified to take into account new views 
of social roles. To do this, we must start with the remnants of 
the old tradition, making the values of that tradition widely 
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known and acceptable to the public through epidelctic rhetoric. 
(Rhetoric 20-21) 
An illogical circularity undercuts Sullivan's argument. If Westerners 
cannot deliberate, then how will they decide which values and beliefs 
epideictic discourse should make "widely known and acceptable?" Asking 
cultures or societies with weak deliberation to sew with "the remnants" 
they already see invites a blindness to the un-seen pieces perpetuating 
weak deliberation and weakened values. Furthermore, "Western 
tradition," as I have indicated, is far from the whole piece Sullivan 
purports 1t to be. To "take Into account new views of social roles" 
hardly speaks to the re-structuring of values relevant to the radical 
developments in social, political, and epistemological philosophies that 
the postmodern world navigates. This reactionary Purpose-Act reaches 
for the blanket of "Truth" as it pushes aside any new deliberative 
weaving in epideictic. 
As in Sullivan's project, the Purpose-Act of Sipiora's theory 
divides epideictic from deliberation. The epideictic consensus-building 
Act "provides the foundation for the other two rhetorical genres," 
deliberative and forensic, and "functions to inform value oriented 
dispositions to action" (249). Although confident that nondeliberative 
epideictic can '"leap ahead' of political discourse and liberate it to a 
re-petition of human dignity which might open genuinely new paths of 
action" (249), the likelihood of any real change seems si 1m, considering 
that the re-petitioning occurs through the conservative appeal to, as he 
quotes Perelman, 'traditional and accepted values'" (248). Re-
71 
petitioning with and for conventional values is analogous to the 
reformulation of Condit's Purpose-Act. 
Duffy advocates philosophy as the ultimate Purpose of ep1deictic. 
The encomium, for instance, expresses "the philosophical wisdom involved 
in securing the maintenance of the ideal state [and] in securing the 
public reaffirmation of values" (86). Because the ideal state needs 
only "maintenance" and values only "reaffirmation," epideictic insures 
only the status quo. Neither is change possible for future Scenes 
because the encomiast reiterates current "philosophical Ideas which 
[will] form the basis of future judgment and action." This projection 
of current thinking onto future thought limits words and deeds to that-
wh i ch-has-a1ready-been-ph11osoph1zed. 
The Purpose of epideictic, as Walker particularizes it to late 
twentieth-century poetry, is to offer "engaging and even important 
thought" to its readers (20). His discussion never places this thought 
in terms of modifying the social, political, or other material realities 
of their beliefs and/or actions. Although he effectively embraces 
persuasion as the essential nature of rhetoric and poetry, he does not 
extend his thesis to envision what the outcomes—the Purposes—of 
lyrical argumentation might be. Consequently, epideictic lyric, drained 
of potential impact on the traditions about which it argues, exists for 
its own sake. 
Carter's theory creates two contradictory Purposes for epideictic. 
On the one hand, these Acts have no essential outcome: 
Like ritual, epideictic discourse possesses the potential for 
achieving an even greater value than more obviously pragmatic 
discourse precisely because it does not have the clear and 
practical consequences of the latter. (217) 
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On the other hand, he points to serious material realities 1n the 
Purpose of a war eulogy: 
In eulogizing the war dead of Athens, their deeds [the warriors'] 
become words and live only as there are words to give them life. 
And the words themselves influence the deeds, or at least the 
values, of those who listen now and in the future. (231) 
This conclusion credits epideictic with the power to change both the 
present and the future, thereby implying that changing words and 
changing deeds are reciprocal Acts—a generative insight. In the war 
eulogy, Agents can choose between words that advocate war and words that 
advocate peace—two very different practical outcomes of eulogizing 
warriors. In the end, however, Carter's theory resolves itself to 
maintain tradition. His peroration about the power of epideictic to 
persuade children to grow up to be warriors indicates that he is less 
interested in cultural innovation than he is in "maintaining the 
collective memory of the culture" (231) in which war always has been and 
therefore always will be idealized. 
These theories, with their nondellberatlve readers, advocate a 
static Purpose-Act in their maintenance of tradition. Conversely, when 
a reader deliberates as the writer persuades and together they negotiate 
meaning in a nonhierarchical relationship, the Purpose of epideictic 
discourse is to create and mediate change. Two contemporary notions 
point epideictic in this direction. 
Poulakos' theory, as I have noted, comes closest to constructing 
an active reader. In encouraging a theoretical shift from treating 
epideictic as a category for texts that "transmit values from one 
generation to the next" to one in which texts have a "propensity to 
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shape and be shaped by the social realm" ("Towards" 149), Poulakos 
clears a space In which change may occur. Readers deliberate about 
transformations in their culture, about the '"variety (or lack of 
variety) in the economic, social, and political arrangements that are 
being encouraged at [their] own moment'" as these options are 
represented in epideictic discourse (he quotes Berlin, 162). Thus the 
Purpose of epideictic seeks to invoke innovation rather than insure 
sameness. In that this theory privileges the reader-critic who 
interprets sometimes centuries after an epideictic text has been 
written, however, 1t values the word's shaping influence on the future 
at the expense of the Purpose-Act's import for its present Scene. 
Because of the disparity between Consigny's theory and practice, 
the Purpose of epideictic is unclear. Despite Its definition of 
epideictic as the rhetoric of display, Gorgias persuades in his 
epideictic speeches. Whether any other epideictic rhetor would be 
capable of rendering deliberation rather than display is not an argument 
Consigny makes. Likewise, the persuasive lessons themselves are limited 
to Gorgias' one totalizing argument that all language use is deceptive. 
If Gorgias can transform epideictic into deliberation by displaying all 
rhetoric as deception, then the ultimate deception (to use this theory's 
primary metaphor for language) would be to argue that epldeictic's 
Purpose is display for display's sake. Nevertheless, this aim is the 
only Purpose this theory constructs for epideictic discourse. Gorgias 
can persuade, but he directs other rhetors to perform exercises in order 
to deceive their auditors who, in turn, fall for the trick. 
Purposefulness perpetually turns purposeless in these epideictic Acts. 
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Thus Poulakos' project limits the readers who may participate in 
change while Consigny's constrains the writers who may participate and 
the changes they may affect. Consequently, these two theories are not 
strong enough to counter the even more limited Purpose-Acts constructed 
in the other six theories. On the whole, contemporary epideictic theory 
keeps change at bay with perpetual, repetitive motion. The present 
occasions for epideictic discourse serve as conduit for transporting 
values and beliefs from the past into the future. The aim is to 
accomplish the transferral with as little effect as possible on the 
intangible materiel intended to supply future deliberative actions. The 
meaning of epideictic, then, is to have no consequence. 
The inaccuracy of this epideictic Purpose lies in its assumption 
that values can be simply maintained without being affected by or 
affecting in the persuasive process. If, for instance, a rhetor 
advocates war through the advocacy of patriotism, listeners are not 
persuaded unless they are convinced of war as well as of patriotism as 
the rhetor renders it. The value of patriotism is not just maintained; 
it is part of what the reader is persuaded to. This Purpose also 1s 
destructive because attempting to maintain values actually hurts the 
values epideictic attempts to preserve. When epideictic writers and 
readers theoretically begin and end with the same values, they do not 
actively engage these values with their minds and hearts. This lack of 
invigoration weakens the values by exposing them to the atrophy that 
naturally proceeds from disuse. Thinking and feeling, on the other 
hand, would strengthen the values by reconstituting them through the 
growth that proceeds from genuine engagement. Maintenance of tradition 
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annihilates opportunities for future growth because it freeze-drles 
current values with the assumption that they will thaw out 1n ways 
appropriate for generations of humanity yet to come. In short, the 
Purpose of maintaining tradition destructs its own aim. 
Agency-Act: Epideictic writers seek to persuade nondellberative 
readers in order to maintain tradition. The motivational element of 
Agency asks the question: How do they do 1t? This 1s the question long 
familiar to rhetoric regarding the relationship between form (Agency) 
and content (Act). Praise, since Aristotle first categorized rhetoric, 
has been a primary Act associated with epideictic. Conventional wisdom 
accepts epideictic as the praise-or-blame genre (although blame receives 
minimal discussion), and it seems simple enough. A war eulogy praises 
dead warriors; an Independence Day speech praises freedom; a 
commencement address praises knowledge and learners. This notion, 
however, inaccurately situates praise as the end—as Act or Purpose—of 
epideictic. On the contrary, praise is the means—the Agency—of 
epideictic. Praise is how epideictic rhetors do their Acts toward 
accomplishing their Purposes. Aristotle himself identifies praise as 
Agency: 
To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of 
action. . . . Consequently, whenever you want to praise any one, 
think what you would urge people to do; and when you want to urge 
the doing of anything, think what you would praise a man for 
having done. (Rhetoric 1368a) 
Isocrates' rhetoric, Poulakos notes, provides the first example of prose 
"employ[ing] praise with the purpose of shaping the audience's moral 
character" ("Isocrates" 318). Praise works as epideictic's Agency 
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through a two-fold strategy—amplification of the Ideal and 
marginalization of the real—whereby an ideal/real binary opposition is 
created and sustained. 
The dominant ideal amplified in epidelctic is the shared nature of 
the values held by the rhetor and the entire audience of an epideictic 
Act. These common values are universal at least among everyone within 
the context of a particular discourse. At most, shared values bind 
present to future generations of as yet unknown rhetors and audiences, 
as this analysis of motives already suggests. Contemporary theorists 
posit these values as if they exist in reality, yet their theories work 
overtly to marginalize any real disagreement by defining appropriate and 
inappropriate Agency. Condit advises that rhetors explain problems 
precipitating epideictic occasions "in terms of the audience's key 
values and beliefs" (288); conversely, "a focus on partial interests 
[would be] anathema" (289). Sipiora brings forward this prescription 
for the rhetor's praise from Cicero, arguing that epideictic '"consists 
in narrating and exhibiting . . . without employing any argument . . . 
for it does not establish any propositions . . . but amplifies 
statements'" (251). Carter recommends that rhetors configure a sameness 
among themselves and their audience members through "flattery" (225). 
It's cheap and easy for Athenians to flatter Athenians, Plato notes, but 
it breaks down social barriers and building up community, Carter 
counters (225). In turn, marginalizing sociopolitical realities 
complements the flattery. Like all good Athenian funeral orators, 
Socrates in Menexenus makes "no mention of disagreements over any of the 
policies that sent Athenians to war so often, always leading to the 
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death of its citizens and sometimes to more disastrous consequences" 
(226-27). Amplification is the appropriate Agency, then; argumentation 
is not. 
Whereas the above-mentioned theories instruct the rhetor to assert 
common values and to desert contrary Ideas according to the readers' 
values, Sullivan's theory requires all values be measured according to 
the writer's. His description of the reading process illustrates this 
yardstick: 
Having filled in the blank, she [the reader] arrives at the 
author's next installment, and it is here that the author's power 
to affect opinion is exerted, either by affirming the reader's 
expectations—and thus reinforcing the presuppositions of the 
reader—or by rejecting the reader's forecast. (This is at a 
cognitive level, not interpretive.) In the second case, the 
reader's image building is impeded, and she must adopt an alien 
perspective. In either case, the author 1s instructing the 
reader, building the reader's wisdom and ability to judge. 
(Rhetoric 180) 
Despite his parenthetical denial that this cognitive description does 
not also convey interpretive process, the bulk of Sullivan's discussion 
equates comprehending the writer's meaning with accepting it. Although 
epideictic interpretation provides space for "alternative responses" 
(Rhetoric 181), his project never mentions ways in which a differing 
opinion survives or thrives within an epideictic Act. On the contrary, 
if the Purpose of preserving orthodoxies is to be met, "the reader and 
the author begin to share attitudes. . . . [T]he reader 1s being 
initiated into the society's heritage of value judgments" (Rhetoric 
181). The rhetor initiates; the reader is initiated. Amplifying shared 
values in turn silences potentially articulated differences. 
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Epideictlc praise also opposes the ideal and real by amplifying 
the abstract and marginalizing the concrete. Sullivan draws the 
either/or choice by privileging the general over the particular. For 
instance, rhetorical criticism employs praise as Agency because it is 
concerned "with celebrating the cultural ideal rather than with 
determining the disposition of a particular case" ("Epideictic" 339, my 
emphasis). Similarly, Agency can pitch truth against fact. In the war 
eulogy, for instance, "the factualitv of the deeds recounted matters 
little compared with the truth of the values they Illuminate" (Duffy 85, 
my emphasis). Thus political causes and material effects of war are 
concrete issues erased eulogistically. Reversing this truth/fact 
dichotomy, Carter equates truth and facts as a knowledge inferior to the 
"extraordinary" or "primordial" knowledge to be learned in epideictic 
(213-14). This knowledge amounts to lies, although Carter resists the 
synonym. Socrates' war eulogy, "whitewashing [Athens'] military 
history" (226), narrates a blatantly false history of the city-state 
that 
fixes before the auditors a transcendent principle that brings 
order and meaning to an otherwise chaotic and meaningless series 
of events. And in doing so, 1t achieves a ritual sense of 
extraordinary knowledge that extends beyond logic—and beyond the 
deliberate falsification of history. (223) 
Lying is justified even when it perpetuates the violent outcomes about 
which it lies: 
It is suitable in a setting in which the dead of war are being 
honored and buried to look for reasons, some justification for 
war; otherwise, they have died for nothing, victims of a world 
gone crazy. (222) 
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Such insanity is precisely the reality that ritualized lying Idealizes. 
Consigny takes falsehood to another kind of extreme. His theory 
characterizes amplifications of any abstraction as deceptive because 
they attempt, as does all linguistic Agency, to articulate "accurate 
replications of 'things as they are'" (287). This view of epldeictic's 
praise as a failed attempt to be concrete renders all praise as false. 
Praise of shared values and of the abstract are two formal 
elements of Agency in the epideictic Act. A third is eloquence, and 
contemporary emphasis on eloquence most overtly exposes a form/content 
split. A high style is the rhetorical strategy whereby the rhetor 
evades content and enamors readers. In order to convince an audience 
that they share common experience, for instance, a speaker must 
create a vivid picture of the shared definition, not merely a 
clear and rational case, and so the epideictic speech may have a 
more pronounced stylistic display than deliberative or forensic 
addresses. (Condit 292) 
The rhetor should "exemplify and model the praiseworthy (or blameworthy) 
by creating vivid (even 1f exaggerated) images with words" (Carter 228). 
The rhetorical outcome mesmerizes the rhetor as well as the reader. "It 
is not surprising," Carter notes, "that Socrates would be bewitched by 
the power of his words, because epideictic oratory is about the power of 
words" (231). Likewise, the ancient orator 1s more concerned with "his 
use of language" than with "recounting the facts" (Duffy 91). And the 
form of versification giving lyric poetry "the power of heightened 
prosody" makes it the superlative epideictic discourse (Walker 218). 
Amplifying shared values, the abstract, and form while 
marginalizing unshared values, the concrete, and content leads to a 
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conflation of the Agency of praise and the Act of persuasion. Praise 
becomes so important a means as to become an end—praise for praise's 
sake. Carter's theory, for instance, claims that "[l]1ke ritual, 1n 
which what is said 1s less Important than that 1t is said, the value of 
epldelctic 1s Intrinsic—the seemingly impractical value of being 'a 
significant action 1n itself'" (217-18). Epideictlc for epidelctic's 
sake. In the same sense, Sullivan theorizes celebration for 
celebration's sake, such as scientific discourse 1n which the 
"standardized pattern of an experimental article 1s a form of 
celebration, a ritualistic enactment of the beliefs of science" 
("Science" 239). Consigny makes the meta-conflatlon of Agency and Act 
in his argument that Gorglas uses language—the whole of linguistic 
Agency--1n order to expose the deception of language—the totalizing 
linguistic Act. Condit concludes that epideictlc 
is told for the sake of the ritualistic need for communal sharing, 
not as preparation for some other action, and thus 1t 1s 
performative, as Walter Beale Indicated; 1n the hearing of such 
self Identifying discourse, audience members share, live, and 
display their community. (292, my emphasis) 
Display for display's sake. These conflations of Agency and Act, as 
Condit's reference Indicates, reflect the notion of performative 
discourse—performance for performance's sake—categorically Instituted 
1n Beale's rhetorical theory. Epideictlc is discourse doing the same 
thing 1n order to keep doing the same thing, an Agency stabilizing its 
Act and stagnating its Purpose. 
81 
Poulakos' project begins to shift this ideal/real opposition of 
Agency dialogically. He hears in Isocrates' Evagoras a tension between 
two contrasting realities, elitist and egalitarian, shaping the life of 
its ancient Athenian reader Nicodes. Isocrates does not resolve, 
transform, order, or otherwise alter this tension. Its change must come 
from a reader (a critic, to Poulakos' exactness). Therefore, Agency 
must be shared by the reader. Through deliberating about ways in which 
this real tension between two opposing world views might be transformed 
into a third, possible world, readers discover the ideal ("Towards" 160— 
61). In his commitment to Marxist theory, however, Poulakos loses a 
portion of his dialogical voice. His argument begins and ends with a 
harsh criticism of hermeneutics as interpretive Agency. His own Marxist 
thinking 
stands in sharp contrast to interpretive notions of understanding 
held by hermeneutics, whose insistence on maintaining a total 
separation between the symbolic and the social prevents 
interpretive experience from raising the interpreter's 
consciousness to the potentiality of social transformation. 
("Towards" 162) 
He argues that critics should politicize their readings into actions 
geared toward more fully attaining democracy: 
What governs a Marxist interpretation of cultural activity is the 
critic's assessment of a cultural artifact vis-a-vis its 
opposition to actual structures of domination and its capacity to 
disclose alternative structures of a more egalitarian character. 
("Towards" 151) 
Clearly preferring the egalitarian world, his argument becomes one of 
choosing between opposing realities rather than one for creating an 
alternative ideal as he imagines the shape of the future. My point here 
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1s not to argue that egalitarianism 1s not a preferable choice to 
elitism, but to suggest that choosing between the two world views is not 
as generative a choice for a peaceful future as is negotiating the two 
of them and thereby transforming them into the third, possible world 
Poulakos speaks of. Poulakos' socialist conviction leads him away from 
a dialogical relationship between real and ideal and into dichotomous 
thinking about "opposition between actual and possible valuations" 
("Towards" 161). Thus his theoretical stance only inverts the 
elitist/egalitarian hierarchy.14 
Despite this slippage in his argument, Poulakos points the way for 
a theory of epideictic that does not necessitate praise's binary 
opposition for its Agency. Not coincidentally, Poulakos' is also the 
one epideictic theory that opens the door for a deliberative reader-
Agent. As well, it argues for a de-emphasis on discourse categories. 
It warns against "our eagerness to classify Isocrates' works all too 
easily into political, artistic, didactic, demonstrative, or other types 
of oratory" and recommends that the challenge and consequence 1n 
studying Isocrates' discourse "lies not in taxonomy but in 
interpretation" of texts that blur the boundaries of such categories 
("Isocrates" 326). Thus his project Illustrates the related theoretical 
tasks of transforming the dichotomies of ideal/real, writer/reader, and 
discourse category "A"/discourse category "B." Without resolution of 
these oppositions, inaccurate and harmful features lace epideictic 
Agency. It is false to assume that Agency only praises the ideal 
(shared values, the abstract, and form) because this assumption ignores 
Agency's marginalization of the real (silenced differences, the 
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concrete, and content). The destructiveness of this Agency arises in 
its blaming real content for opposing ideal form, rather than its 
shaping of more ideal creations through a conversation with reality. 
Scene-Act: "Genuine thought," Sipiora notes of epideictic 
meditative thinking, "is always a response to that which calls to be 
thought about" (247). His observation points to the final question in 
this analysis of motives in contemporary epideictic theory: When and 
where do epideictic Acts occur? Or, to put it in context with the other 
terms as I have analyzed them, the question is: What kind of Scene 
supports (and is supported by) an active writer who persuades a 
nondeliberative reader to maintain tradition through praise grounded in 
ideal/real oppositions? In short, this is the text-context concern. 
Theory currently splits epideictic practice across two Scenes. While 
two theories focus attention on the present word, the majority conflate 
present and future into a universal Scene. 
Condit and Consigny's theories situate epideictic in the present. 
Communities "create epideictic occasions ... in order to have 
opportunities for expressing and reformulating [their] shared heritage," 
which is the reason that audiences resent any reference to diversity 
(Condit 289). Therefore, the Scene is a faked occasional moment during 
which writers and readers pretend that they share that which they all do 
not share. According to Consigny, the Scene 1s any instance in which an 
orator 1s savvy enough to modify Agency to suit the emerging moment. In 
fact, "the rhetor may compete in any discourse whatsoever, if he is able 
to adapt to and master Its apparatus" (293). Epideictic, for both 
theories, is a matter in the here-and-now, and Scene ultimately 
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evaporates in their explanations. To say, as Condit does, that we 
forget our differences does not shape the Scene; it ignores it by 
eradicating the text from its real context. To say, as Conslgny does, 
that Scene is only that which a rhetor reads in order to play his 
rhetorical cards well does not allow context to inform discourse in any 
deep way, nor does the discourse affect the Scene. 
As theorized by Carter, Duffy, and Walker, the Scene of epideictic 
is universal. Epideictic transcends place by "connecting its 
participants to the cosmos or to a transcendent principle"; for 
instance, Socrates falsifies Athenian history in order to take his 
auditors to a "special place in the cosmos" (Carter 221). Socrates also 
transcends time by opening the mouths of dead warriors and thereby 
making listeners "aware of an historical immortality to which they 
belong" (Carter 223). That this Athens or these warriors do not really 
exist only makes them more poignant. Duffy also reiterates 
otherworldliness by assigning epideictic "a broad and timeless 
educational function" that bears no resemblance to the practical nature 
of deliberative or forensic rhetoric (86). This function imbues 
epideictic texts with "universal" meanings such as, Duffy argues, the 
definition of love advanced in the final speech of Phaedrus (a Platonic 
dialogue that has yet to garner universal critical interpretation). 
Walker's theory conflates the past and present into one universe by 
suggesting that epideictic "speaks to the recurring, or experientlally 
'permanent' or chronic issues in a society's pattern of existence" (8). 
In theories that avoid change such as this one, the Scene is the place 
85 
where history repeats itself. Indeed, as any of these theories 
illustrate, a static Purpose and a universal Scene go hand-in-hand. 
The Scene in Sullivan's theory is not consistent throughout his 
project. Most often it is universal, possessing the transcendental 
quality described in Carter's theory. The writer's ethos embodies 
Scene: 
Ethos is not primarily an attribute of the speaker, nor even an 
audience perception: It is, instead, the common dwelling place of 
both, the timeless, consubstantial space that enfolds participants 
in epideictic exchange. ("Ethos" 127) 
This omnipresent Agent-come-Scene also consumes the future: 
One can almost call such a place sacred, for it is the place where 
the educative and celebratory functions of epideictic take place, 
the place where the continuing ideology of an orthodoxy is given 
birth in a new generation and rebirth in those who already dwell 
within the tradition. ("Ethos" 128) 
This epideictic rhetoric of orthodoxies alms to perpetuate its 
ideological Scene forever. In countering Marxist criticism of such a 
goal, it speaks from the hegemonic ideology it is accused of: 
I use the term orthodoxy not in reference to a dominant Ideology 
but in reference to the belief systems and perspectives of 
subgroups or subcultures within a society. What others refer to 
as a pluralistic or fragmented society, I see as a society made up 
of competing orthodoxies. From the perspective of those who do 
not share the benefits of being members of an orthodoxy, 
epideictic can be seen as hegemonic rhetoric (Poulakos), for in 
the traditional Marxist terminology, it celebrates the dominant 
ideology. ("Epideictic" 339) 
Contrary to this emphasis on future Scene, Sullivan's articles on 
literary criticism and scientific reports situate epideictic only in the 
present, positing Aristotle's triad of past, present, and future 
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rhetorics 1n its most simplistic explication ("Epideictic" 344, 
"Science" 230). This emphasis on the here-and-now returns Scene to a 
site for display rhetoric similar to Condit's and Consigny's theories. 
Sipiora's work straddles epideictic across two Scenes. Reflection 
takes place in the present; action takes place in the future. Thus 
epideictic texts are "transcendent" because they "'overshoot the 
established universe of discourse and action toward its historical and 
real alternative'" (he quotes Herbert Marcuse, 249). On the one hand, 
this insight points to the powerful link between present word and future 
deed. It treats words and deeds too discretely, however, and they exist 
too far apart from each other to suggest any real connection. The gap 
between present epideictic and future deliberation obscures the 
political consequences born of values not deliberated 1n the past's 
epideictic occasions. Conversely, Sipiora also flattens all temporal 
space, describing a speech by Heidegger as epideictic because 1t 
"illuminates the present as an enduring embodiment of things past and of 
those yet to come" (242). Scene, then, is either a fission or a fusion 
of time. 
Once again, Poulakos' theory stands apart from Its contemporaries. 
His discussion of text and context suggest an Act 1n dialectic with its 
Scene. Epideictic texts are informed by their Scenes as they "come into 
being, and acquire their meaning, under particular social conditions" 
("Towards" 148). In turn, they inform their Scenes, "capable of 
critiquing or transforming the existing socioeconomic relations at the 
time of [their] production" ("Towards" 153). Poulakos explains the way 
in which a material concept of Scene fundamentally changes the ways in 
which epideictic can be theorized: 
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Conceived as the site of a critique or transformation of the 
social order, the genre of epideictic oratory can no longer be 
understood as a stable ground upon which tradition leaves its 
unalterable traces and attains an intelligibility that persists 
across time. Rather, the totality of works that make up the 
tradition of epideictic oratory must be understood as a historical 
register that supplies us with a heritage of conflicting 
valuations among participants of various societies at various 
times. ("Towards" 161) 
Thus Poulakos constructs the epideictic Scene as a place in which 
differing values are deliberated rather than a space in which 
"universal" values are deposited. This Scene is a Scene that can exist, 
one that can live and breathe. In contrast, his colleagues' theories 
construct Scenes that are impossibilities. There is no instance in the 
present that does not have consequences in the future. Likewise, there 
is no instance that is identical in the present and the future, however 
much epideictic theory conflates the two Scenes. No one steps twice 
into the same place in the river. To assume otherwise drains Scene of 
its power and responsibility in shaping epideictic Acts with an 
inaccurate and destructive text/context split. 
Dividing Word from Deed 
The most serious implication of the inaccuracy and destructiveness 
of contemporary epideictic theory elucidated by this analysis of motives 
is the theoretical division of word from deed. In the Agent-Act 
relationship, the writer-Agent controls the word and the reader-non-
Agent must perform the deed. Theory acts as if the writer performs a 
deedless word—merely if authoritatively representing shared values. 
This notion is inaccurate because the writer is actually engaged 1n the 
act of persuasion to values and their future enactments. Theory expects 
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its reader to perform wordless deeds—merely and nonauthoritatively 
accepting represented shared values. This notion is destructive because 
the reader's critical thinking about future values and actions is 
numbed. The absence of deliberation furthermore casts persuasion as a 
misnomer. Contrary to Burke's concepts of identification and 
addressedness through which writers and readers transform similarities 
and differences, epideictic theory advocates the violent practice of a 
writer/reader hierarchy in which writers overpower readers and 
persuasion silences deliberation. In his pedagogy for literacy that 
advances learning as an act of becoming more human, Paulo Freire speaks 
against such de-humanizatlon: 
Any situation in which some individuals prevent others from 
engaging 1n the process of inquiry 1s one of violence. The means 
used are not important; to alienate human beings from their own 
decision-making is to change them Into objects. (66) 
The epideictic Act's Purpose to maintain tradition privileges a 
static state over a dynamic transformation. Sameness is always 
perceived as better than change. The writer's aim of no change means 
that only words are significant in epideictic. The reader is likewise 
deedless with automatic reactions that are more like the thoughtless 
motion of machines rather than the conscious actions of human beings. 
No change means no deed. Nothing happens in this theoretical position, 
unlike Burke's philosophy of language as symbolic action 1n which 
language users always do something with their words, and their meanings 
always bear consequence. As Jerome Bruner pithily makes the point, 
"Everything is use" (87). 
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Agency in epidelctic produces the word/deed split through 
praise's dual strategy of amplification of the ideal and marginalization 
of the real. The Idealism manifests as epideictlc words that in turn 
marginalize the realism of deliberative deeds. The resulting 
form/content split awards epideictic the invective of "mere rhetoric," 
counter to Burke's distinction of form jis appeal that melds words and 
deeds into a mutually shaping relationship of the container and the 
thing contained. As Ralph Waldo Emerson understands the organicity of 
form in uses of language, "it is not meters, but a meter-making argument 
that makes a poem" (1190). By recognizing the humanistic nature of 
language, Bakhtin also transforms this dichotomy: "Form and content in 
discourse are one, once we understand that verbal discourse is a social 
phenomenon" (259). 
Finally, the Scene of the epideictic Act either ignores the future 
in deference to the present or presses both present and future into 
universality. When epideictic Scene limits itself to the present, it 
divorces present word from future deed. When it conflates present and 
future making them anytime and anywhere, it makes the Scene no time and 
nowhere—contextless—because the present and future can never be the 
same, and in many cases should not be the same, as Richards' definition 
of rhetoric as "a study of misunderstandings and its remedies" 
underscores (3). Furthermore, their divisibility over time as a present 
value-word and a future action-deed prevents ideality and reality from 
transforming one another. Contemporary epideictic theory, with its 
sensitivity to the relationship between present and future, stands on 
the verge of incarnating Burke's concept of incipient action, in which 
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acts of mind shape present as well as future acts. It ignores, however, 
the ideologically-drenched, contextual nature of symbols and all their 
users that Burke's pragmatics acknowledges. 
The taxonomic goal to define and characterize epideictic as 
something different from other discourse and then to count the fruits of 
that work as theoretical conclusion leads epideictic theory to create 
numerous dichotomies, all of which are hierarchies of power struggle. 
These oppositions—writer/reader, meaning/consequence, form/content, 
text/context, word/deed—mirror the hierarchies sustained by a theory of 
rhetoric as one use of language. As chapter one discusses, this large 
categorical concept also limits writer-reader interactions and parcels 
out persuasion and deliberation as consequences of some but not other 
discourses. Its Agency foregrounds form. Its desire to stabilize the 
world and the word shapes a Purpose of sameness and a Scene pretending 
always to be the same. The category of rhetoric as one use of language 
and the category of epideictic are both theories constructed contrary to 
the cognitive and social nature of language as symbolic action. Both 
articulate unauthentic relationships between an Act and its Agent, 
Purpose, Agency, and Scene. Therefore, as currently theorized, 
epideictic is a rhetoric of denial—a discourse of no deliberation, no 
change, no content, no context, no deed. The pentad, Burke's dynamic 
heuristic, reveals epideictic as it reveals rhetoric-as-one-use-of-
language: a-human, a-consequential, a-worldly discourse. 
In order to discover the ways that the theoretical discrepancies 
and problems emphasized in this discussion of contemporary epideictic 
theory manifest themselves in real epideictic occasions, the next two 
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chapters investigate epidelctlc practice. They explore what actually 
happens between epideictic readers and writers, meanings and 
consequences, forms and contents, and texts and contexts that ultimately 
shape words and deeds. Chapter three illustrates epideictic through the 
most ceremonial of occasions, the war eulogy. Chapter four depicts the 
classroom essay and its frequent ceremonial writing. The eulogy and 
essay are drawn together in chapter five for a comparison of these two 
epideictic occasions and their implications, demonstrating that they 
expose similarities among all uses of language. Whether a statesperson 
orates or a student writes, epideictic words and deeds must be 
interpreted as rhetorical realities. Whether intentionally ceremonial 
or not, the ethical implications of these epideictic occasions are 
equally serious and meaningful. 
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CHAPTER III 
WAR EULOGIES: IN SEARCH OF REAL PEACEMAKING 
Epldeictic In the Eulogistic Occasion 
The eulogy 1s the paradigmatic example of epldeictic discourse. 
As the analysis of contemporary theory 1n chapter two suggests, when 
theorists study epldeictic, they often discuss eulogies. More 
particularly, they talk about war eulogies, describing and prescribing 
epldeictic practice for contemporary rhetors through examples in 
classical oration. In selecting one war eulogy through which to 
illustrate the practice of epldeictic, this chapter Investigates 
Pericles' "Funeral Oration," a eulogy delivered by Athens' prestigious 
statesman early in the Peloponneslan War between Athens and Sparta 
during fifth century B.C. Rhetoricians and historians agree on this 
eulogy's significance as exemplar of and influence on political life and 
rhetorical genre. It is often cited in rhetorical theory as a model for 
contemporary discourse. E. J. P. Corbett analyzes the "Funeral Oration" 
1n his text Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, asserting that 
"Pericles' noble utterance is the prototype of all memorial addresses" 
(236). He considers 1t along with Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address" to be 
"as eloquent and genuine now as they were the day they were delivered 
from the podium," and he advises the modern student to take the oration 
"as his guide 1n the preparation of any discourse designed to praise or 
censure his fellow man" (236, 239). Nicole Loraux Introduces her study 
of Athenian funeral orations by discussing the need to "first exorcize 
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the despotic dominance of Pericles' famous speech" (7). Clifford Orwln 
launches his study of Thucydldes with a rhetorical analysis of the 
"Funeral Oration," describing 1t as the "best known passage 1n 
Thucydldes" and one 1n which Pericles "depicts Imperial Athens as the 
noblest of human projects" (15). Peter R. Pouncey describes Thucydldes' 
respect for Pericles as the "archetype of the statesman 1n his pristine 
virtue" who projects their mutually-shared "vision" of Athens 1n this 
epidelctic discourse (79, 82). As the symbol of epidelctic discourse 
for more than 2,400 years, then, the "Funeral Oration" 1s a logical 
choice for illustrating epidelctic practice.15 
When Celeste Condlt puts her epidelctic theory Into practice, she 
Introduces an analysis of the Boston Massacre Orations with this 
comment: "In rhetorical studies, the chief tests of 'utility' have 
always been performance and criticism. I cannot perform an epidelctic 
speech here. ..." (292). At any rate, she notes, a critique 1s the 
"more appropriate" test by which to evidence the usefulness of her 
theory. In this chapter's investigation of a war eulogy, I choose the 
method Condlt leaves behind: performance, by which I mean enactment. I 
enact my reader response to Pericles' "Funeral Oration" because 1t 1s 
the most dramatic and therefore clearest way that I can Illustrate the 
Inaccuracies theorized about epidelctic and the destruction that results 
from employing an inaccurate theory of language. Rhetorical theory has 
always listened to epidelctic writers. It 1s time to listen also to 
epidelctic readers in order to gather a more complete composite of 
epidelctic words and deeds. Rather than transfer the univocal voice 
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from author to critic, my response Illustrates the dlaloglcal nature of 
language as I put myself 1n conversation with Pericles. 
Contrary to ep1de1ct1c theory's expectations, as I read this war 
eulogy I hear the orator persuading readers. I also recognize a need 
for its listeners to deliberate about what they are being persuaded of. 
Rather than universal values, Pericles asserts foundational beliefs that 
I as his reader do not share. My response calls Into question his 
appropriation of womanhood as a way of justifying and naturalizing war. 
It also questions his construction of manhood as a violently natured and 
abstractly idealized man of courage, nobility, and honor. A problematic 
public/private::mascul1ne/fem1n1ne opposition accompanies these 
treatments of gender. The response also resists misrepresentations of 
acts of war, in which Pericles Idealizes war by characterizing warriors 
as immortal and marginalizes the realities of war that I foreground—the 
actual Injuring and killing of and by warriors and the political and 
social Ideologies that lead to war. His oration Intends to maintain all 
of these beliefs by advocating the tradition of war that empowers them. 
Consequently, my response highlights the links between these valued ends 
and their violent means and Its "might makes right" mentality. The 
eulogy's hierarchical world view significantly underglrds this 
relationship between values and violence. Superiority of one country 
over all others necessitates violence as a means of maintaining 
hierarchy, which my response persistently points out. I have first-hand 
familiarity with this world view; I grew up as the daughter 1n a career 
military family. 
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The purpose of Pericles' eulogy draws great concern 1n my 
response. His Introduction claims that his eulogistic words are 
insignificant compared to deeds. I, however, listen to what his words 
are doing. Although he states the purpose of his eulogy 1s to praise, 
my response uncovers the Intention to persuade his audience to future 
acts of war through the agency of praise. In his purported praise of 
ancestors, he actually advocates traditional abstract values. His 
praise of Athens promotes a hierarchical world view. Praise of warriors 
persuades his audience to continue warring behavior, and comfort for the 
bereaved further argues for them to perpetuate the world view 
occasioning the war eulogy. In each of these segments of his eulogy, my 
response draws out the covert intention behind the overt "praise," and I 
deliberate the values and actions that Pericles would persuade me of. 
What you read in this chapter's reader response 1s akin to reading 
my marginal comments and journal entries on Pericles' war eulogy. I 
share my reactions, paraphrases, Immediate and revisited 
interpretations. I respond to the entire eulogy as I read 
chronologically (ellipses condense his argument but eliminate none of 
Its points). For the sake of my response's readability, I have 
clustered my comments rather than present each Interruption of the 
oration as 1t actually occurred. My words are earnest, emotional, 
thoughtful, harsh, inquisitive, relentless. I feel as 1f I'm talking 
back to more than talking with Pericles, as 1f I am, say, sasslng my 
father. Rhetorically and Ideologically that's a fair analogy, although 
I don't like the difference 1n our voices—Pericles' so controlled, mine 
so desperate. His speech commands the epldeictlc occasion through the 
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power of patriarchy, in turn excluding the feminism guiding my response. 
His patriarchal words Incorporate war ideology, whereas my feminist 
language engenders pacifism. A power struggle goes on between Pericles 
and me in our collision of world views. We need to figure out a way to 
transform the latent violence brewing between his and my use of these 
eulogistic words. 
The presence of an Antigone 1n the Imagination of ancient Greece 
makes me hopeful that feminists then would have responded or at least 
have wanted to respond similarly as I do now. The consequences of their 
speaking out, much greater than my own, sadden and further determine me. 
My placing myself as a deliberative co-Agent 1n the making of this 
ep1de1ct1c text Interrupts Its dominant ideology of war. War was "men's 
business" and war eulogies were male orations "1n which no female 
element [could] assume a decisive function" 1n ancient Greece (Loraux 
24, 284). The political and rhetorical situation 1s not significantly 
different today in these regards. My response 1s akin to the radical 
assertiveness of Sophocles' Antigone who illegally buries her outcast 
warrior-brother, Polynices. It 1s unlike the responses of real ancient 
Athenian women. As Margaret Alexlou's research of funeral laments 
explains, their responses were limited to walling, often seen as a 
sickness, even while 1t was valued for Its ability to Incite vengeance. 
The oration was the public act of the man, and the right to mourn was 
his, given mourning's alignment with the right to Inherit.16 
I am an Agent unwilling to wall or shut up. I don't trust 
Pericles' authority as Agent. I question his use of praise as Agency 
and the values he employs to perpetuate his world view. I react to what 
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he says of and 1n his Scene and listen for Its resonance within my own 
context. I blur distinctions between Athens and America 1n the course 
of noticing their similarities as nations of war, and I don't worry 
about creating anachronisms or catching allusions. My sltuatedness 1s, 
to say the least, overt 1n my response. I loathe the Purpose of this 
eulogy—Its persuasive Intent to move me and other auditors to future 
war acts. I am not persuaded, but I am deliberative. I am, 1n Judith 
Fetterley's rich term for a feminist who actively reads a patriarchal 
text, a "resisting reader." I resist as an "'act of survival'" not only 
for myself but for others 1n the hope that war eulogies, as Fetterley 
hopes for American literary texts, "will no longer be read as they have 
been and thus will lose their power to bind us unknowingly to their 
designs" (she quotes Adrienne Rich, vi1i; x11-xx111). 
Reader Response to Pericles' "Funeral Oration" 
The response begins with Thucydides' Introductory recounting of 
this epideictic occasion, Its eulogy, and the orator: 
Introduction of Occasion and Orator: 
In the same winter the Athenians, following their annual custom, 
gave a public funeral for those who had been the first to die in 
the war. (143) 
Thucydides, I notice you do this every year; It's an "annual custom." 
It's winter—the most deadly of seasons. The "custom" 1s "public." 
What about the private grief? 
These funerals are held 1n the following way: two days before the 
ceremony the bones of the fallen are brought and put 1n a tent 
which has been erected, and people make whatever offerings they 
wish to their own dead. Then there is a funeral procession in 
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which coffins of cypress wood are carried on wagons. There 1s one 
coffin for each tribe, which contains the bones of members of that 
tribe. (143) 
You talk of bones and of coffins. What more will your eulogy say about 
these material effects and what they show the "tribes," our families, of 
the reality of war? As my country prepared for a recent war 1n the 
Persian Gulf, some people complained when the news reported military 
purchase of body bags. Often not a lot of tolerance for material 
reality when we're busy being "patriotic. ..." The mourners are 
clustering to make "offerings." What would my family have offered? 
One empty bier 1s decorated and carried 1n the procession: this 
is for the missing, whose bodies could not be recovered. (143) 
Yes, I know what you mean. During and after the Vietnam War, some 
Americans wore bracelets engraved with names of missing warriors on 
them. I prayed every night that my father, piloting A1r Force gunshlps, 
would never become one of "the missing," or one of the dead. 
Everyone who wishes to, both citizens and foreigners, can join 1n 
the procession, and the women who are related to the dead are 
there to make their laments at the tomb. (143) 
No! Thucydldes, lamentation doesn't begin to satisfy my response to 
this funeral. I don't want to wall for the war-dead; I want to speak 
against the wars that we create and order people to die 1n. I don't 
want to repair the damages—heal the wounded and bury the dead; I want 
to stop death in war from happening to begin with. I don't want to help 
repeat the same old story: Men fight; men die; men are heroes. Women 
are the reason they fight; women cry; women are alone. I want to 
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transform the narrative for all who die and mourn—men and women. And, 
in my modern times, I don't want the equality of fighting alongside men; 
I want the equality that enables me to stop the fighting. Lament? 
Don't ask for my lament, employ my tears at the tombs, use me 1n your 
justification of people killing each other, marginalize me. God, that 
makes me mad. I am sick that these men killed and were killed. And I 
don't want your eulogy to ennoble and therefore enable the dying to 
continue. 
The bones are laid 1n the public burial-place, which 1s 1n the 
most beautiful quarter outside the city walls. Here the Athenians 
always bury those who have fallen 1n war. The only exception is 
those who died at Marathon, who, because their achievement was 
considered absolutely outstanding, were burled on the battlefield 
itself. (143) 
The bones and the coffins of men "fallen"—euphemism for dead men—are 
themselves falling away to an Idealized remembrance of war. Bury them 
1n the "most beautiful" place. The most excellent of warriors earn the 
most beautiful of places—the killing scene itself. 
When the bones have been laid 1n the earth, a man chosen by the 
city for his Intellectual gifts and for his general reputation 
makes an appropriate speech in praise of the dead, and after the 
speech, all depart. (143-44) 
Pericles is the man (of course a man) selected because of his 
"intellectual gifts." What are his emotional gifts? He's "chosen by 
the city" because of his "general reputation"; he's a patriarchal 
mouthpiece. Sounds like the grand ol' orator in, say, Dale Sullivan's 
ep1de1ct1c rhetoric of orthodoxies. The speech, you promise, will be 
"appropriate." Appropriate—meaning it'll maintain values by 
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marginalizing disagreement? Praise 1s the aim here, you tell me: 
"praise of the dead." And that's 1t? Praise as an end, not a means? 
Praise for praise's sake; really? And afterwards I'll merely "depart?" 
"Depart" to do think, feel, and be what? What will Pericles tell me? 
What would a feminist tell me? 
This 1s the procedure at these burials, and all through the war, 
when the time came to do so, the Athenians followed this ancient 
custom. . . . (144) 
Did you Imagine or hope, Thucydldes, that twenty-four centuries later we 
would still be enacting this "ancient custom?" Across the world, 
warriors and other citizens are burled 1n every season, on every day 1t 
seems, as part of war's deathful outcomes. Kill-eulog1ze-kin-eulog1ze-
k1ll-eulog1ze. Same story for you, for me, for whom else tomorrow? 
When the moment arrived, [Pericles] came forward from the tomb 
and, standing on a high platform, so that he might be heard by as 
many as possible 1n the crowd, he spoke as follows: (144) 
It's time for me to listen. I hear the crowd hushing. We look up as 
you, Pericles, take your position overlooking us. 
Eulogy's Introduction: 
'Many of those who have spoken here 1n the past have praised the 
institution of this speech at the close of our ceremony. It 
seemed to them a mark of honour to our soldiers who have fallen 1n 
war that a speech should be made over them. I do not agree.' 
(144) 
How interesting! You begin by questioning the genre of war eulogy. 
'These men [the dead warriors] have shown themselves valiant 1n 
action, and it would be enough, I think, for their glories to be 
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proclaimed 1n action, as you have just seen 1t done at this 
funeral organized by the state.' (144) 
You suggest that the act of burial 1s a more fitting honor for warriors' 
acts than words of praise. The word 1s inferior to the deed, then? Is 
the word deedless? Why do you erect a deed/word hierarchy at the 
beginning of your speech? 
'Our belief 1n the courage and manliness of so many should not be 
hazarded on the goodness or badness of one man's speech.' (144) 
You believe not 1n words but 1n the "courage and manliness" of these 
dead men's war acts. I believe 1n the courage required of living with 
differences through peaceful means, rather than violating one another 
because of them. I believe It's manly to live with people whom we are 
different from, not kill people un-like us. You speak 1n the first 
person about "our belief" in your notion of "courage and manliness" as 
if there's a universal voice in this "one man's speech." But I won't 
silently mouth your words and nod 1n agreement about "our" supposed 
universal values. 
'Then [in one man's speech] 1t 1s not easy to speak with a proper 
sense of balance, when a man's listeners find it difficult to 
believe in the truth of what one is saying. . . . Praise of other 
people 1s tolerable only up to a certain point, the point where 
one still believes that one could do oneself some of the things 
one 1s hearing about. . . .' (144) 
You sense that you risk over-stating "the truth" about the war-dead. 
You evaluate your rhetoric according to how "tolerable" 1t will be, and 
the measure of Its "praise" will be 1f "one still believes that one 
could do oneself sane of the things one 1s hearing about." In other 
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words, 1f you can persuade us that we can do what these warriors have 
done, then you'll be more likely to get us to do 1t 1n the future. 
"Tolerable" = persuasive. Audience member "believes" = persuaded to 
perpetuate the cycle of war. "Praise" = a purpose I'm becoming more 
deeply suspicious of "tolerating." 
'However, the fact 1s that this Institution was set up and 
approved by our forefathers, and it 1s my duty to follow the 
tradition and do my best to meet the wishes and the expectations 
of every one of you.' (144) 
"Fact." "Institution." "Set up." "Approved." "Forefathers." "Duty." 
"Tradition." Sounds so permanent, so Impervious. And we aren't 
supposed to shake the permanent and impervious—especially not the 
institutions of our foreFATHERS—are we? But I believe that 1t 1s my 
duty not to follow the patriarchal tradition of war eulogies. If my own 
father had been killed while killing 1n war, this "tradition" or 
"custom" couldn't possibly have meet my "wishes" or "expectations." I 
wish to change the facts and the institutions; I expect to create new 
duties and traditions. You, on the other hand, discount eulogistic 
words as impotent or Inferior to deeds, yet advocate their tradition and 
agree to take the leading performance of them. You don't doubt the 
power of eulogistic words; you're going to use them to get me to meet 
vour Intentions. 
"Praise" of Athens' Ancestors: 
'I shall begin by speaking about our ancestors, since 1t 1s only 
right and proper on such an occasion to pay them the honour of 
recalling what they did.' (144) 
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Congratulations are 1n order, beginning with our ancestors. "[R]1ght 
and proper," of course. I hear a maintenance of tradition coming. 
Seems morbid, even perverted, to congratulate the heritage that led to 
these deaths. Can we find an Interpretation of the past that lies 
somewhere between your congratulations and my condemnation of 1t so that 
we can get farther along? Where's the thlrdness here? 
'In this land of ours there have always been the same people 
living from generation to generation up till now, and they, by 
their courage and their virtues, have handed 1t on to us, a free 
country. They certainly deserve our praise.' (144) 
And up until now, all over the world we have "foreigners" and xenophobia 
and other hierarchical manifestations of difference . . . and more war. 
Ancestors violate other ancestors with "their courage and their 
virtues." 
'Even more so do our fathers deserve [our praise]. For to the 
inheritance they had received they added all the empire we have 
now, and it was not without blood and toll that they handed 1t 
down to us of the present generation.' (144-45) 
Imperialistic "add[1ng to] the empire," and certainly not "without blood 
and toil." Your phrasing—"it was not without blood and toil"—makes 
the cost sound but little. But Pericles—"blood and toll"—the 
injuring—is war's primary goal and consequence. 
'And then we ourselves, assembled here today, who are mostly 1n 
the prime of life, have, In most directions, added to the power of 
our empire and have organized our State 1n such a way that it 1s 
perfectly well able to look after Itself both 1n peace and 1n 
war.' (145) 
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More congratulations: H[W]e" maintain the tradition. Oh, God—1n what 
ways have I and do I maintain 1t? I fear that the Perlcleses of the 
world will maintain 1t with or without me—by adherence or coercion. 
Twenty-five hundred years have maintained traditions via the tradition 
of war. In the United States, a revolutionary war, a civil war, two 
world wars, regional wars 1n the Far East and Middle East. . . . Where 
are the pacifists? The feminists? 
(I have no wish to make a long speech on subjects familiar to you 
all: so I shall say nothing about the warlike deeds by which we 
acquired our power or the battles in which we or our fathers 
gallantly resisted our enemies, Greek or foreign.' (145) 
Now that you think you've convinced me to maintain tradition through 
your ancestral "praise," what's next? Not war stories. What would 
happen if you talked about these "warlike deeds," Pericles? Would 1t 
invite (incite?!) a discussion that complicates your Intentions? If 
deeds are so great and words so meager, why not recall the deeds that 
bring us to this mass burial today? Let's talk—realistically—about 
killing and dying. Let's look at the connections between "power" and 
war you flaunt. Many warmongers today downplay that relationship, 
hiding more persistently behind the "values" and "beliefs" 1n new world 
orders and simplistic notions of right versus wrong and good versus 
evil. But, no, you don't want to talk about material reality or 
political ideology, not 1n the way that I want to, anyway. 
'What I want to do is, 1n the first place, to discuss the spirit 
in which we faced our trials and also our constitution and the way 
of life which has made us great.' (145) 
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How are these topics—a country's spirit, law, and lifestyle—separate 
from its "warlike deeds," Pericles? 
'After that I shall speak 1n praise of the dead, believing that 
this kind of speech 1s not Inappropriate to the present occasion, 
and that this whole assembly, of citizens and foreigners, may 
listen to 1t with advantage.' (145) 
I should listen . . . "with advantage." You've put me on notice: Pay 
attention; my praise for the dead will benefit you. This rhetorical 
situation 1s becoming clearer and clearer: You Intend to persuade me. 
Not praise for praise's sake. But I am a "foreigner"—a resisting 
reader—you didn't count on. I'm supposed to be one of the silent 
"citizens"—a woman lamenting at the tomb. But I'm talking back. 
"Praise" of Athens' Spirit and Law: 
'Let me say that our system of government does not copy the 
institutions of our neighbours. It 1s more the case of our being 
a model to others, than of our Imitating anyone else.' (145) 
Athens, "model" city-state. Smug, elitist superiority fueling 
imperialism. 
'Our constitution is called a democracy because power 1s 1n the 
hands not of a minority but of the whole people.' (145) 
I'm not going to pretend that women had an equal place 1n this 
"democracy" you praise, Pericles. Women still work to have equal voice 
1n my democracy. Your public sphere excludes me. 
'When 1t 1s a question of settling private disputes, everyone 1s 
equal before the law. ... No one, so long as he has 1t 1n him 
to be of service to the state, 1s kept 1n political obscurity 
because of poverty. ... We are free and tolerant 1n our private 
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lives; but 1n public affairs we keep to the law. This 1s because 
1t commands our deep respect.' (145) 
The law, the law, the law .... Translation: Don't talk back; come 
to the tomb and lament. That's how my "service to the state" has been 
defined for this ceremonial occasion. That's my "public" role, 1f I am 
to maintain the law with "deep respect." You are not, then, "free and 
tolerant" of my "private" life. 
'We give our obedience to those whom we put 1n positions of 
authority, and we obey the laws themselves . . . and those 
unwritten laws which 1t 1s an acknowledged shame to break.' (145) 
Although you shame me for disobedience, I will not obey "laws" drained 
of humanity. What about these bones and coffins between us, Pericles? 
I'm having trouble attending to your "praise" of Athens because I'm 
thinking about the deadly results of Athenian actions and attitudes that 
bring us to this funeral service today. 
*And here is another point. When our work 1s over, we are 1n a 
position to enjoy all kinds of recreation for our spirits. There 
are various kinds of contests and sacrifices regularly throughout 
the year;' (146) 
Reinforce war's win/lose, I1ve/d1e ideology as play's entertaining 
value. 
'. . . in our own homes we find a beauty and a good taste which 
delight us every day and which drive away our cares.' (146) 
Home, in your public/private division, 1s the private sphere of a 
woman's place and responsibility. My service, then, 1s to provide "a 
beauty and a good taste" that will "drive away [your] cares." 
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'Then the greatness of our city brings 1t about that all the good 
things from all over the world flow 1n to us, so that to us 1t 
seems just as natural to enjoy foreign goods as our own local 
products.' (146) 
Athens: The great political and economic centripetal force. Sounds 
like my supposed land-of-plenty. 
"Praise" of Athens' Spirit and Courage: 
'Then there 1s a great difference between us and our opponents, 1n 
our attitude towards military security. . . . [W]e rely, not on 
secret weapons, but on our own real courage and loyalty.' (146) 
Weapons need no secrecy when they are possessions of men with superior, 
"real courage and loyalty." What makes these men more "real" than 
others? 
'There 1s a difference, too, 1n our educational systems. The 
Spartans, from their earliest boyhood, are submitted to the most 
laborious training 1n courage; we pass our lives without all these 
restrictions, and yet are just as ready to face the same dangers 
as they are.' (146) 
"real." Athenian courage 1s Oh, now I see how they are more 
genetic—natured, not nurtured, 
killers. 
Athenian warriors are natural-born 
'Here is a proof of this: When the Spartans invade our land, they 
do not come by themselves, but bring all their allies with them; 
whereas we, when we launch an attack abroad, do the job by 
ourselves, and none of our enemies has ever yet been confronted 
with our total strength. . . .' (146) 
I live 1n a superpower country, too, although we like to enlist allies 
as a way of justifying wars. When countries use "total strength" 
nowadays, it's nuclear war. Hiroshima is a complicated, hard war story 
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to tell. When we don't use "total strength," It's a war that won't end. 
Vietnam is a difficult story to tell, also. 
'Yet, 1f our enemies engage a detachment of our forces and defeat 
1t, they give themselves credit for having thrown back our entire 
army; or, 1f they lose, they claim that they were beaten by us 1n 
full strength.' (146) 
When the "enemy" tells war stories, they lie. When you tell them, It's 
the truth. Isn't that just what your enemies' eulogists are telling 
their citizens? 
'There are certain advantages, I think, in our way of meeting 
danger voluntarily, with an easy mind, Instead of with a laborious 
training, with natural rather than with state-Induced 
courage. . . .' (146) 
A voluntary military—naturally courageous, spontaneously brave, 
genetically superior. Men born to die 1n war. 
More Praiseworthy Athenian Attributes: 
'There are also [other reasons for Athens to be admired]: 
Our love of what is beautiful does not lead to extravagance; our 
love of the things of the mind does not make us soft.' (147) 
Moderate aesthetics and hard intellect control love, beauty, softness. 
Masculine/feminine hierarchy 1n your associations here. 
'We regard wealth as something to be properly used, rather than as 
something to boast about. As for poverty, no one need be ashamed 
to admit 1t: the real shame is in not taking practical measures 
to escape from it.' (147) 
Blame the poor individual for weak individualism. Overcome adversity 
with autonomy, not collectivity. 
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'Here each Individual 1s Interested not only 1n his own affairs 
but 1n the affairs of the state as well. . . . [W]e do not say 
that a man who takes no Interest 1n politics 1s a man who minds 
his own business; we say that he has no business here at all.' 
(147) 
If everybody 1s politically active as you describe Athenians, then 
everybody can take credit—or blame—for politically-Incited wars, 
right? If, however, citizens are bound to be respectful of the law and 
are bound by a warring nature, as your praise of Athens Indicates, then 
aren't they unlikely or unable to act any differently from ways they 
always have? I'm reminded we're perpetuating an "ancient custom." 
Where's the Agency for change in this system? 
'We Athenians ... do not think that there 1s an Incompatibility 
between words and deeds; the worst thing 1s to rush Into action 
before the consequences have been properly debated. . . (147) 
Words and deeds! But you don't mean words are deeds. You mean "think 
before you act"—two separate things. Consequences are "properly 
debated" 1n some other, deliberative forum unlike this ep1de1ct1c one. 
We're just praising and lamenting for the moment. Therefore, we miss 
the most poignant moment to re-think our words and therefore to re-shape 
their deeds. 
'We are capable at the same time of taking risks and of estimating 
them beforehand. . . . But the man who can most truly be 
accounted brave 1s he who best knows the meaning of what 1s sweet 
in life and of what 1s terrible, and then goes out undeterred to 
meet what is to come. . . .' (147) 
Deliberation precedes future action. Don't mix the two; act 
"undeterred" by subsequent thought once 1n the actual context being 
shaped by your prior deliberations. The real mark of bravery, you say, 
110 
is to realize that you are going to do something terrible, and do 1t 
anyway. Now there's an attitude twisted by an abstract value of 
courage. It privileges a model of self-sacrifice; 1n other words, 1t 
values violence to the self. 
'We make friends by doing good to others, not by receiving good 
from them. This makes our friendship all the more reliable, since 
we want to keep alive the gratitude of those who are 1n our debt 
by showing continued goodwill to them. . . .' (147) 
Athenians engage in war knowing how terrible 1t is, and they engage in 
friendship knowing how much gratitude 1t will net. The power 
relationship is the same. It's all about keeping Athens on top. 
'Taking everything together then, I declare that our city 1s an 
education to Greece. . . .' (147) 
And, as this funeral occasion evidences, "[t]ak1ng everything together," 
these attributes of Athenian superiority lead to war. No way to avoid 
the violence with your hierarchical world view. But then, that's not 
your aim. 
"Praise" of Athens' Power and Immortality: 
'And to show that this 1s no empty boasting for the present 
occasion, but real tangible fact, you have only to consider the 
power which our city possesses and which has been won by those 
very qualities which I have mentioned. . . .' (148) 
You see? That's what I mean! Might = right. Your praise of Athens is 
advocacy of hierarchy. Now reverse the equation. Right = might. How 
do we maintain the hierarchy? Materially, war. Rhetorically, eulogy. 
Sooner or later. Therefore, grief for dead warriors 1s hypocritical and 
inevitable. 
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'Mighty Indeed are the marks and monuments of our empire which we 
have left. Future ages will wonder at us, as the present age 
wonders at us now.' (148) 
Mighty immortality—the changeless Agent, Act, Scene, and Purpose. 
'We do not need the praises of a Homer, or of anyone else whose 
words may delight us for the moment, but whose estimation of facts 
will fall short of what is really true.' (148) 
The "facts" are the real "Truth" in your abstractions. 
'For our adventurous spirit has forced an entry Into every sea and 
into every land; and everywhere we have left behind us everlasting 
memorials of good done to our friends or suffering inflicted on 
our enemies.' (148) 
Through forced entry with irrevocable markers you patronize the willing 
and violate the unwilling. The rapacious imagery repulses me. 
'This, then, is the kind of city for which these men, who could 
not bear the thought of losing her, nobly fought and nobly died.' 
(148) 
Oh, yes . . . draw up your "praise" of Athens with the ancient 
feminization of one's country. Such a familiar personification. "She" 
is the reason for the war. It is noble to kill and be killed for "her." 
I'm angered by the feminine being blamed for violence; the feminine 1s 
nonviolent. What could be "noble" about killing in the name of the 
mother? 
'It is only natural that every one of us who survive them should 
be willing to undergo hardships in her service. . . .' (148) 
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Therefore, 1t would be iin-"natural" for survivors not to want to km 
and be killed. You silence me from articulating a different, paclflstlc 
value by perverting 1t. 
'I have spoken at such length about our city [] because I wanted 
to make 1t clear that for us there 1s more at stake than there 1s 
for others who lack our advantages;' (148) 
Your enthymeme persists today: Athens has a lot at stake; therefore, 
Athens has great reason to engage 1n war. Unstated premise: Powerful 
countries deserve to remain powerful—at any cost. If I don't 
deliberate your eulogistic argument, Pericles, I won't uncover your 
logic. So, I deliberate. 
'. . . also I wanted my words of praise for the dead to be set 1n 
the bright light of evidence. And now the most Important of these 
words has been spoken. I have sung the praises of our city;' 
(148) 
The greatness of Athens should justify any means to maintain Athenian 
tradition. You have attempted to persuade me of "her" superiority, 
which now will be the "bright light of evidence" you shine on warriors 
as you sing their "praises." 
"Praise" of Dead Warriors: 
. but it was the courage and gallantry of these men, and of 
people like them, which made her splendid. Nor would you find 1t 
true 1n the case of many of the Greeks, as 1t is true of them, 
that no words can do more than justice to their deeds.' (148) 
"[T]he1r deeds ... I stop to Imagine a war deed for a moment . . . 
mutilating someone else's body . . . watching blood gush, flesh tear, 
bones break . . . pushing their injured body away from my own . . . 
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hurting them again to be sure that they are dead. The words "courage 
and gallantry" or "splendid" never come to mind when I Imagine such 
scenes. 
'To me 1t seems that the consummation which has overtaken these 
men shows us the meaning of manliness 1n Its first revelation and 
1n Its final proof.' (148) 
"[Consummation": euphemism for death. Want to be a man? Die 1n war; 
It's the alpha and omega of "manliness." 
'Some of them [the dead], no doubt, had their faults; but what we 
ought to remember first is their gallant conduct against the enemy 
1n defence of their native land. They have blotted out evil with 
good, and done more service to the commonwealth than they ever did 
harm in their private lives.' (148) 
You split the warrior into a public/private self, making public 
"conduct" honorable, private "harm" Insignificant. The opposition helps 
justify acts of war. Killing 1s murder 1n the private sphere; killing 
is "gallant" deed in the public sphere. You also couch their "service" 
in binary opposition: "good" versus "evil." 
'No one of these men weakened because he wanted to go on enjoying 
his wealth. . . . More to be desired than such things, they chose 
to check the enemy's pride.' (148-49) 
"[C]heck[ing] the enemy's pride": euphemism for killing the other 
person. Paradigm for public behavior: self-sacrifice. 
'This, to them, was a risk most glorious, and they accepted 1t, 
willing to strike down the enemy and relinquish everything else. 
As for success or failure, they left that 1n the doubtful hands of 
Hope, and when the reality of battle was before their faces, they 
put their trust in their own selves.' (149) 
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You imagine warriors engaged 1n battle as "glorious" risk-takers 
trusting their autonomous selves and abandoning concern to "(tope." Not 
the scene, as you know, 1n my imagination. 
'In the fighting, they thought 1t more honourable to stand their 
ground and suffer death than to give 1n and save their lives.' 
(149) 
They did not run. "[H]onourable" to take life, not "save" 1t. 
'So they fled from the reproaches of men, abiding with life and 
Umb the brunt of battle;' (149) 
"Abiding": euphemism for sustaining mutilation to the body. "Brunt": 
injury's pain. 
. and, 1n a small moment of time, the climax of their lives, 
a culmination of glory, not of fear, [they] were swept away from 
us.' (149) 
Death 1s a momentary "climax"—nothing to be afraid of. It "swept them 
away"—the ultimate, "glorious" orgasm. How, Pericles, do you know that 
this 1s what death was like for these warriors? My father's post-war 
nightmares don't suggest "glory." Would it have been glorious 1f he'd 
been killed—or "gone all the way," as the sexual idiom puts 1t? 
'So and such they were, these men—worthy of their city. We who 
remain behind may hope to be spared their fate, but must resolve 
to keep the same daring spirit against the foe.' (149) 
Emulate them. Hope not to die, but covet the "daring spirit" of those 
who did. Harness 1t when you make war. Otherwise, you won't be 
"worthy"; you won't make your country "splendid." 
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'It 1s not simply a question of estimating the advantages 1n 
theory. I could tell you a long story (and you know 1t as well as 
I do) about what 1s to be gained by beating the enemy back.' 
(149) 
Somebody has to win; somebody has to lose. Always win. Remember the 
tradition. Maintain the tradition. 
What I would prefer [to tell you] 1s that you should fix your eyes 
every day on the greatness of Athens as she really 1s, and should 
fall 1n love with her. (149) 
Concentrate on Athens, you say. Think about Athens 1n terms of desire; 
think about desire 1n terms of a woman; "fall in love with her." See 
lovemaklng as a metaphor for warmaklng. What? We're not really killing 
and dying—we're loving a woman? What could be more natural, right? 
You implicate women as accomplice to war acts—women naturalize them. 
If I flip the analogy, it validates violent conquest of women by 
defining loving her in terms of making war. Double-edged sword. You 
gloss war with love and love with war. I'm so angry, I almost can't 
keep reading. 
'When you realize her greatness, then [you will] reflect that what 
made her great was men with a spirit of adventure. . . . [T]hey 
gave to her the best contribution that they could.' (149) 
Warriors are the greatest citizens because they die (or come) for 
Athens. If dying in war 1s the best act of all acts, then bring on the 
world war to end all worlds! The farther I push your logic, the more 
destructive it gets. 
'They gave her their lives, to her and to all of us, and for their 
own selves they won praises that never grow old, the most splendid 
of sepulchres—not the sepulchre in which their bodies are laid, 
but where their glory remains eternal in men's minds, always there 
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on the right occasion to stir others to speech or to action.' 
(149) 
War death: Ticket to immortal life as everlasting inspiration. Quite a 
tempting proposition for all the future warriors and women of warriors 
in your audience. You hold up the ghosts of wars past to "stir [them] 
to speech or to action"; 1n other words, to persuade younger generations 
to fight. If getting killed in a war Immortalizes a person, then should 
I wish that all my loved ones die war deaths? More destructive logic. 
'For famous men have the whole earth as their memorial: it 1s not 
only the inscriptions on their graves 1n their own country that 
mark them out; no, in foreign lands also, not in any visible form 
but in people's hearts, their memory abides and grows.' (149) 
The memory not only lives, it "grows." Yes, and one way 1t grows is 
through an advocacy of war values in eulogistic "praise" of the dead. 
Rhetorical perpetuation of the process. Notice the feminine Images 
appropriated to the process. Earth, often a maternal figure, holds the 
dead men eternally. The heart, often figured as the site of feminine 
emotion (not masculine reason) nurtures them forever. There are other 
ways to remember, other reasons to remember. Unlike your Ideal of 
Immortality, The Wall begs us never to forget reality as 1t makes Its 
visitors read thousands of names of dead Vietnam warriors. 
"It 1s for you to be like them.' (149) 
Yes, Pericles. You do advocate war death for all. "It 1s for you to be 
like them." Your argument, your thesis 1n eight simple words. It 1s 
the point that I deliberate here and urge us to negotiate. You come 
completely from behind the veil of praising Athens and "her" warriors 
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and explicitly persuade your audience to perpetuate Its history of war. 
You metaphorically have put the words in the warriors' mouths. They, 
not you, "stir" us to war's word and deed. How persuasive, because we 
don't want to think the un-thinkable—that millions of people have 
killed and been killed 1n war for uncourageous, unnoble, very mortal 
reasons. "It is for you to be like them." Once again, I am so angry, I 
almost cannot read. 
'Make up your minds that happiness depends on being free, and 
freedom depends on being courageous. Let there be no relaxation 
in the face of the perils of the war.' (149-50) 
Therefore, to continue your logic, happiness depends on being 
courageous. Your equation of "courageous acts = war acts" ignores a 
whole other realm of human interaction. Acts of love, of caring, of 
healing the body, of discourse. My attempt to engage you right now 1s 
an act of courage. 
'The people who have most excuse for despising death are not the 
wretched and unfortunate, who have no hope of doing well for 
themselves, but those who run the risk of a complete reversal in 
their lives. . . .' (150) 
Within the paradigm erecting war death as superior immortal death, you 
now create another hierarchy: the more prosperous a warrior, the 
greater his "sacrifice" of death. Your divisive oppositions never end 
as your "praise" of dead warriors works to persuade young men to emulate 
them and all other persons to enable their emulation. 
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"Comfort" for Parents of Dead Warriors: 
'For these reasons I shall not commiserate with those parents of 
the dead, who are present here. Instead I shall try to comfort 
them.' (150) 
Finally, you will speak to the grieving loved ones. But no sympathy, 
you say. Instead, something to ease the pain. Oh, have you set us up. 
Who wants to say that their dead warrior did not serve a great country, 
or that he was not courageous, brave, manly, patriotic, immortal? How 
easily you can withhold sympathy now because there is nothing to be 
sorry about. I sense advice coming. 
'They [the parents of the war-dead] are well aware that they have 
grown up in a world where there are many changes and chances. But 
this is good fortune—for men to end their lives with honour, as 
these have done, and for you honourably to lament them;' (150) 
The advice goes like this: Parents, amid a changing world, consider 
yourself lucky to have ended up with a war hero. At least some things 
don't change. Take it as an "honour" which, like your sons' courage and 
nobility, is another value abstractly defined 1n terms of war. 
'. . . their life [the warriors'] was set to a measure where death 
and happiness went hand 1n hand.' (150) 
But happiness and death are not necessarily mutually dependent 
ingredients that we must "measure" into violent formulas. 
'I know that it 1s difficult to convince you of this.' (150) 
Yes, Pericles. Yes, it is. 
'When you see other people happy you will often be reminded of 
what used to make you happy too. One does not feel sad at not 
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having some good thing which 1s outside one's experience: real 
grief is felt at the loss of something which one is used to.' 
(150) 
You refer to their children as if they were objects! They are "what 
used to make [them] happy" and "something [they got] used to." You 
suggest that I cannot feel sad because their grief is outside my 
experience, but I can sympathize, and I won't Keep this distance you 
establish between individual and community. 
'All the same, those of you who are of the right age must bear up 
and take comfort in the thought of having more children. In your 
own homes these new children will prevent you from brooding over 
those who are no more, and they will be a help to the city, too, 
both in filling the empty places, and 1n assuring her security.' 
(150) 
Your understanding of grief: Parents will be sad when they see other 
parents with their living children. Your advice: Bear more children. 
Replace the ones "who are no more" in order to forget them. 
Reproduction for the sake of war helps "secure" the city. Good citizens 
fill the gaps that their dead sons have left in Athens' volunteer army— 
at least until the "new children" are killed, too. 
'For it is impossible for a man to put forward fair and honest 
views about our affairs if he has not, like everyone else, 
children whose lives may be at stake.' (150) 
Children's lives are not "at" stake; they MS the stakes with which war 
maneuvers! Another hierarchy—allegiance to country is more important 
than care of family. Who am I to talk, you suggest. Childless adults 
have no credibility 1n speaking about war policies. But, wait! My 
stepchildren were young adults when I met them—draftable, enlistable 
120 
ages. Should I have wished a war for them? I have a nephew and niece, 
ages 5 and 4. Should I hope their parents raise them as recruits for 
future wars? When my stepchildren have children, do I encourage them to 
train warmongers? 
'As for those of you who are now too old to have children, I would 
ask you to count as gain the greater part of your life, in which 
you have been happy, and remember that what remains 1s not long, 
and let your hearts be lifted up at the thought of the fair fame 
of the dead . . . [and] having the respect of one's fellow men.' 
(150) 
Your advice to parents too old to have more children: Be glad for the 
life you've had, realize you'll be dead soon, and enjoy the "fame" and 
"respect" that having dead warriors for sons brings in the meantime. A 
bit of your own immortality. These words to all parents you call 
"comfort." Would they have comforted my grandparents? Maybe, although 
the only war stories I've ever heard from them are about family letters 
and packages keeping them 1n touch, and one about Japanese radio 
propaganda that made them laugh. Hardly Immortal heroics. Would these 
words have comforted my parents? Less likely. When I told my father I 
was studying war eulogies and their praise of the dead, he demanded, 
"What's to praise?" Hardly a desire for "heroic" immortality. Would 
they have comforted me as a parent? No. These are not words of 
comfort. They are words of propaganda. 
"Comfort" for Hale Relatives of Dead Warriors: 
'As for those of you here who are sons or brothers of the dead, I 
can see a hard struggle 1n front of you. Everyone always speaks 
well of the dead, even if you rise to the greatest heights of 
heroism, it will be a hard thing for you to get the reputation of 
having come near, let alone equalled, their standard.' (150-51) 
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Your more sympathetic tone here 1s not because fathers and siblings have 
died. Rather, you advise these sons and brothers of the difficult time 
they can expect 1n trying to live up to their dead relatives' 
reputations. How do you compete with a dead war hero? Guess they'll 
have to die in war, too. Just your point. 
'When one 1s alive, one is always liable to the jealousy of one's 
competitors, but when one 1s out of the way, the honour one 
receives is sincere and unchallenged.' (151) 
The real, young men in your audience should aspire to be ideal, ageless 
warriors. Their competitive edge will cut a death wish, if your 
persuasion is effective. Would your "comfort" have persuaded my 
brother? Hardly. His music seeks to unite, not divide. 
"Comfort" for Widows of Dead Warriors: 
'Perhaps I should say a word or two on the duties of women to 
those among you who are now widowed. I can say all I have to say 
in a short word of advice.' (151) 
Oh, yes—the women. "Perhaps" you should speak to the widows briefly 
about their "duties." Evidently, it's a pretty sure bet that they 
wouldn't disobey. I doubt the likelihood of my mother's servitude 
should she have become a warrior's widow. I notice you won't speak to 
these dead men's daughters or sisters. No doubt we'll follow our 
mothers' duty? The "comfort" amounts to an authoritarian afterthought. 
'Your great glory is not to be Inferior to what God has made you, 
and the greatest glory of a woman 1s to be least talked about by 
men, whether they are praising you or criticizing you.' (151) 
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A woman's "greatest glory" 1s to be un-notlced, un-ment1oned, silent, 
absent. No! My invisible status as object is part of vour design, 
Pericles, not God's. Why 1s my silence necessary? Does 1t facilitate 
the advocacy of all you value in war? Conversely, how does a feminist 
voice complicate matters? My response makes your persuasive task more 
difficult, yet you thought I'd have to work just to avoid being 
"Inferior." No fear that I would actually be superior to what you 
perceive God has made me. 
Conclusion of the Eulogy: 
'I have now, as the law demanded, said what I had to say.' (151) 
That's the extent of your "comfort" to the widows? You've done all the 
patriarchal LAW demanded. What about the demands of our hearts and 
minds? You measure out words of comfort only as they help persuade 
people to continue grievous acts. The "law" forbids questioning the 
"law"; re-thinking not allowed. 
'For the time being our offerings to the dead have been made, and 
for the future their children will be supported at the public 
expense by the city . . . for the ordeals which they have faced.' 
(151) 
Veteran benefits reward the "ordeal" of becoming a fatherless child. 
'Where the rewards of valour are the greatest, there you will find 
also the best and bravest spirits among the people.' (151) 
A touch of flattery to buy future silence: Your loved ones have been 
killed; therefore, you have one of the "best and bravest spirits among 
the people." 
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'And now, when you have mourned for your dear ones, you must 
depart.' (151) 
Your closing statement. Its finality bothers me. As 1f mourning can be 
completed at the grave side. As 1f departure will make 1t no more of my 
business. Walk away from the war-dead . . . not so easy for me to do. 
You've given me three places to go: 1) If I am a mother of child-
bearing ability, I bear more sons so that more warriors can die; 2) If 
I'm too old to bear children, I appreciate the respect that comes from 
having a dead warrior for a son until I die, which I can hope will be 
soon; or 3) If I am a widow of a dead warrior, I keep my invisible 
place. Pericles, I want to depart, but not to any of these places. 
Summary 
This reader response to Pericles' war eulogy exposes the 
inaccuracy and destructiveness of epldeictic theory. As the Agent of 
this epideictic Act, Pericles authoritatively presents universal values. 
As the eulogy's reader, however, I assert myself as a co-Agent. Rather 
than share or succumb to its values, I deliberate and reject them. 
Pericles' authoritarian manner of persuasion attempts to silence my 
deliberation, even in the words of "comfort" he offers the bereaved. My 
deliberation manifests in a hostility that suggests the violation I feel 
from his authoritarian position in this discourse and the latent 
violence brewing in its struggle between writer and reader. The Purpose 
of praise 1s falsified as the response draws out Pericles' multiple 
strategies to persuade his audience members to perform future acts of 
war. The harm in this persuasive Intent 1s 1n Its denial, which 
represents Pericles' words as "mere rhetoric" or ceremonial display yet 
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expects readers' actions to result from them. By conflating praise as 
both meaning and consequence of the discourse, Pericles hides Its real 
outcome. Epideictic Agency amplifies the Ideal of war and marginalizes 
the realities of wars, thus negating truths and degrading the discourse 
to lies. Consequently, adherence to eulogistic form contaminates Its 
content. The erroneous conflation of present and future Scenes becomes 
clear 1n the differences between Pericles' patriarchal and my feminist 
ideologies. The danger of reading this text a-contextually comes 1n 
repeating its history unthinkingly. 
The values advocated and traditions maintained in Pericles' 
"Funeral Oration" do far more than praise the dead, commemorate their 
memory, or comfort loved ones. They persuade readers to perpetuate the 
world view that occasions them. Therefore, as a pacifist I must become 
a resisting reader. I must recognize that "[consciousness is power" 
(Fetterley, x1x). If I want to work for peace, then I must change 
epideictic theory and practice such that my pacifism 1s allowed a voice. 
I must transform epideictic occasions as traditionally conceived Into 
rhetorical ones. Accordingly, the potential for constructive outcomes 
from discourse occasioned by ceremony is demonstrated 1n my active 
reading of Pericles' oration. His eulogy promotes a world view, and my 
response makes 1t an opportunity for re-think1ng that world view. His 
oration persuades its readers to act on behalf of that world view, and 
my response deliberates those actions and suggests alternate ones. His 
oration seeks to accomplish its aims by asserting authority and 
employing implicit strategies, and my response seeks to accomplish Its 
aims by sharing authority and making strategies explicit. Thus 
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rhetorical choice rather than rhetor1c-by-number designs the ep1de1ct1c 
occasion. My response 1s an instance of acting with the moral 
responsibility integral, as Burke and many others acknowledge 1t, to the 
uses of language. Contrary to the erroneous determinations of 
epideictic theory, rhetors and readers can choose whether its Agents 
will Include readers, its Purpose will be clear, its Agency will be 
fair, Its Scene will be ethical, and whether 1t will treat Its Acts as 
words and/or deeds. My response opens up the epideictic occasion to an 
analysis of its motives in order that symbol-users may know more about 
what they do and can do with their epideictic words. 
This transformation of epideictic is Important for advocating any 
world view. Even if I shared Pericles' values, I would still need to 
deliberate 1n my response to his eulogy in order to make a conscious 
decision about whether and why I would advocate war for my own and 
future generations. In other words, deliberation 1s necessary 1n order 
to respond humanistically rather than mechanistically to an epideictic 
occasion. Whatever the ceremonial oration may be about, rhetors and 
readers choose what they will promote within it. In the eulogies of 
war, the choice between advocating peace or war 1s the most crucial— 
life or death—choice of all. 
Although Pericles' "Funeral Oration" stands as the premiere 
Illustration for describing and prescribing epideictic discourse from 
ancient to contemporary rhetorical theory, current eulogistic occasions 
replicate its persuasive nature and further suggest the importance of 
its active deliberation. The national memorial service for victims of 
the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on 
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19 April 1995 provides one example. Four days after the destruction 
that killed 168 people, political and religious leaders came together to 
eulogize the dead and to comfort the living. Whereas my pac1f1st1c 
response to Pericles' war eulogy requires my dissent as I speak from the 
margins of a warring society's dominant Ideology, I am an assenting 
member of the majority in this eulogistic occasion. I understand this 
moment as do millions of other auditors. I join Americans as well as 
citizens of other countries 1n mourning the deaths and 1n questioning 
the morality and motives of the bomber(s). I have seen the dead and 
injured children and adults, the frightened families gripping 
photographs of loved ones yet unearthed from the rubble, and the tearful 
rescuers exhausted from the physical, psychological, and spiritual 
strain of their work. I abhor the violence; I am shocked by Its cruel, 
unsuspected perpetration; I am hurt and angry. I struggle with the 
information that an American or a group of Americans are the primary 
suspects in the planning and carrying out of this act of terrorism. I 
am open, not hostile, to the authoritative orators of this service, 
including its most prestigious—President Bill Clinton, the Reverend Dr. 
Billy Graham, and Governor Frank Keating—and to them leading me through 
this tragic event and toward healing. To this extent, then, I am in 
traditional ep1de1ct1c terms a member of a universal audience with 
shared values. Less traditionally, however, I also am prepared to 
deliberate what these orators say and the way they say 1t—to listen for 
the deeds of their words. 
Furthermore, in part because I know what 1t feels like to be a 
marginalized, silenced, and resisting reader in other ceremonial 
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occasions, I am aware that all members of this memorial service's 
audience are not assenting listeners. If, 1n fact, white males who are 
extremely fearful and distrusting of their federal government bombed 
this building, these men are not alone 1n their escalating concerns 
about governmental control of citizens' lives. Although investigative 
reports range in estimates of the numbers of activist anti-governmental 
citizens and groups and the states 1n which they live, the consensus 1s 
that the numbers are growing. Newsweek recently reported an estimated 
membership in militia groups of 100,000 (Morganthau 36). Attorney 
General Janet Reno was warned in October 1994 that m1Ht1a groups exist 
in 47 states (Applebome 33). Many of these people, males and females, 
are white supremacists who perceive themselves to be "'dispossessed'" by 
their country, as the leader of the White Aryan Resistance Tom Metzger 
characterizes their lives (Applebome 33). These dissenting voices are 
heard by thousands of listeners on public and short wave radio programs 
in which they advocate their causes and seek to increase their number of 
compatriots. Not unlike the people with whom they disagree, patriotism 
and Christianity often are the common values through which they make 
their appeals. The American Revolution slogan "Don't tread on me" 
typifies their reaction to governmental control. Neighbors of chief 
bombing suspect Timothy McVeigh 1n Kingman, Arizona do not find his 
hatred of government "particularly unusual," the New York Times reports: 
People here condemn the killing and bloodshed 1n Oklahoma City, 
and say the perpetrators should be promptly strung up. But 1n 
nearly the next breath, conversations turn to the 'socialistic' 
practices of the Government, ranging from taxing cigarettes and 
whiskey to not allowing people to shoot mountain Hons. They also 
rail about Attorney General Janet Reno and her 'whole alphabet' of 
law enforcement agencies, and what they see as the possibility 
that foreign soldiers, who are being trained in secret locations, 
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will soon be coming door to door to confiscate citizens' beloved 
weapons. (Klfner B9) 
It 1s not only persons speaking from the extreme right margins of 
American society, then, who share the concerns and sympathies 1f not the 
violent methodology of the Oklahoma bomber(s) and other anti-
governmental militia members. Even the most mainstream of criticisms 
coming from Republican politicians have been questioned as to their 
Influence on the more radical consequences of ant1-governmental 
rhetoric. 
The Oklahoma memorial service eulogies, as I listen to them, 
marginalize not only the most vicious of these dissenters, the bomber(s) 
in particular, but by implication all of the listeners who have views 
different from the pro-governmental ones held by the speakers and many 
assenting auditors. Therefore, rather than gather comfort about the 
deaths, injuries, and sorrow among my fellow citizens and rather than 
gain insights about ways to heal the divisions that led to this war-like 
act, I am more deeply troubled after the memorial service than before. 
The eulogies perpetuate the world view occasioning them—a federal 
government and a community of citizens embroiled 1n an Increasingly 
violent relationship. 
Unity 1s a dominant theme 1n the eulogies by Clinton, Graham, and 
Keating. Despite the division among American people that the bombing 
makes graphically apparent, the eulogies purport that Americans are 
united. Clinton represents "the American people" and speaks for the 
"nation" and to his "fellow Americans" (B8). His separation of 
Oklahomans who are "mean and selfish" from those who retain "the 
129 
capacity for love and caring and courage" as well as his planting of a 
dogwood tree as a reminder of "the life of a good person" suggest that 
the bombers and their Ideological sympathizers are not among the 
"Americans" Clinton speaks for or to. Graham likewise divides his 
audience by announcing "to those who masterminded this cruel plot and to 
those who carried it out, that the spirit of this city and this nation 
will not be defeated." Similarly, then, those persons who question 
their government's power can expect to be defeated by 1t. Keatlng's 
introduction most clearly establishes the parameters around this 
eulogistic occasion in which some Americans but not others can 
participate: "Today we stand before the world and before our God 
together, our hearts and our hands linked in a solidarity these 
criminals can never understand. We stand together 1n love." Thus his 
oration permanently excludes the people who most need to love and be 
loved by their Oklahoman, American community. Citizens with anti-
governmental political convictions are not part of "our" communities as 
Keating enumerates them: "neighbors . . . fellow Americans . . . 
families . . . heroes and heroines [the rescuers] . . . children . . . 
God." Each orator also supports the concept of unity that he carves out 
by placing it within a larger context. Clinton positions the justice he 
promises within the current tradition of justice-seeking as he recalls 
the Pan American Airlines terrorist disaster. Graham Invokes the 
ancient tradition of Job's suffering as similar to the suffering of 
Oklahomans, and Keating reminds listeners that they have been "strong 
through the generations" and will be "stronger yet through this terrible 
ordeal." 
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In contrast to the unity that these eulogists praise and with 
which they comfort, the person(s) who bombed the federal building and by 
implication people of similar beliefs are dehumanized, demon1zed, and 
disenfranchised. Clinton's eulogy dehumanizes them by never referring 
to the bombers as human beings. They are "those who did this evil" and 
the "dark forces that threaten our common peace." Graham's eulogy 
demonizes them, calling their violence an example of the "mystery" of 
"evil." Although this evil is something we cannot understand 1n this 
life, Graham explains, we can know that "there is a devil, that Satan 1s 
very real and he has great power," as the bombing illustrates. 
Keating's eulogy disenfranchises the bombers and their Ideological 
sympathizers from the lessons to be learned from this destructive event. 
Only the united mourners "can reach beyond Its horrible consequences" 
and make the "journey through darkness" to light. Like the Initial and 
immediate speculations that the bombers would be non-Americans or non-
whites, then, their otherness is emphasized 1n the eulogies. 
As each man speaks, the purposes of praising the dead, honoring 
the rescue workers, and comforting the bereaved give over to other 
persuasive Intentions. In a rhetorical moment providing the opportunity 
to persuade his audience that he 1s a mighty political leader, Clinton 
encourages his audience to join him in a search for justice. This 
mission translates into expulsion rather than resolution of difference 
among Americans. "To all my fellow Americans beyond this hall," he 
declares, "I say one thing we owe those who have sacrificed 1s the duty 
to purge ourselves of the dark forces which gave rise to this evil." 
The purge is a fight between oppositions: 
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They are forces that threaten our common peace, our freedom, our 
way of life. Let us teach our children that the God of comfort 1s 
also the God of righteousness. Those who trouble their own house 
will inherit the wind. Justice will prevail. Let us let our own 
children know that we will stand against the forces of fear. When 
there is talk of hatred, let us stand up and talk against 1t. 
When there 1s talk of violence, let us stand up and talk against 
it. In the face of death let us honor life. As St. Paul 
admonished us, '"Let us not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil 
with good.' 
His message of vengeance teaches children to control hierarchically 
rather than to negotiate dlalogically their differences. His resolve 
for justice, requiring that the dead's "legacy must be our lives," 
drives the dead as an Immortal wedge between assenting and dissenting 
Americans. 
Granted the occasional moment 
to persuade his auditors to convert 
He warns his listeners that without 
all things and desperately wicked. 
to preach to the nation, Graham alms 
or re-ded1cate their lives to God. 
God all hearts are "deceitful above 
That's one reason we each need God 
in our lives." His message of salvation shores up human beings' 
relationship with the Creator as he concludes, "It is better to face 
something like this with God than without Him." His message does not, 
however, elaborate about the ways that having God 1n one's heart enables 
people "to pray and forgive and love" with each other. Graham's brief 
mention of these genuinely unifying acts—praying, forgiving, and 
loving—acts that are capable of transforming relationships among people 
with differing world views goes undeveloped. They are the only words in 
the entire memorial service that speak for unity of all. Americans, and 
they are overwhelmed by the persuasion to salvation that dominates 
Graham's eulogy. 
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Rhetorically positioned to speak as the leader of every citizen of 
the state he governs, Keating argues for solidarity among all 
Oklahomans. He repeats the theme of justice in Clinton's oration, 
confident that God is "a God of love but he is also a God of justice" 
and that federal investigation "will bring us to justice." He echoes 
Graham's emphasis on closeness to God because "He assures us, once 
again, that good is stronger than evil, that love 1s greater than hate." 
His particular emphasis on community—"we have each other" and "we are 
one . . . with one another"—Insulates the bereaved and Isolates the 
hated. Thus his words separate the state he Intends to solidify. 
Eighty-six people died 1n the explosion of the Branch D1v1d1an 
compound near Waco, Texas as the infernal conclusion of a battle between 
dissenters and the federal government. Two years later to the day 
almost twice as many people died 1n Oklahoma City. In looking to the 
future, the question for ceremonial discourse 1s this: Did the national 
memorial service for the victims of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building create a rhetorical occasion that makes 1t more or less 
likely that violence will occur again? Its eulogistic praise of the 
dead persuades its audience to vengeance, salvation, and solidarity. In 
each eulogy, the message 1s that good, Godly people will remain divided 
from and powerful over evil, un-Godly ones. Therefore, violence will be 
their ultimate method of communication. The opposition of good versus 
evil separates the persons who need to be united if future violence 1s 
to be avoided. However much the bereaved abhor the unjustness of their 
loved ones' deaths, eulogistic words that create hierarchy only serve to 
encourage the same kind of divisive, violent act as the one occasioning 
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this memorial service. Imagine the hostility swelling 1n persons who 
shared the sentiment 1f not the violent methods of the bombing 
suspect(s). What were the Americans who feel dispossessed and 
threatened by their government feeling and thinking as these eulogists 
portrayed evil and pledged justice? What was the effect of their world 
view being discounted rather than taken into account? Just as I feel 
the violent tension rise between Pericles and myself 1n my response as a 
silenced reader, so too could I sense the same difficulties brewing as 
America's leaders spoke during this ceremonial occasion on a spring 
Sunday afternoon. By emphasizing a God of righteousness and a country 
of laws in order to maintain justice, these eulogies foreground the 
differences that escalate civil war between a government and Its 
dissenters. 
As this contemporary instance of epidelctic suggests, the need for 
responding with critical consciousness 1s crucial for assenting readers. 
How unlikely it 1s that the orators and auditors of the Oklahoma 
memorial service consciously wished to perpetuate the violence that has 
caused such enormous grief and horror. Nevertheless, unthinking assent 
leads to a lack of awareness of the deeds that words perform. When 
orators and writers depend on the traditional forms that ceremonies have 
called for, their words act 1n ways they do not realize. When listeners 
and readers participate 1n unthinking assent, they ignore the 
consequences of their uses of language. The epidelctic moments 1n which 
audiences are least likely to be hostile are the moments 1n which they 
most need to be active readers, critically re-mak1ng the text and 
scrutinizing the actions—incipient and overt—that proceed from words. 
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The moments 1n which they are most emotional are the Instances 1n which 
they are most likely to overlook the consequences of seeking release 
from their grief and rationale for their anger without also taking the 
next, most important step of looking underneath the apparent divisions 
between good and evil 1n order to create a more humane thlrdness and 
thereby get farther along 1n human relationships. 
A re-envision1ng of ceremonial occasions, perhaps especially 
eulogistic ones, 1s not easy. It asks people to give up the comfort of 
the familiar. It calls for a re-th1nk1ng of what communities want and 
expect their ceremonies to do. But it is precisely the recognition that 
ceremonies will do something, consciously or unconsciously, that should 
encourage their re-invention. Using the occasion of eulogistic words in 
Oklahoma City to begin the process of coming to terms with differences 
rather than widening their gaps could have provided a healing remedy 
that would make it more likely that nonviolent acts would constitute the 
future. Some of the participants in the Oklahoma memorial service were 
ready for such a task. On the morning of the memorial service 1n 
Oklahoma City's First United Methodist Church, which served as a holding 
facility for bodies and body parts and which was the home church of 
three bereaved families, members prayed for whoever bombed the Federal 
Building. As Don Gutterldge, the church member who led the prayers 
reflected, '"Obviously it's difficult when you look at the carnage and 
see the wreckage of lives to know that the people that have done this 
are in God's sight his children. ... We don't want to admit that, but 
we have to'" (Bernstein B7). As New York Times journalist D1rk Johnson 
talked with people who attended the service in person, he observed, 
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"there was anger, even shame. For all the talk about the Innocence of 
the heartland, some noted, the terrorists did not appear to be 
foreigners from some hard-to-pronounce sects, but young men bred, 
presumably, with the values of America" (B7). In response to this 
similarity among killer and killed, one participant commented, '"There's 
so much hate in this country. ... All of us need to look into our 
hearts and say, 'What's wrong? What's going on here?'" Another person 
hoped to find "the beginning of healing" at the memorial service. My 
husband watched the service with the need "to suffer the grief 1n order 
to better understand the horror of this human choice." Expressed at 
the ceremonial moment of eulogy, these attitudes suggest the possibility 
of transforming ep1de1ct1c occasions into the genuinely persuasive and 
deliberative Instances that language equips them to be. 
Before turning to the implications of this choice for ceremonial 
rhetoric in chapter five, chapter four investigates a rhetorical 
situation that at first glance seems to be the opposite of the 
eulogistic occasion. Whereas epldeictic theory believes that the war 
eulogy, with all its ceremony, will not be persuasive or deliberative, 
composition pedagogy assumes or hopes that the classroom essay will be. 
The expectation of persuasion and deliberation, however, 1s not 
sufficient assurance for Its dynamic practice. The next chapter 
Investigates the metadiscourse of students who were supposedly engaged 
1n deliberative discourse. As the analysis of their comments Indicates, 
their writing often could be aptly described as traditional epidelctlc 
discourse, as ceremonial display. Chapter four Illustrates that a 
hierarchical theory of language (writer/reader, meaning/consequence, 
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form/content, text/context, word/deed) leads with Its Inaccuracy to 
destructive consequences. Furthermore, a transformative theory (with 
the shaping elements of a rhetorical situation 1n dialoglcal 
relationship) leads to authentic communication in which persuasion and 
deliberation occur and the word's deed is negotiated. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMPOSITION ESSAYS: IN SEARCH OF AUTHENTIC CLASSROOM WRITING 
Epide1ct1c 1n the Composition Classroom 
The seed for this chapter's investigation of ep1de1ct1c practice 
was planted in a very early conversation about my dissertation with Dr. 
Hephzlbah Roskelly, perhaps when I asked her to direct this project. I 
had been thinking for some time about the Implications of ep1de1ct1c 1n 
the scene of the war eulogy. As I enumerated the problems I saw In 
traditional concepts of epideictlc, which chapter three Illustrates, she 
leaned forward and said something like, "And think about this 1n terms 
of the classroom! What could be more 'ceremonial' than the composition 
essay? Our students only write for the present moment occasioned by our 
assignment, and all they want 1s our praise for filling 1n whatever form 
we give them." In spite of the pedagogical goal for students to write 
persuasively (or dellberatively or argumentatlvely), essay writing 1n 
composition classrooms often 1s marked by writers who do not really 
persuade; readers who do not really deliberate; goals and forms and 
scenes that do not change—all of which render the word deedless. This 
kind of classroom discourse, we agreed, 1s as deadly as the war eulogy— 
deadly for students to write and teachers to read with Its corpse-Uke 
texts. Furthermore, although the discrepancy between aim and outcome 1s 
particularly obvious 1n a composition course designed to generate 
deliberation, and a concern commonly held among teachers of any 
composition course, deadly writing also is a familiar problem to 
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teachers and students 1n any course that requires students to write. 
Teachers and students 1n literary studies, for Instance, struggle with 
writing that lacks genuine meaning and consequence beyond the completion 
of an assignment, weak prose that reveals the writer's lack of Interest 
1n the topic about which she or he writes and thus falls to engage the 
reader, and interpretations too 111-supported to Influence the 
classroom's work of learning Its subject matter. 
Ep1de1ct1c theory, unintentionally, describes this comatose 
pedagogical discourse. It 1s "display rhetoric" 1n which a writer 
"displays his rhetorical skill" and readers "observe and judge that 
skill" (Consigny 281-82). Ancient as the definition 1s, 1t explains the 
Purpose 1n a contemporary student ceremoniously producing a text as a 
display to be judged—a performance to be graded—by the teacher. An 
artificial rather than real Scene for writing further drains 1t of any 
significant effect beyond graded performance. The student 1s not 
"constrained by a practical exigence [and] 1s at liberty to advocate any 
position whatsoever, regardless of how frivolous, as long as 1t affords 
him an opportunity to exhibit his rhetorical prowess" (Consigny 281). 
Classrooms commonly "create ep1de1ct1c occasions . . . 1n order to have 
opportunities for expressing and reformulating [their] shared heritage" 
(Condit 289). In other words, they perpetuate the same kind of school 
writing to which students and teachers have become accustomed, which 
further explains the familiar ring 1n the ancient definition of display 
rhetoric. The Agency for this writing makes content Inferior to form 
and conflates display as both Its means and end: "Like ritual, 1n which 
what is said is less important than that it 1s said, the value of 
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epidelctlc 1s Intrinsic—the seemingly Impractical value of being 'a 
significant action 1n Itself'" (Carter 217-18). Thus classroom writing 
1s performance for performance's sake seeking praise for praise's sake— 
"academic discourse" at its most Intellectually Impotent. Teachers are 
Its real Agents, although they may pretend that students have an Agent's 
power to make meaning with and of their writing. As Sullivan's analogy 
of the epidelctlc orator::teacher Indicates, teachers "have the 
authority to tell students the way things are [but] choose Instead to 
support generalizations with good reasons out of respect for the 
students' rationality" ("Ethos" 125). Students, aware of this power 
relationship despite the teacher's attempts to bamboozle them with "good 
reasons," question teachers about exactly what they expect 1n an 
assigned piece of writing: How long should 1t be? How many sources 
should 1t cite? Should they, can they, do they have to give their 
opinion? Can they use the personal pronoun "I?" How will 1t be graded? 
The nature of the questions suggests a filling 1n of form rather than a 
creating of meaning, and 1t Illustrates students' bewilderment about 
whether school writing can or must have any real meaning for them at 
all. Given these elements of motive along with the fact that "the 
master 1s already human, the pupil a mere candidate for humanity" 
(Sullivan Rhetoric 208), authentic writing from the student seems an 
impossible dream. 
Poulakos' theory argues for a dynamic epidelctlc that describes a 
much more enlivening rhetorical situation for classroom writing: 
Conceived as the site of a critique or transformation of the 
social order, the genre of epidelctlc oratory can no longer be 
understood as a stable ground upon which tradition leaves Its 
unalterable traces and attains an intelligibility that persists 
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across time. Rather, the totality of works that make up the 
tradition of epidelctlc oratory must be understood as a historical 
register that supplies us with a heritage of conflicting 
valuations among participants of various societies at various 
times. ("Towards" 161) 
Rather than perpetuate classroom writing as a universal discursive Act 
unchanged by and unchanging of particular Agents, Purposes, Agencies, or 
Scenes, Poulakos' theory resuscitates 1t as an occasion for writers and 
readers to critique, transform, and negotiate the values among them. 
The significant difference in the epldeictlc theorized by Poulakos 
and that of his contemporaries 1s his move beyond dichotomy and toward 
dialogical thinking. Berthoff, alluding to the philosophy of C. S. 
Peirce, points to the significance of Poulakos' move 1n a warning about 
the limits of dichotomous thinking: 
[U]ntil and unless we base our pedagogy on a trladlc semiotics, 
all dichotomies will be hazardous and we will find ourselves 
defenseless against divisions like critical/creative, 
subjective/objective, cognitive/affective, and reading 1n/read1ng 
out. ("Killer" 16) 
Furthermore, she underscores Poulakos' dialogical thinking as a matter 
of theoretical and practical choice: "There are no dichotomies 1n 
reality: dichotomizing 1s an act of mind, not of Nature" ("Killer" 13-
14). Writing does not, after all, have to begin and end with 
categories. "Criteria for definition," she explains, "are developed not 
by asking 'Is 1t X or 1s 1t not?' but by asking 'What does 1t mean to 
say that thus and so 1s X rather than Y?' And not asking 1t once but 
continually ..." ("Killer" 15, my emphasis). To re-env1s1on classroom 
writing as something more generative than display rhetoric requires this 
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'"continuing audit of meaning'" (she quotes I. A. Richards) Into what 
students are doing with their classroom essays and why. 
In order to Illustrate the ep1de1ct1c nature of pedagogical 
discourse, I conducted research 1n three of my sections of English 
Composition II (ENG 102), the second-semester writing course at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro. The goal of this course as 
stated 1n the University's Undergraduate Bulletin 1s "[p]ract1ce 1n 
writing responsible public discourse. Students write extended, Informed 
arguments on Issues of public concern" (119). The course 1s Intended to 
focus on "deliberative" essays as one of the three kinds of writing 
taught 1n the pre-requ1s1te English Composition I (ENG 101) course, 
which Introduces students to the "alms and strategies of Informative, 
deliberative, and reflective writing" (119). As I worked to manifest 
this goal in my teaching of English Composition II, I became 
Increasingly Invested in occasioning the discovery of argument rather 
than requiring the writing of "deliberative" or "argumentative" essays. 
I taught two of these sections, 01 and 02, 1n Spring Semester 1994 
and ENG 102-03 1n the following Fall Semester 1994.17 The second half 
of these two semesters was conducted similarly. Each class worked on 
individual research projects, which Included three finished, graded 
pieces of writing: a study proposal, an annotated bibliography (which 
were grouped together as one essay for ENG 102-01 and -02), and the 
research study Itself. Topics were required to arise from the context 
of the class's readings and/or discussion. Class colleagues were 
intended readers, and students worked in small groups developing the 
writing-in-progress. For the first half of the Spring 1994 sections (01 
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and 02), students read and discussed assigned texts and wrote one long, 
graded essay on a topic drawn from the reading and class discussion for 
colleagues as readers. Throughout the semester, they kept a portfolio 
of reader responses and Ideas for future writing. They also kept a 
journal for thinking about themselves as writers. In the first half of 
the subsequent Fall 1994 section (03), students also read assigned 
texts. Their portfolio Included all the Inventive and exploratory 
writing that had been assigned to both the portfolio and journal during 
the previous semester. Rather than write one long essay, they wrote 
four short ones with colleagues as intended readers. I gave them 
evaluative comments on each short essay and one letter grade for the 
entire collection. In all three sections, I commented on journal and/or 
portfolio entries about every two weeks, giving a final grade based on 
the percentage of required entries made. The student-selected general 
topics for the Spring 1994 sections were gender myths and myths of 
Individual opportunity, chosen from possibilities 1n the reading 
collection entitled Rereading America: Cultural Contexts for Critical 
Thinking and Writing (Colombo et al). In Fall 1994, the general topic 
was learning, chosen by me and for which I collected a group of texts 1n 
a McGraw-Hill Pr1m1s reader. 
At the end of each semester, I asked students to complete a 
"Writer's Questionnaire" for my composition research and to sign a 
consent form permitting me to study their writing and report my findings 
(see Appendix A for the Spring 1994 questionnaire, Appendix B for the 
Fall 1994 questionnaire, and Appendix C for the consent form). The 
questionnaires were essentially the same, although the Fall version's 
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order was rearranged and the last three questions were changed 1n order 
to elicit comments more directly about writer-reader relationships. The 
questions were designed to prompt student descriptions of relationships 
among themselves as writers and their writing, their readers and 
responses from them, and aspects of context 1n or out of the classroom 
that Influenced their writing. I advised them that the questionnaires 
would be kept 1n the English Department Office until I turned 1n course 
grades. Of the 52 students enrolled 1n the three sections, 49 (94%) 
responded to the questionnaire and gave their consent. The three non-
parti c1 pants were absent on the day I gathered data. 
In order to discover the nature of ep1de1ct1c as these students 
perceived their writing experiences 1n these composition classrooms, I 
studied each student's responses to the questionnaire hollstlcally for 
the ways 1n which they characterized relationships between 1) writer and 
reader (Agent-Act), 2) meaning and consequence (Purpose-Act), 3) form 
and content (Agency-Act), and 4) text and context (Scene-Act). By 
Hep1de1ct1c," I should reiterate, I do not mean just the essay, or Act, 
itself. Rather, I refer to the entire rhetorical situation Including 
Agent(s), Purpose, Agency, and Scene. I Intentionally did not conduct a 
textual analysis of their essays 1n order to avoid fossilizing the Act 
or foregrounding what 1 as the teacher had to say about their writing. 
Their metadlscourse, students talking about the dynamics that made their 
writing seem living or dead to them, Illustrates the ep1de1ct1c 
occasion. They describe the motives shaping their discourse. 
To gather their sense of the writer and reader relationship, I 
listened especially to comments about colleagues and me as their readers 
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and about being a reader of colleagues' writing and of published 
writers' work. For relationship between meaning and consequence, 
comments about grades, evaluation, and small group workshops were most 
significant 1n eliciting what they determined were the alms of their 
writing. The form and content relationship was analyzed according to 
the relative emphasis placed on writing process and writing product, 
often-heard through comments about journals and portfolios as compared 
to essays, and also through characterizations of their writing as "fake" 
or "real." The relationship between text and context became apparent 
through responses about ways writing, reading, and talking Informed each 
other and about logistical constraints on their writing. Features of 
the metadlscourse informing my interpretations Included strength and 
tone of voice, clarity and reiteration of particular points, details 
recounted about pieces of writing, movement between particular 
observations and general interpretations, and word and phrase choices 
from cliche to Innovative prose. I also placed responses against the 
background of other thoughts that they had shared with me about their 
writing throughout the semester. 
As I listened to the ways these students described pedagogical 
discourse, four variations of classroom ep1de1ct1c emerged: 1) Students 
who represented all four relationships in dichotomies were most clearly 
display writers or, 1n other words, they were engaged 1n display (or 
ceremonial) ep1de1ct1c. 2) Conversely, students who described all four 
relationships dlalogically were authentic writers, engaging 1n authentic 
ep1de1ct1c. 3) Students who indicated a majority of dichotomies shaped 
their writing were primarily display writers with emerging authenticity. 
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4) Students who talked of a majority of dlaloglcal relationships were 
primarily authentic writers with lingering display. Analysis of the 49 
responding students revealed that 15 (31%) of the students were engaged 
in display ep1de1ct1c, 6 (12%) in authentic ep1de1ct1c, 15 (31%) were 
primarily display writers with emerging authenticity, and 13 (26%) were 
primarily authentic writers with lingering display (see Appendix D). 
Comparing the two clusters of display writers with the two clusters of 
authentic writers, the totals across all three classes were two-thirds 
(62%) display and one-third (38%) authentic.18 
These clusters of students Immediately suggest that the category 
of epidelctlc as display rhetoric or performative discourse as well as 
the category of deliberation for classroom writing of argumentation are 
insufficient concepts for understanding the writing that occurred 1n 
these classrooms. My Inductive categorizing of the students Into four 
groups provides a heuristic for discovering what did occur. It serves 
as a tool for pulling out and then thinking about the destructive and 
constructive aspects of these rhetorical occasions 1n order to continue 
composition pedagogy's audit of meaning in school writing. The point 
here 1s not to establish the categories of "display" and "authentic" 
writers and writing (and their combinations), but to use these terms as 
guides for initiating—not concluding—further thinking about the 
epldeictic quality of pedagogical discourse. As Berthoff explains the 
way in which dichotomy creates categories of A and non-A, they serve not 
as an Indicator of reality but as an Instrument toward discovering 
dialectic: 
But what about sea and land? Surely one 1s really, actually wet 
and the other is really, actually dry. Well yes, wet and dry 
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constitute a dichotomy and so do sea and land, as abstract—or 
mythical—categories, but where does one end and the other begin, 
at the shore? There 1s no line 1n nature that establishes that 
difference. The fact 1s, rather, that land and sea constitute a 
dialectic, which 1s now happily called The Coastal Zone. 
("Killer" 14). 
With this heuristic intention 1n mind, the following discussion 
describes each of the four groups. 
Display Writers 
In their responses to the "Writer's Questionnaire," 15 students 
expressed all dlchotomous relationships shaping their classroom 
ep1de1ct1c. Of the four hierarchies, the most pronounced was the 
meaning/consequence split, as evidenced by an emphasis on grades to give 
their writing Its only meaning. There were three variations of display 
writers: the belligerent, the bright, and the bland. 
The Belligerent: Larry (03), one of five belligerent display 
writers, was hostile about grades. When asked how the grading system 
affected his writing, he responded "It hurt 1t, never knowing what grade 
I really had." (He received written evaluations but no letter grade 
until near m1d-semester.) His recommendation was to "trash 1t, get a 
real grading system. Inexact, uncertain." Yet the research project, 
which grouped three Individually graded pieces of finished writing 
(study proposal, annotated bibliography, and research study), also 
frustrated him: 
They were useless and served a purpose only 1n the sense that they 
have successfully disillusioned me from taking further English 
courses when writing and reading (1f there 1s a purpose) happen to 
be things I greatly enjoy. 
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Larry also believed that contexts of school and work oppressed the 
discourse he might have written. In a postscript voluntarily added to 
the questionnaire, he referenced his lifestyle 1n order to emphasize the 
Impossibility of his own research and writing having any meaningful 
consequence. The "research paper had no real significance, I didn't 
have time (w/19 hrs. & a job) to conduct the necessary amount for 1t to 
be valid (eg 100's of questionnaires)." (Larry clearly did not believe 
my assurances that quantity was not a necessary Indicator of quality 
research.) Given these pressures along with his grading concerns, Larry 
wanted to write things that were, I suspect, forms he had written 1n 
previous English classes and had received good grades for. He suggested 
for the research project that I "[f]orget it, lose the assignment. Do a 
book review or a f1ct1on/non-f1ct1on story for the E.O.Y. [end-of-year?] 
project." The form of his research project was not one he felt willing 
and/or able to write; hence, the content suffered. 
Larry's writing "was always fake 1n this class," and he resisted 
opportunities designed to make 1t more real, as comments about his 
journal further illustrate. He advised, "if you must have journals, 
picks [sic] d1ff. topics, lose all the feelings & reader/writer 
relationship stuff, it is dlsinteresting." Not surprisingly, feedback 
about sharing his writing with colleagues and me was harsh: "teacher as 
reader is fine, classmates have no business reading what I write." He 
also did not like being the reader of group members' work, not wanting 
"to pick apart people's papers who don't ask me to w/ their own free 
will." Yet, after telling me to discard virtually everything I had done 
in the course, he concluded by affirming the hierarchy of teacher-
reade r/student-wr i te r: 
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P.S.—You are a great teacher and are knowledgeable 1n your field, 
however your teaching style 1s contradictory to my learning style. 
I really was uncomfortable having others read my stuff, I could 
present it, but not share 1t. It 1s nothing personal tho, you are 
a really nice lady, (my emphasis) 
He signed with a smiley face character and his initials. His choice of 
words were especially revealing about his discomfort. He was used to 
"present[1ng]" or displaying his writing for teachers, but he had never 
genuinely "share[d]" 1t with readers or, evidently, been asked to 
connect with 1t himself. 
Cassle (01), on the other hand, was a belligerent display writer 
Intimately connected to her texts and just as unlntlmately distanced 
from her readers. As a result, the Issue of grades became a lightening 
rod for her concerns. When asked what made her writing feel real or 
fake, she responded, "no offense, but all of my writing felt fake. One 
bad grade after another just prompted me to write what fulfilled the 
requirement." (Cassie's course grade was a "B.") Her determination to 
"fulfill!] the requirement" or perform the form was not always a useful 
approach. She was "confus[ed]" by the piggy-backed second and third 
essays of the research project: "The link between essays 2 & 3 was not 
clear. (It was, but where one ended & the other began wasn't.) It 
seemed like an extended essay, not two separate ones." She accurately 
described the assignment, although she could not manage 1t within the 
paradigm of writing assignments that I was requiring her to move out of. 
Her desire to choose essay topics, allowing her to "create better 
writings when there are less limits," was a request for freedom from 
readers' responses, particularly teachers' grades. Similarly, she 
preferred to author her comments orally rather than respond 1n writing 
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as a reader to the assigned published texts, as she explained why 
discussing was more Interesting than reading: "The discussions were our 
realities, our take on life." 
One of Ruth's (03) comments especially Illustrated the difficulty 
that all five belligerent display writers had with grade-as-mean1ng and 
teacher-as-reader of their writing. In responding to the question about 
real and fake writing, she drew a line from my statement "We do 1t just 
to get the grade." and wrote 1n the margin "so true." She then wrote 1n 
the allotted space for her answer, "I believe from the begnlng [sic] of 
the semester my writing 'felt real' to me." The contradiction between 
the two responses suggested that Ruth was playing the display game of 
giving the teacher what she wants, a game she described 1n another 
response about her colleagues and me as her readers: "Writing for my 
teacher as my reader was just like 'clock work.' Writing to my 
colleagues was tough. I have never had other students comment on my 
writing." To write "for" someone (a teacher) was performance; to write 
"to" them (her colleagues) was communication. 
The Bright: Five of the students who stand out 1n my memory as 
the best or potentially best writers 1n these three composition sections 
revealed themselves to be display writers through their questionnaire 
responses. Jayne (02) articulated the tension between the goals of 
being a good student and a good writer. In describing what made her 
writing feel real or fake, she wrote: 
I feel fake in my writing when I try to please the teacher 1n 
order to get a good grade. Any thoughts and revisions added or 
done to my papers with only the teacher 1n mind makes [sic] me 
feel as 1f I'm not writing for myself, or for my readers, but for 
a grade. I feel more 'real' 1n my writing when I can set my own 
pace, structure, and ideas 1n my essays. 
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Yet Jayne was deeply Invested 1n her graded writing, especially 
concerned about the finished pieces: 
The only grades that I considered important 1n here were my essay 
grades, and they were very Important. I get uptight when I write 
for a grade, so when I failed my first essay (for not documenting 
correctly), then damn 1t all 1f It's going to happen again. 
Jayne cried 1n my office during one or two of our meetings to discuss 
her work, mentioning the pressure she felt to succeed 1n all her 
courses. Her choice to incorporate secondary sources in her first 
essay, a strategy I neither mentioned nor encouraged for the assignment, 
was significant. Rather than willful plagiarism, 1t was, I imagine, a 
choice in stress management to do the same kind of writing for which she 
had received excellent grades 1n high school (without adequate 
documentation instruction). Documentation problems aside, 1t was an 
Intelligent and articulate interpretation and synthesis of her readings. 
In responding to the prompt inquiring about what else other than grades 
encouraged the student's writing during the semester, Jayne continued 
describing the Influence of grades: "I also think of a graded paper as 
proof of the worth of my work. It's like 'here 1t is—my blood, sweat, 
and tears—and this grade 1s what someone thought of my Ideas and 
effort.'" 
Jayne's worry over her grade shaped the way she Interpreted the 
assignments. She envisioned them as forms, none of which she preferred 
to fill. She explained that 
the first [essay] was more like an 'English' paper. The last two 
seemed more like psych, reports. I don't like to think 1n such a 
structured manner. I'd rather write things that I can Imagine [] 
would show up in a newspaper or magazine. 
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The form overpowered the content 1n her composition writing, whereas she 
was unaware of journalism's "structured manner." Her focus on the 
finished, graded essays also divided her texts from their context. 
Thinking about a general topic neither helped nor hindered her writing; 
"1t just helped [her] to think about essay topics." Interestingly, 
however, she "Hked the class discussions" and suggested that the class 
could have been Improved by having more of them. She also distanced 
herself from the exploratory writing. The portfolio sometimes was "busy 
work" and felt "strained," although other times 1t was "kind of 
helpful." Some of the journal prompts "seemed kind of cheezy," yet 
others were "kind of informative." Thus the reading, writing, and 
talking were significant to her texts; however, she either Ignored or 
felt constrained by their Influence given her focus on graded texts. 
Other bright students had mastered the art of display while 
remaining untouched by the significance of their writing. Lee (01), for 
instance, a graduating senior with honors 1n business who had already 
secured a full-time position with a nationally reputable employer, 
wrote: 
The grade is the motivating factor 1n my writing. Because I would 
not voluntarily chose [sic] to write. I need that (grade) as a 
guide for me. It Influences my decision about whether or not to 
do the assignment—most Importantly how much though[t] goes into 
it. Without the grades—my effort would most likely diminish. 
These students believed they were authentic writers when "authentic" and 
"academic" were equated. As Anne (03) put 1t, ". . . we are 1n school; 
what we are learning 1s great, but 1t all bolls down to a grade." Her 
comments and suggestions about the grading system Indicated the 
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willingness of a bright display writer to do whatever the teacher wanted 
1n order to earn her praise: 
Sometimes I couldn't understand exactly what your comments asked 
of me. . . . Just be a little more clear 1n explanlng [sic] your 
evaluating process: what you're looking for, what 1s most 
Important etc.—" 
Rita's (02) advice emphasized the necessity of grades. "Deflnetly 
[sic], do not stop grading school writing or 1t will never get done," 
she wrote. Not surprisingly, her portfolio with Its ungraded Individual 
entries "was busy work. Again, not to say that parts of 1t weren't 
enjoyable, but I feel as 1f 1t really had no relevance whatsoever to 
what we were pursuing 1n the course, other than keep us writing along." 
Any pleasurable or otherwise meaningful consequence for R1ta was an 
unexpected, nice but not necessary, side benefit to her completion of 
the school assignment. 
The Bland: As I recall the writing and participation of these 
last five display writers, nothing seriously flawed or outstanding comes 
to mind. As do the belligerent and the bright, these bland display 
writers looked for grades to give meaning to their writing 1n the 
classroom. They also paid special attention to the form of their 
writing. Annette (01) described herself as 
very much a grade oriented person—I try to do my best to get a 
good grade b/c my grades & QPA are [Inevitably?] what matter; 
however, if I wasn't being graded, I still would try to do well, 
rather than being slack b/c I would want the instructor to know I 
can do a good job; as well as for myself. 
Praise, whether 1t came through a grade or the teacher's respect, was 
more important to Annette's writing than, as she tagged her comment, her 
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own relationship with 1t. Journal writing about herself as a writer and 
her writing was advantageous only 1n terms of what 1t told her about how 
to finish written products. She "didn't really come to any conclusions 
about [her]se1f as a writer through [her] journals [] although [she] 
analyzed what [she] need[ed] to do better 1n essays." Likewise, the 
portfolio reader responses were often "busy work" 1n which she "just 
spat something out to get it done" even though they got her "thinking 
analytically, creatively and critically." They also "kept [her] writing 
so [that she was] not so 'stiff' when assignments came up." Her Image 
casts portfolio writing as preparatory calisthenics for bigger, essay 
gymnastics. She liked building the research study on the study proposal 
and annotated bibliography because 1t "was kind of easy to write b/c 1t 
follow[ed] #2's form." Annette was so convinced that she could fill 1n 
the forms of her essays that she proposed a gender study of women 1n 
business through an analysis of the movie Broadcast News without having 
seen the movie, following the suggestion of a girlfriend that 1t would 
prove sexist treatment of women, an Interpretation that she could not 
support once she finally watched the movie. 
Susan (01) also was a grade-driven bland writer who saw the 
portfolio and journal writing as fake, purposeless. "Journal entries 
are of no entries [Interest?] to me," she explained. "They can be 
written 5 m1ns. before class and serve basically no purpose—the only 
reason I did 1t was for a grade." She would have rather done "something 
more challenging like writing a couple of 2-3 page essays." The 
portfolio writing was "busy work" because, she assumed, any points about 
their reading assignments would have come up in class discussion without 
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them. Thus the contexts of written, read, and oral texts were unrelated 
in Susan's mind. Amy's (02) attitude was a little different from 
Susan's, yet ultimately as egocentric. She Hked the journal writing 
because it was writing about her writing, unlike the portfolio writing 
that required her to understand what another writer was saying. The 
readings, she thought, were "kind of dull," but the discussions were 
"interesting." Kevin put the problem with portfolio and journal forms 
in a teacher-reader/student-writer hierarchy by noting that the 
helpfulness of his portfolio "depended on what you had me writing about" 
(my emphasis). 
Summary of Display Writers: In their own ways, all of these 
display writers demanded, resented, expected, and/or were resigned to 
their classroom writing being shaped by hierarchical relationships. 
Some of them insisted on the traditional dichotomy of teacher-
reader/student-writer, while others Inverted it. The pressure of grades 
to give their writing Its meaning was so strong 1n these writers as to 
collapse meaning and consequence Into one. Thus their writing became 
artificial or "fake" with Its only purpose being to obtain a 
praiseworthy grade. With the teacher as the only essential grader-
reader, despite reading responses from their colleagues, writer-reader 
relationships also became artificial. In order to obtain the grade they 
desired, they viewed composition writing as a performance of whatever 
form the teacher requested. The performances occurred outside of the 
real, concrete classroom's context—the writing, reading, and talking 
occasioning them—as they attempted to situate themselves within a more 
familiar if more un-real, abstract school context. They were fearful 
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and/or resentful of me as the reader-teacher-grader requiring them to 
make their writings read, meanings consequential, forms contentful, and 
texts contextual. 
Authentic Writers 
The number of authentic writers 1n these three composition 
sections, six, 1s two and one-half times less than the number of 15 
display writers. These six students talked about their ENG 102 
experiences 1n dlaloglcal terms, bridging writer and reader, meaning and 
consequence, form and content, and text and context. As a result, they 
transformed artificial, abstract school writing Into authentic, concrete 
writing occasions. 
Don (01) talked about making his writing meaningful for himself 
while also acknowledging the Importance of grades. In responding to the 
questionnaire's suggestion that students often write in school just to 
get a grade, he asserted: 
I feel the writing that was done this semester was not just to get 
[a] grade. In class we searched for Ideas/topics that would 
Interest the writer. When you write about something Interesting, 
you write for yourself and a grade. 
He also put the grade 1n perspective 1n speaking about what encouraged 
his writing: 
I believe whenever you are writing for course credit the thoughts 
of what grades you may get [will] always be there, but when you 
find something to write on that really gets your Interest, 
sometimes the grade 1s not all that Important. 
Don's comments do not force choices; they facilitate movement between 
writer and reader as well as meaning and consequence. Form and content 
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were synthesized 1n Don's remarks about his research project, portfolio, 
and journal. He Hked the connection between the second (study proposal 
and annotated bibliography) and third (research study) essays because 
the second "gives you a place to start your research. You know what you 
are looking to get from the research." His portfolio served Its 
inventive aim, "helpful in finding an Idea or topic." The journal 
worked even better. It was "very helpful" because, as he noted, 1t 
"allowed me to look back at myself as a writer and see 1f I feel any 
different before and after the course." He felt process and product 
working together in the development of writing and writer. Don's sense 
of the relationships between writers and readers and text and context 
blended 1n comments about class discussions. He saw that "when you 
discuss a topic as a group, 1t helps the writer Individually to take a 
position when writing his/her own paper. . . . Overall, I believe the 
class discussions were the key to the class." Don's arguments 1n all 
his finished writing were well-developed from class discussion, and he 
situated his writer's point of view according to this real sense of his 
readers. 
When I recall Don's puzzled questions to me earlier 1n the 
semester about his grades and the new kinds of writing I was requiring 
of him, his questionnaire responses Indicate that he shed several 
traditional school expectations 1n order to become an authentic writer 
1n ENG 102. Furthermore, his writing continued to have relevance for 
him after the course was completed. In the subsequent semester he came 
to visit me, wanting to be sure he had the final version of his research 
study with my comments on it in order to adapt 1t for an oral 
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presentation 1n one of his business major courses. He was obviously 
pleased with his work's meaning and with the opportunity to share 1t 
with another audience. 
Mitch (03) talked about getting beyond the teacher grade-giver as 
his only reader 1n order to achieve authentic writing. My providing 
evaluative comments without a grade the first half of the semester 
helped. Mitch assessed, "I found that I could write without worrying 
about what grade I would receive on each paper." He recommended that I 
"[k]eep using it [this grading system]. It 1s helpful to writers b/c 
they don't have to worry about 'pleasing the teacher' on each paper." 
Like Don, Mitch referred to himself as a "writer" rather than a 
"student" when not 1n a display mode of teacher-pleasing. Mitch re-cast 
writer-reader relationships 1n order to accomplish authentic discourse. 
In comparing what 1t was like writing for his teacher and for his 
colleagues, he noted: "Writing for the small group to read helped me 
get passed [sic] writing for the teacher. I tried to focus more on them 
than on the teacher as my reader." He also valued responding to 
colleagues' wr1t1ng-in-progress because he "felt like [he] had some 
input to their writing & tried to help them become better writers." The 
goal of being a better writer superseded being a better student. 
Mitch was not unaware of the teacher's guidance, however, as his 
comments about the context for conducting and reporting his research 
indicated: 
Maybe give a little more time to actually conduct experiment. I 
felt a little rushed doing 1t. The deadlines set for each piece 
(eg Study Proposal, Bibliography, etc) helped me get 1t done, 
otherwise I probably would have done the study yesterday & written 
the paper last night! 
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His humor alluded to conversations he and I had about the time It takes 
for a writing process to proceed. The rewards for managing his process 
for the research project were apparent 1n comments about real writing: 
"The research paper felt real to me because 1t was something I had 
actually gone out & observed. It was also the end of a process started 
long ago & it gave me a sense of accomplishment." Form and content 
worked together 1n his project, and Mitch knew when their dialogic had 
reverted to hierarchy. In journal writing, he noted, M[t]ry1ng to meet 
the 4 page a week assignment made me feel like I was doing busy work. 
The first two pages were usually more Insightful than the last two." 
The first two, 1n other words, were contentful; the last two were form-
filling. Comments from Stacey (03) about the journal treated Its 
fluctuating meanlngfulness as natural. She noted that "[s]ome times 
[sic] I wrote with feeling and others I just wanted to get my 4 pages 
for the week done. I think the journals work well. I also think this 
1s to be expected," she concluded, drawing an arrow to her comment about 
their variability. Also like Mitch, she found colleagues' and teacher's 
evaluative comments helpful in getting her to stop '"writing for the 
grade'." 
The respect for and pride 1n their and their colleagues' writing 
evident 1n Don and Mitch's comments also came through 1n Marie's 
responses (01). "I believe all the essays we have done made the writing 
seem real," she declared. "I did great and interesting studies, as 
other students did, on topics of concern 1n our society. This was 
wonderful and fun, not just for a grade." A balance between writing for 
her own Interest and writing better because she knew a teacher-reader 
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would evaluate with a grade was also reflected 1n comments about what 
encouraged her writing: 
The encouragement, other than a grade, that made me do the 
writings 1s that we got to choose topics that were of Importance 
to us. That encouraged me to want to do the essays just to find 
out Information on my own. The grading of course made me want to 
do 1t even more. 
Marie's "of course" suggested that she took school and grades 1n stride 
as she got Into her "great and Interesting" work. These comments also 
bridged worlds of school and society, as she contextual 1zed her work 
with her colleagues' and their larger, shared world. Mitch agreed, 
noting that reading and discussion "helped open [his] eyes to other 
aspect[s] of learning and helped [him] realize more what was going on 
around [him]." 
Jack (03) and Ted (02), two of the least traditional students 1n 
these three sections, were also two of the six authentic writers. 
Although Jack was a non-native speaker of English and Ted had a learning 
disability, neither of these potential encumbrances manifested 1n a 
greater desire to perform the form for the teacher. Jack's comments 
illustrated a genuine aim of communication 1n his writing. In comparing 
what it felt like to write for his teacher and colleagues, he wrote, "It 
was the same thing for me. I just wanted to get my point across." His 
preference for comments rather than grades emphasized his desire to know 
whether his communication was effective. He explained, "I personally 
understood more the comments than a letter grade so I think this method 
worked fine for me." He also recommended that "[m]aybe you could give 
more comments on each of the paragraphs of the writing." The journal 
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was the only writing that confounded Jack. He could not "see the use of 
it," and 1t was hard to write because he was "not used to 1t." The 
function of the journal was unclear to Jack and, as an authentic writer, 
he often resisted writing 1n 1t, unwilling merely to fill a form, even 
1f he also was unwilling to explore its potential usefulness. 
Ted, on the other hand, was more flexible than Jack about 
exploratory writing. He understood the portfolio's Intent to help 
writers explore Ideas even when they think they have none. He noted 
that 
1f I did get into [the topic], 1t was help 1n getting me to write 
down all my thoughts and getting them to flow. But on the other 
hand your [sic] not always going to get to write things you can 
get Into, so when those came up they helped me to deal with them. 
He also took the journal as an opportunity to do something he had not 
done before: "It made me stop and think what type of writer I am and 
how I write and why." The Influence of one relationship on another can 
be heard 1n the following comment expressing the way a change 1n purpose 
affects the writer's relationship with reader and text: 
Well, when writing the essays, which is a bigger grade [,] of 
course the influence is there to make 1t the best you can do. I 
feel this 1s Important and needed, but when writing the portfolios 
& journals there is not as much Influece [sic] to do anything 
except to get thoughts down on paper which also 1s Important and 
helpful. 
Ted also used the intertextual context of his writing 1n the research 
project to his advantage, allowing 1t to diminish concerns about 
"commlng [sic] up with topic ideas" and the "recomended [sic] number of 
pages" for his essays. 
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Summary of Authentic Writers: Unlike the display writers, who 
voiced concerns with various strains of rebellion, these authentic 
writers talked with a confidence and respect for their rhetorical 
situations. They developed comfortable relationships with their 
readers, teacher and colleagues alike. They were enthusiastic about the 
consequences of their writing, having put grades 1n perspective with 
other meanings that were as or more Important to themselves as writers 
and to their readers. In order to achieve their purposes, they employed 
forms as tools for shaping their writing's content and vice-versa. 
Their texts arose from the various discursive contexts of their 
classrooms, and they also perceived the classroom as relevant to 
contexts beyond it. They took responsibility for making exploratory 
writing in journals and portfolios meaningful and contextual. Rather 
than succumbing to or inverting hierarchies, they transformed them 
dialogically. These writers accomplished the authentic writing as I 
attempted to occasion it for all of the students in these three 
composition sections. 
Primarily Display Writers with Emerging Authenticity 
The "Writer's Questionnaire" elicited 15 students who transformed 
one of the four dichotomous relationships between writer/reader, 
meaning/consequence, form/content, and text/context. Many of these 
students, I recall, began the semester with overt obligatory attitudes 
about their enrollment 1n ENG 102 and became openly delighted about 
their emerging authenticity by semester's end. I have arranged the 
description of these students according to the emerging authentic 
relationship that distinguishes them from the 15 students completely 
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engaged 1n display writing. The most dynamic changes were apparent 1n 
comments Indicating that students had negotiated the pressures of 
teacher-as-reader and grade-as-mean1ng. These writer-reader and 
meaning-consequence relationships were practically Inextricable from one 
another as students emerged from display writing. Therefore, although I 
discuss Wendall as speaking primarily about his emerging writer-reader 
relationship and Kris about meaning-consequence, their comments 
evidenced the overlap. 
Writer-Reader Relationship: Wendall (02) expressed himself as an 
emerging writer who was learning to negotiate what he said to whom. He 
was one of the few students who made a point to discuss his grades with 
me on more than one occasion during the semester. In one meeting, he 
asked me the point-blank reader/writer question, "What do I need to do 
to get an 'A' from you?" H1s question represents the Intimacy between 
writer-and-reader and mean1ng-and-consequence in classroom writing. My 
suggestion, designed to make him more aware of their mutual influences, 
was that he start looking for a reason to write other than his grade 
because 1t would make his writing more Interesting, both for him to 
write and me to read. He did and, as a result, his research study was 
authentic for him. It "actually felt like real research for personal 
benefit, not just a grade." The tension he balanced was complex, 
however, as reflected in his comment about gradlng's influence and other 
encouragements: "Grading saved my life. If it wasn't for my D-, I 
wouldn't have gotten A's on my last two essays. The Interest in my 
study was as important in making me wr1t[e] it for a grade." Wendall 
received a "D-" on his first essay because I read it as an 111-
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supported, racist argument unconvincing for the Intended readers 1n our 
class. We talked individually a great deal about evidence and audience 
as he tried to understand why his essay had failed, especially 
considering he thought he had brought to the piece the same hard-h1tt1ng 
tone that his last semester's history teacher valued. Given his 
comments about the research project and his recommendation to continue 
small group workshops (along with my perception of Wendall as a student 
who would welcome the opportunity to be forthright on a teacher's end-
of-semester questionnaire), Wendall's lesson suggests not one about 
manipulating words 1n order to satisfy teachers. Instead, 1t was one 1n 
learning about connecting one's words with a real reader or two. 
Mean1ng-Conseauence Re1at1onsh1d: Kris (01) articulated a shift 
1n the way grades influenced her writing process over the course of the 
semester. In recalling her first essay, she wrote, "At first the grade 
made me upset and not want to write but I also want[ed] to pass so I 
kept going. When the grade got better so did my writing." (Actually, 
her writing got better, then the grade.) She continued talking about 
grades on the back of the questionnaire: 
A grade can often effect [sic] a persons [sic] writing in a 
negative way. Society 1s lead [sic] to believe that a grade 1s a 
basis for how smart a person is but that 1s Inaccurate. A grade 
is a letter out of the alphabet and means nothing except that you 
had a good day or a bad day. 
Although Kris's discounting of the worth of a grade swung the pendulum 
to another extreme, she at least was moving toward a confidence 1n her 
Intelligence. Kris was one of the weakest writers at the beginning of 
Spring 1994, and she told me with resigned acceptance on several 
164 
occasions early 1n the semester that she "just could not write." 
Although she "hated writing the first essay," she concluded her 
questionnaire with a note much more positive than I Imagined she would 
sound about this class: "I think the class was great. I enjoyed 1t all 
together [sic] and only perhaps [would] pick a dlffrent [sic] topic for 
essay #1." Kris's sense of a real context for her process also 
developed, as her final comments about personality differences 
Indicated: "Also you are a morning person and I am not. I would take 
this class later 1n the day so I could enjoy 1t more." 
Form-Content Relationship: Ben (02) became aware of writing as 
process rather than just product during the semester and therefore his 
writing became more than just forms to complete. What made his writing 
feel real, he enumerated, was "the way we've approached the essay; 
1)rough draft 2)rev1s1on 3) revision workshops and 4) final drafts." 
Until he began the process of writing the research study, he did not 
understand the ways 1n which it would be different from his study 
proposal and annotated bibliography. "... [Q]nce I started 1t," he 
noted, "I realized they would be pretty different .... these two 
essays were interesting because 1t was a hands on kind of experience." 
Process and product, form and content did not always blend 1n Ben's 
writing, however. His portfolio writing was done "basically for 
completion" and his journal, he did not think, "benefitted me 1n anyway. 
Revision workshops were my advantage." Ben remained focused on 
finished, graded pieces of writing, exclusive of Inventive writing that 
he only completed for credit. Emphasis on grades kept him from 
transforming dichotomies any further than he did, and he advised me of 
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the importance of grades for students' motivation: "I know that 1f you 
didn't grade essays but it was a pass/fail course then the essay would 
never be as good. The grading makes people put effort Into 1t, 1n order 
to achieve a good grade." Yet with his research study, the piece of 
writing he valued most, he transcended the purpose of grade. In our 
last class meeting, I confessed that I was sorry that I had not planned 
time for each writer to report a bit of his or her findings to the 
entire class. Ben concluded his questionnaire with this suggestion for 
making the class better: "Like you said about sharing our studies. We 
all worked hard on them and 1t would have been more of a benefit to 
share them rather than just getting a grade." Earlier 1n the semester, 
Ben would not read his colleagues' writing-in-progress prior to 
workshops. Thus this comment suggested the impact of transforming the 
form/content split. 
Journal and portfolio writing were more significant for Patricia 
(01) than Ben. Her initial attention to surface details of finished 
products developed into a deeper sense of things to attend to in her 
writing process because of this exploratory writing. "Grading has 
influenced my writing because it has made me think about grammar, 
punctuation, etc.," she explained, then describing how things changed: 
Writing became interesting to me after awhile. It wasn't such a 
struggle because the journals and portfolios forced me to be open-
minded .... and to think more. I already had ideas about 
topics before starting a paper because I was constantly thinking 
while writing portfolios. 
She listed the advantages of her journal as "more thought put into 
writing" and "more feed-back from teacher." The connection between her 
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writing and thinking processes was evidenced in her concern that the 
topic for the beginning of the semester was "much too controversial" 1n 
the face of the open-mlndedness she was discovering through her 
exploratory writing. 
Text-Context Relationship: Other display writers indicated a 
heightened sense of their writing's contexts. Alice (03) perceived all 
her writing for the course Intertextually, finding the connections 
beneficial. She saw how "one built on the other" 1n the series of texts 
comprising the research project, and she also reflected on this pattern 
in the first half of the semester. Comparing the research project to 
the first two short essays of the semester, she noted they were "just 
like the Interviews [,] compiled to get the class data. You can see the 
progress of ideas." Alice was glad not to have the pressure of grades 
at the beginning of the semester, claiming, "You don't feel hindered by 
a bad grade. You learn how to improve your writing before the final 
grade." She advised, however, to "give grades on the first few essays, 
but don't make them count." 
The context of class discussion was particularly Important for 
other writers. Beverly (02) appreciated the influence of talk on her 
writing and thinking. "It helps your writing," she explained, "because 
as a group you hear different opinions that you haven't thought of 
before but will enhance your writing." Discussions of gender myths were 
"interesting because you heard different Ideas & beliefs." She spoke on 
behalf of the entire class for big and small group discussion: "I think 
these are helpful to all of us." Bruce (02) suggested that I add more 
class discussion in future sections because "it brought out some great 
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Ideas 1n people." Ultimately, however, he believed that "you really do 
have to grade the students, even though 1t does force them to write." A 
great idea, evidently, only went so far on its own volition in the 
composition classroom. 
Summary of Primarily Display Writers with Emerging Authenticity: 
Each of these students, primarily engaged 1n display writing, 
demonstrated some development as a dialogic writer. Their respect grew 
for their readers, themselves as writers, their writing processes and 
products, or the living scene within which they wrote for a semester. 
Most often, if they were transforming the dichotomy between writer and 
reader, they also were beginning to re-th1nk the emphasis of grades as 
the conflated meaning/consequence of their writing. If they were 
discovering relationships between form and content, they were less 
likely to let go of the need to define their writing 1n terms of grades. 
They gained, however, an awareness of themselves as writers, not just as 
students, and of their writing as process, not just product. The 
writers who felt an enhanced reality for the context of their discourses 
often expressed pleasure about the course even while continuing to worry 
about their grades. Through these transformations, then, these display 
writers with emerging authenticity were farther along than their 
colleagues who were completely engaged 1n display writing. 
Primarily Authentic Writers with Lingering Display 
Thirteen students, one more than twice as many as the six fully 
authentic writers, gave responses to the "Writer's Questionnaire" 
suggesting they were primarily authentic writers with lingering display. 
Each of these students talked about their writing experience in ENG 102 
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in terms of three but not four dialogical relationships, or 1n terms of 
two that were expressed with notable strength and clarity. I have 
arranged their description according to the lingering threads of display 
writing that distinguish them from the six authentic writers. 
Writer/Reader Relationship: Although bridging other dichotomies, 
Gary's (01) recounting of his essays suggested that awareness of the 
teacher-as-reader overwhelmed some of his writer's choices. He stated 
that the first essay "was a little fake. Perhaps because I didn't like 
the topic." Gary's choice to write about marital rape laws, never 
explicitly discussed 1n our work with gender myths, seemed like a 
typical choice for an "English argumentative essay"; I wondered 1f he 
had written on 1t for a previous class and was looking for an easy out. 
He made a more meaningful choice for his research project. "The third 
[essay] was real writing to me. Since I believed in what I wrote," he 
concluded, "1t really helped me write it. I felt that I did the third 
essay more for myself than the grade." When he gave himself authority 
over his choices, the consequence of a grade likewise became more 
controlled. Gary also took ownership of his journal while testing the 
waters with his teacher-reader. Its advantage, he noted, was that "I 
could throw a lot of stress or anger, or my feelings onto the journal. 
I felt that it was my journal & I could write whatever I thought. The 
disadvantage was that you were going to read them!" He also perceived 
his texts in connection with other students' writing, which 1n turn 
"helped [him] revise [his] own topic" and "showed [him] that many 
different people have a different assessment of what individual 
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opportunity really 1s," an awareness gathered from class reading and 
discussion that informed his research project. 
Unlike Gary, Carol represented several nearly authentic writers 
who, while feeling a balance between writers and readers when they were 
the writer, demonstrated a lack of ability to interact similarly when 
they were in the reader's position. Although her writing was real when 
it was "personal," for Instance, in talking about "opinions on our wrt. 
process, our exploring paper topics, [and] research for final essay," 1t 
was fake when "responding to writing 1n book," meaning the assigned 
reading of published discourses. In her assessment of the readings and 
discussions, she wrote: "[T]he readings were boring to me. I liked the 
discussion but these are topics all of us will never agree on or reach a 
solution about—frustrating." Carol's frustration suggested she had not 
yet figured out how to negotiate to her fullest satisfaction writer-
reader relationships. Other than this dlchotomous relationship, her 
comments illustrated an authentic writer. She was encouraged by 
"getting involved personally with issues" therefore yielding meaningful 
journal and research writing. She recognized that "grading [journal 
responses] would be Impossible: better to let students respond as they 
wish." Her sense of her research study's context informed her 
understanding of her "intended readers' previous attitudes about [her] 
subject." 
Meanina/Conseauence Re1ationship: Not surprisingly, six of these 
nearly authentic writers focused on grades. Lindsey (01) admitted: 
Honestly, the grading of my essays affects my writing a lot. If 
there were no grades, I would do the writing, but I'm sure I 
wouldn't put as much into it. I would much rather read!! Besides 
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my grade, though, I was encouraged to write to express a few Ideas 
and look into what I thought about a few others. 
Her portfolio aided her expression and Investigation. Although 1t was 
half the time "busy work," she recalled that her ideas for the first 
essay and research project began as portfolio writing, which was "kind 
of magical, how [they] popped out of the class writing from [for?] me!!" 
Similarly, she found the journal advantageous for Its Insights and 
"clues" about her writing. She described the context of class reading 
and discussion as "excellent" because "1t 1s so Interesting to see how 
each student chooses the Individual subjects!! It's fun!! . . . When 
you take one topic, you get so many Ideas and opinions back—which helps 
everybody!!" The context for Undsey's work was so relevant that she 
"wouldn't have minded sharing [her] 2nd/3rd essay with the class and 
also hearing about their studies!!" 
V1ck1 (01) matter-of-factly figured the meaning of grades as 
primary 1n the larger school picture: 
Since we are all concerned about our grades especially since we 
have to apply to schools for our majors w/ certain GPA's I think 
our grades were Important. Also I think we want to Improve on 
less adequate grades and 1f you know its [sic] going to be graded 
your [sic] going to do 1t. The Interest of the subjects also 
encouraged me to do the writing. 
Mary (03), however, was anxious to move beyond this superiority of 
grades over other meaning for her writing. In comparing writing for her 
colleagues and teacher, she expressed dissatisfaction with her emphasis 
on grades, noting: 
I didn't really mind writing for you although I tend to worry too 
much about the grade and not on my work's content. I enjoyed 
writing for my colleagues b/c it was interesting to hear their 
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comments, feedback, suggestions, etc. I found myself more 
enjoying their reading my work than you (no offense) but the 
pressure 1s off when I was evaluated by them on my work. 
The static nature of a grade was highlighted by Mary's wording—she got 
a "grade" from her teacher, but was "evaluated" by her colleagues. 
In spite of this lingering display of meaning/consequence, 
dialogles in other relationships were woven by these students. Wanda 
(03) spoke to the significance of real readers, writing that "[w]hen you 
know that people actually care about what you are saying and will take 
real notice to what you write, you seem to be more aware and precise." 
Jed (02) connected form and content as he remembered the difficulties he 
had understanding the requirements for the study proposal and annotated 
bibliography. He could not get the image of a finished argument out of 
his mind and "got confused" about the piggy-backed essays. He finally 
saw, however, that it helped him "plan [his] research in advance," 
concluding that "both essays really have to be connected to make the 
idea clear & effective." 
Form/Content Relationship: Zach (01) was one of two primarily 
authentic writers held back by an emphasis on form, the issue that Jed 
resolved by semester's end. As a writer with little experience in 
exploring and developing topics, Zach was overwhelmed by the 
requirements of a project Incorporating primary and secondary research. 
He felt that "[t]he final result of the last 2 essays was more 1n depth. 
I kind of got tired of the same material." His topic's content, as a 
result, could not carry the weight of a research project. Yet he 
intuited the difference that time and thought gave his writing as he 
described his portfolio writing: "If I did the portfolios the day 
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before class they would be Interesting, but 1f I waited till before 
class, the only think I accomplished was busy work." In terms of 
dlaloglcs, Zach was one of the writers who benefitted most from a keen 
sense of classroom context. His writing felt real because 1t "was 
discussed thoroughly 1n class [and] [m]any topics that are discussed 1n 
society were discussed 1n here." His situation influenced his writing's 
meaning: "The class 1n general encouraged me because I wanted to keep 
up with everyone and be able to participate." He also valued the class 
readings and discussions for the ways they allowed "some of us [to] 
relate and then others [to] learn[] how the 'other side' 1s." 
Context/Text Relationship: Although a number of students 
throughout all of these clusters commented generally about the logistics 
of student life (usually complaining that I had required too much 
writing), Bud was the student who alluded most persistently to the ways 
1n which a school context overshadowed his discourse. His writing felt 
fake at the beginning of the semester because he perceived he "had to 
write about a topic [he] had no interest 1n. It [his writing] felt real 
when [he] did [his] final paper on something [he] wanted to write 
about." Similarly, he thought it was "fine" that the class discussed a 
general topic together; however, he believed "it hurt [him] to have to 
write about what everybody talked about." His parenthetical disclaimer, 
"(Maybe I misunderstood the aim of the first paper.)," was noteworthy 
because the topic requirements for the first and final essays were the 
same 1n terms of their need to connect to the class reading and 
discussion. Bud, I suspect, began the semester automatically assuming 
that his teacher would dictate his topic from among uninteresting school 
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choices. Therefore, he did not negotiate a text suitable for both him 
and his readers until our work was farther underway. Portfolio and 
journal writing helped his thinking, but "when given all the time" 
became "busy work." Bud, in his m1d-20s, was returning to college for a 
second time while working nights as a bartender and planning to marry 
soon. Despite these contextual pressures, he could articulate the 
connection between reading, writing, and talking: "The readings seemed 
to help us express ourselves orally in class and verbally in the 
portfolios and journals. Writing and talking about them made them 
interesting." He ended up with a research project that he "was 
interested 1n [] grade aside." 
Summary of Primarily Authentic Writers with Lingering Display: 
Most of the authentic writers with lingering display suggested that the 
last dichotomy to be transformed 1n order for them to become completely 
authentic writers would be the writer/reader or meaning/consequence 
relationship. The writer/reader relationship was often Inverted rather 
than negotiated, as some students connected with the teacher-as-reader, 
but could not negotiate their own position as reader of texts laden with 
authority as published material assigned by their teacher. With varying 
tones of acceptance or agitation, students spoke about grades as the 
ultimate motivator and point of their writing. A minority of these 
nearly authentic writers wrestled most explicitly with form/content or 
text/context Issues. Form oppressed content. Texts were relinquished 
to a school context while real class situations were Ignored when the 
writing persisted with lingering display. One or another dichotomy, 
then, kept this group of students from not quite developing into fully 
authentic writers. 
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Summary 
In shaping display or authentic writing, all four groups of 
English 102 students suggest the primary significance of the writer-
reader and meaning-consequence relationships. In the most extreme of 
display writers, meaning and consequence were conflated Into the one 
Purpose of grade. In contrast, fully authentic writers found other 
reasons to give their writing meaning, along with Its grade. 
Accompanying these respective perceptions of grades, display writers 
were more likely to resist their teacher and/or colleagues as readers, 
while authentic writers developed working relationships with their 
teaching and colleglal readers. Comments from display writers were 
marked with frustration and resentment; authentic writers expressed 
satisfaction and pleasure. As a result of dichotomies, display writers 
saw their writing as forms to perform or to rebel against 1n a context 
that was either Irrelevant to or oppressive of their discourse. 
Alternatively, writer-reader and meaning-consequence dlaloglcally led 
students to discover ways to form their thinking 1n contexts that 
resonated for them, their topics, and their readers. 
Display writers with emerging authenticity suggested the intricate 
weaving of writer-reader and meaning-consequence relationships. When 
one began to emerge dialogically, the other was not far behind. Form-
content and text-context were less likely to be the dominant emerging 
dialogical relationship, although it was possible for change toward 
authentic writing to begin with them. As writer-reader or meaning-
consequence were usually the first relationships to emerge, they were 
also the last to be transformed fully, as the primarily authentic 
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writers with lingering display illustrate. Even as those two 
relationships were developing dlaloglcally, tensions still were present, 
and students expressed dissatisfaction similar to that of writers more 
fully engaged 1n display writing. Just as form-content or text-context 
infrequently led transformation, so too were they occasionally the last 
dichotomies to linger 1n nearly authentic writers. 
In this research, writer-reader, meaning-consequence, form-
content, and text-context all were illustrated as dynamic relationships. 
In addition to maintaining the dichotomies of epldeictlc theory by some 
students, hierarchies also were inverted or transformed by others. The 
dynamic, fluctuating nature of the epideictic developed among these 49 
students within and across the four clusters of writers suggests that 
classroom writing is not necessarily a static rhetorical situation, or a 
matter of ceremony. Teachers, grades, genres, and school do not 
necessarily have to pre-determ1ne the writers that students must be and 
the writing that they must do, even though this research Indicates they 
most often do. Therefore, epideictic theory inaccurately constructs 
hierarchies of writer, meaning, form, and text over reader, consequence, 
content, and context. 
More significantly, this analysis of epideictic practice uncovers 
the destructlveness that results from efforts to enact these Inaccurate 
concepts of language use. When the theoretical hierarchies were 
maintained or inverted, writers and readers became embattled, pitting 
persuasion against deliberation. Students who demonstrated 
writer/reader opposition, as constructed 1n epideictic theory, expected 
no deliberation from their teacher-reader, in lieu of an anticipated 
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praiseworthy grade. Students Inverting the opposition Into a 
reader/writer relationship gave up any real persuasive aim and wrote 
whatever they believed the teacher and/or school requested. When 
students wrote with an emphasis on meaning over consequence, as 
ep1de1ct1c theory hypothesizes, their only or dominant purpose was to 
get a satisfactory grade. When they Inverted the hierarchy, they 
resisted grading altogether. In terms of form and content, students 
enacted the theoretical dichotomy when they found no connection with 
their writing and attempted Instead to fill form, more often 1n journals 
and portfolios but also 1n essays. Conversely, students who flipped the 
dichotomy rebelled against any constraint on the expression of their 
ideas. As epldelctic theory would have 1t, some students saw their 
texts outside of real context, having little or no relevance to the 
reading, discussing, and exploratory writing they were doing as they 
developed finished pieces of writing. Conversely, the context of school 
inhibited texts that students imagined they could write 1n a 
context/text hierarchy. 
In contrast to writing the flawed and debilitating epldelctic of 
display, other students wrote dlaloglcally. In this authentic writing, 
the relationship between writer and reader enabled students to enact 
persuasion and anticipate their teacher's and colleagues' deliberation. 
Their dialoglcal sense of meaning and consequence was grounded in 
worthwhile reasons to write beyond, but not exclusive of, graded 
evaluation. Students who developed a working relationship between form 
and content saw writing as a matter of both process and product; writing 
was a formative act of creating rather than a filling of forms already 
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created by someone else. Students who negotiated text and context saw 
other forms of thinking (reading, discussing, and exploratory writing) 
shaping their texts and, 1n turn, their texts affecting the readers and 
issues related to that thinking. With each student, then, something was 
lost 1n a dlchotomous relationship, while something was gained 1n a 
dlaloglcal one. Students invested in display writing Implicitly and 
probably unconsciously believed in ep1de1ct1c theory's draining of 
deliberation, consequence, content, context, and—ultimately—deed from 
their discourse. They gave over to ceremonial school writing. 
Conversely, students Invested 1n authentic writing implicitly and 
perhaps more consciously believed in the Inextricable connection between 
words and deeds. They transformed ceremony into an occasion for 
negotiating symbolic action. 
Ep1deict1c theory does not accurately explain what happened 1n 
these composition classrooms. More significantly, 1t overlooks the 
destructive nature of the dlchotomous relationships advocated 1n Its 
hypothesizing and displayed 1n these ep1de1ct1c occasions. Furthermore, 
epldeictic theory ignores the potential for a more constructive outcome. 
In the terms of the pentad, this student metadlscourse raises several 
questions about theory of the epideictlc Act. Who is the Agent of this 
writing—the student or the teacher? What role of Agent can the 
students' colleagues play? Why do these students write—for the Purpose 
of grade or for some other reason? How do these students write—by 
filling 1n a form or by forming as Agency? Finally, where 1s the Scene 
for their writing—an abstract notion of "school" or a real classroom? 
Likewise, my reader response to Pericles' war eulogy raises questions 
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about who Its Agents are or can be; what Its real Purpose 1s or should 
be; how it does or should go about achieving Its Purpose; and whether 
its Scene 1s or can be universal or particular. The way rhetorical 
theory answers these questions will suggest whether 1t wishes to 
continue shaping rhetorical practice as a perpetuation of display by 
orators and students or as a facilitation of the negotiation of values 
and Ideas in ceremony and 1n school. 
As language often divided Into the categories of epldeictlc and 
deliberative, war eulogies and classroom essays have things 1n common 
that categorical differences cloud and that a theory of rhetoric as one 
use of language denies. The theoretical Insufficiency and practical 
consequences that follow from destructive choices 1n epldeictlc have 
been illustrated 1n chapters three and four, as has the potential for 
stronger theoretical explanation and more constructive outcomes. 
Chapter five draws these similarities together and explores implications 
for moving rhetorical theory and practice farther along toward real 
peacemaking and authentic classroom writing. 
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CHAPTER V 
EULOGIES, ESSAYS, EPIDEICTIC: REUNITING WORD AND DEED 
As disparate as war eulogies and classroom essays might at first 
seem, these occasions of cultural and pedagogical discourse as 
Illustrated 1n chapters three and four suggest foundational 
similarities. The same inaccuracy and destructlveness result 1n both of 
them when dichotomies dictate the relationships shaping the discourse— 
writer/reader, meaning/consequence, form/content, text/context, or their 
inversions. When the relationships work dialoglcally, the eulogy and 
essay generate peaceable negotiations within and among the discursive 
Act, Agent, Purpose, Agency, and Scene. These similarities point to 
implications for theoretical and practical choices 1n all discourse. As 
Ronald and Roskelly advocate, "looking beneath the surface" (7) of 
differences emphasized by categories and discovering similarities across 
categories leads to the transformation of the del1berat1ve/ep1de1ct1c 
dichotomy and to a recognition of the larger concept of the rhetorical 
nature of all uses of language. An epldeictlc occasion 1s a rhetorical 
occasion, just as a deliberative occasion 1s rhetorical. In either 
category, language is unnaturally twisted with damaging results when Its 
persuasive nature 1s Ignored and its deliberation marginalized. A 
drawing together of the common ground 1n my reading of Pericles' 
"Funeral Oration" and my students' writing of essays illustrates. 
In the "Funeral Oration," Pericles as writer and I as reader were 
clearly in conflict. I struggled against his superior and my inferior 
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position in the writer/reader hierarchy, and their lack of resolution 
left the relationship tainted with potentially greater violence. The 
English 102 writers who resisted their teacher and/or colleagues as 
readers took a stance similar to Pericles'. They wanted readers to 
agree and praise with nondellberative deed, just as Pericles expected 
his auditors to do. The students who gave up their author-ity as 
writers, wanting or expecting the teacher to assume it, inverted the 
hierarchy into reader-teacher/writer-student. Or, perhaps these 
students actually maintained the hierarchy while reversing roles within 
it. Perceiving the teacher—not themselves—as the real writer of 
classroom compositions, they assumed the passive, non-Agent status that 
I resisted in the war eulogy. 
The potential for generative discourse, on the other hand, emerged 
in my genuine response to Pericles' persuasion, indicating that co-
Agents are one curative for the violence festering in epideictic 
characterized as nonpersuaslve and nondeliberative. Similarly, 
constructive discourse developed when students asserted themselves as 
equal partners in their writing's meaning-making and accepted readers as 
responsible respondents. In these moments, writing became a means for 
affecting both the writers' and readers' attitudes and behaviors about 
the particular issues investigated, proving that for all human agents, 
"[u]nderstanding comes to fruition only in the response" (Bakhtln 282). 
Pericles overtly claimed that his eulogistic words had little real 
meaning by conflating praise as both its Agency and Purpose. Students 
who wrote with the primary goal of a praiseworthy grade also collapsed 
means and end. In both cases, the harm was clear in the discursive 
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outcomes. Pericles' eulogy consciously persuaded to deadly acts, and 
students, often unconsciously, did not persuade themselves or their 
readers with dead essays. When other meanings grounded the discourse, 
productive outcomes appeared—1n my response, the opportunity to 
investigate war and peace Ideologies; 1n students' writing, the occasion 
to discover and communicate through language. By embracing meaning, the 
eulogy and the essays shaped the consequences that would result from 
their use. 
Denying persuasive Intent, either consciously or unconsciously, 
also meant denying discursive content. With Agency and Purpose 
conflated, Pericles treated his oration as a vessel for repeating 
history's words, just as students completed assignments by limiting 
writing process and product to time-worn, form-filling performance. 
Alternatively, when students treated words as content, form became a 
process for creating an Act, rather than a meaningless Act itself. My 
response likewise opened up the eulogy to new ways of creating alternate 
insights into political and social paradigms. In both cases, rather 
than determine mean with end or vice-versa, forming and the thing formed 
generated a variety of means for a diversity of ends. 
Disavowing the real contexts of discourse, Pericles and some 
students wrote as if all funerals and all classrooms were the same. 
Therefore, texts were Inappropriate for the real, present Scene and 
damaging to possible, future Scenes. Pericles forced his past and 
present's ideology on future generations of readers and writers; 
students advanced to a new semester with petrified writing and reading 
that probably was similar to their previous classroom discourse. In 
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contrast to the universal treatment Pericles and students gave to 
discourse, other readers and writers worked to make context part of 
meaning. I advocated a re-th1nk1ng of the influence of Pericles' eulogy 
on my world, and students argued for re-search1ng Into matters Important 
for the well-being of their own and their readers' worlds. Realizing 
that texts are Informed by and Informing of contexts, we saw words 
perpetuating deeds. 
As the war eulogy and the classroom essay Illustrate, then, 
hierarchical relationships in discourse lead to violence. When writer, 
meaning, form, and text dominate reader, consequence, content, and 
context, power struggles emerge and inversions only reverse who or what 
gets silenced. On the other hand, dlaloglcal relationships allow all 
parts of the rhetorical situation to develop, change, relnvlgorate—to 
get farther along. Writer nod reader, meaning and consequence, form and 
content, text and context are shaped 1n mutually dependent ways. With 
all the dynamics of language working in concert, language 1s an 
instrument for growth. With the dynamics functioning 1n conflict, 1t 1s 
a tool only for more conflict. These examples of the uses of language 
illustrate Kenneth Burke's philosophy of language. Language 1s symbolic 
action. All language does something. All words are deeds. All words 
persuade. Rhetoric is all language use. A definition of rhetoric as 
the act of using language emphasizes the power of language: to use 
language 1s to do something with 1t. Language 1s the symbol-tool with 
which human beings shape all occasions. Rhetoric 1s the name for 
putting hand to tool, of taking word from mouth. It 1s the act of 
utterance. To argue, then, as my dissertation's title indicates, for a 
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"reuniting of word and deed" 1s to argue for a conscious acknowledgement 
of the Indivisible nature of word and deed 1n theory, and to argue for 
the shaping of practice 1n light of that union. To deny this perception 
of language 1s to deny responsibility for deciding what to do and for 
what gets done with words; 1t 1s to perpetuate deadly consequences of 
discourse such as those that result from traditional war eulogies and 
students' ceremonial essays. 
Categories of discourse, from ancient to contemporary theory, do 
not build from a foundation of word as deed. The old ep1de1ct1c 
category does not nor do new, Improved ones. Rather than continually 
re-def1ne and re-descr1be categories and metacategorles of discourse 1n 
order to stabilize "a bewildering array of confusing and overlapping 
terminology" (Beale Pragmatic 3), discourse would be better served by 
the acknowledgement of all language use as part of a universe of 
discourse 1n which human beings seek to communicate with one another 1n 
human, worldly, consequential rhetorical situations. Rather than a 
structuralist model for these discourses, a more helpful model would 
"locate language within the individual rather than external to the 
individual," as Barbara Johnstone explains (39, my emphasis). It would 
help answer the question, '"Why does this particular utterance take the 
shape it does?"' and thereby account for Interactions between the human 
agents so often marginalized 1n "external" models. Further research of 
war eulogies and classroom essays, as well as other discourse occasioned 
by ceremony and school, can contribute to an understanding of peaceful 
and warring options 1n uses of language. This work should analyze 
rhetorical situations for the ways each one moves between display and 
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authenticity and the ways each persuades and engenders deliberation. It 
should not aim for comprehensive typ1f1cat1on of these Instances, as an 
external model would. 
The persuasive and deliberative nature of rhetoric moves theory 
away from focus on "what" shapes exist and to an Interest 1n the "why, 
how, who, when, and where" of shapes. Ep1de1ct1c and deliberative 
discourse are no different 1n this essential theoretical regard. As 
chapter two explains, the purpose of this Investigation of the 
ep1de1ct1c category 1s to blur categorical boundaries, not re-draw them. 
"Ep1de1ct1c" or "ceremonial" discourse are workable names for discourse 
occasioned by a culture's ceremonies, but they should not prescribe a 
category of discourse for ceremony's sake. Similarly, school writing 
(or "academic discourse" as 1t 1s often called 1n current pedagogical 
discussions) describes discourse occasioned by school, but 1t should not 
prescribe writing for school's sake. No discourse 1n ceremony or school 
should be performed for performance's sake and judged for judgment's 
sake. Words need to do something of deeper purpose for writers, 
readers, and the little parts of the world occasioning them. No 
teacher, student, class, or school has to settle for academic discourse 
for the sake of perpetuating academic discourse; 1t 1s a reductive act 
of institutional preservation. Similarly, no culture has to settle for 
ceremonial discourse for the sake of ceremony; 1t is a futile act of 
trying to hold the world still. Rather, a more productive maxim by 
which to guide the teaching and practice of rhetoric would be Bakhtln's 
proclamation: "An independent, responsible, and active discourse 1s the 
fundamental Indicator of an ethical, legal and political human being" 
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(349-50). If such a discourse is taught 1n school, 1t also will serve 
as a fundamental Indicator of the discourse's society.19 
It makes a difference whether we begin, as Burke does, with 
rhetoric as all language use or whether we end, as Beale does, with 
rhetoric as one use of language. As Lakoff recommends, rhetorical 
theory needs to make the most accurate and humane choice, and as Ronald 
and Roskelly assert, composition studies need to transform dichotomies. 
The way to transform the dichotomy of these two schools of thought, 
rhetoric as all language use and rhetoric as one use of language, 1s to 
put taxonomizlng in the service of understanding and managing what we go 
with words and why. In that way, categories can be constructive tools 
for rather than tyrants of the theory and practice of all uses of 
language. This shift in emphasis from product to process follows the 
wider evolution that Geertz traces 1n modern reflguratlons of thinking 
about thinking, as genres have been blurred and the emphasis on "a laws 
and Instances ideal of explanation" has shifted to "a cases and 
Interpretation one" 1n Inquiry about how, rather than what, human beings 
think (19). 
The chief theoretical implication of this dissertation's argument 
about the division of word from deed 1n discursive categories, then, 
underscores the presence of choice among answers to Burke's question 
about language use, "What 1s Involved when we say what people are doing 
and why they are doing it?" (Grammar xv). Rhetorical theory, of which 
Beale's project 1s just one example, denies that persuasion and 
deliberation are Involved 1n many uses of language by categorizing 
rhetoric as only one use of language. As a result, this theory inflames 
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violence 1n language by privileging writers over readers, meanings over 
consequences, forms over contents, and texts over contexts. In a 
hierarchical theory, language 1s a weapon with which to divide. 
Rhetorical theory that articulates ways that all language persuades and 
1s deliberated, such as Burke's corpus, Instigates peaceful, working 
relationships among writers and readers, meanings and consequences, 
forms and contents, and texts and contexts. Rather than the a-human, a-
worldly, a-consequent1al discourse that results from categorizing 
rhetoric, the generative power of dlaloglcal thinking Invites real 
negotiation of deeds advocated through words. In a transformative 
theory, language is a weaver of relationships.20 
The choice, then, 1s not whether language 1s a tool, but what kind 
of tool it is. If rhetorical theory acknowledges word as deed, 
practices can be Implemented that occasion constructive, rather than 
destructive, discourse. Should theorists and practitioners so choose, 
discourse can provide rhetorical occasions for real peacemaking and 
authentic classroom writing and whatever other world-shaping activities 
rhetors value. With an increased consciousness about what 1t means to 
use language, practitioners choose what they will do with their words 1n 
Infinite instances of communlcation, rather than achieve little, with 
limited awareness, by filling the prescriptions of words' categories. 
As Edward Saplr notes: "Language is a purely human and non-Instinctive 
method of communicating Ideas, emotions, and desires by means of a 
system of voluntarily produced symbols" (8). Therefore, as other 
rhetoricians have claimed on the grounds of Saplr's pioneering work 1n 
modern studies of language, "we are responsible for what we do with 1t" 
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(Brltton 276). In these closing pages, I can merely sketch two 
scenarios 1n order to suggest a few ways to facilitate generative use of 
language 1n ceremonial and pedagogical occasions. 
Pericles' war eulogy and the many others 1n Its tradition do not 
model constructive rhetoric for discourse of ceremony. Texts 1n other 
ceremonial occasions—commencement, keynote, and acceptance speeches, 
for Instance-—have invited transformative practice. The Chair's keynote 
address for the 1995 Annual Convention of the Conference on College 
Composition and Communication was an Instance of making ep1de1ct1c or 
ceremonial words matter for the real people and place comprising Its 
rhetorical situation. Unlike traditional ep1de1ct1c orators, Jacqueline 
Jones Royster acknowledged language as symbolic action, treating both 
speaker and listeners as its Agents:21 
I feel this morning, as I imagine that many African American women 
before me have felt, a compelling desire to make this rhetorical 
moment matter, to have 1t be something more than just a ritual 
experience at an annual convention of people who are Interested 1n 
rhetoric, composition, literacy, and communication. I have 
experienced an overwhelming urge to say heartfelt things, to lay 
bear my mind and soul 1n such a way that all within the sound of 
my voice will know that my Intent 1s to make 1t quite Impossible 
for any person who 1s at all Inclined to listen to what I have to 
say to go away feeling the same as when he or she sat down. 
I want this experience to be, for all who are willing, an active, 
1f not an activating experience, one 1n which my voice swirls Its 
way, as the voices of women before me, not just toward ears but 
Into minds and hearts, and even Into the pits of stomachs. In 
making this statement, I acknowledge that I come from an ethnic 
community that believes that the human voice 1s an Instrument for 
transcendence, transformation, even liberation, that the using of 
it and the hearing of it should be a visceral experience and not 
just an intellectual exercise. We believe that the voice 1s an 
Instrument of change, Internal and external. So, what I really 
want is for this message to burrow Its way into the bone marrow 
and to latch on tenaciously to the fibers of humanity 1n this 
room, so that my words matter, so that they make a positive 
difference for somebody, somewhere, sometime. (1) 
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Royster laid claim to some authentic thing happening as she, her speech, 
and its auditors came together 1n a meeting room in Washington, D.C. on 
the morning of March 23, 1995. Furthermore, Royster accepted the 
challenging responsibility of making her speech a conscious, ethical 
act: 
Please note that I'm fully aware that the task, as I am describing 
1t, is easier said than done. It strikes me, though, that I 
consider myself no exception to the rule that African American 
women who speak out do so quite often with a rather bold agenda. 
When we are granted the privilege of a podium, any podium, but 
especially one with a crowd like this, rarely do we feel that we 
can afford to waste the moment on the privilege of just speaking. 
Always, it seems, we're compelled to consider that this 
opportunity may indeed be, if not the only one, the best one, and 
we have to make it count. We're compelled to speak with a clear 
and present sense of an old saying, 'If not now, when; if not me, 
who?' Always, it seems, forces demand from us that we dedicate 
ourselves to the principle of good use. (1-2) 
Rather than "just speaking," theoretically the task of a ceremonial 
orator, the "good use" to which Royster put her speech was an argument 
about the theory and practice of voice, and her thesis explicitly 
announced her intention 
to suggest today that a shift in paradigms is long overdue and to 
propose that a reinvention of paradigms, especially around the 
notion of 'voice,' would permit a fuller range of interpretive 
positions to be recognized and valued in the construction of 
knowledge, the shaping of discourse, and the making of policy and 
practice, even in places like colleges, universities, and 
classrooms. (3) 
Her argument did not provide all the answers, as epidelctlc rhetors are 
theorized to do. Rather, 1t posed crucial questions: "How can we 
teach, engage in research, write about, and talk across boundaries with 
others, instead of for, about, and around them? . . . How do we 
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listen?" (15-16). "The goal," she asserted, "1s better practices so 
that we can exchange perspectives, negotiate meaning, and create 
understanding with the Intent of being 1n a good position to cooperate, 
when, like now, cooperation 1s absolutely necessary" (16). Likewise, 
her speech did not pose praise as Its Act or Purpose. Praise of voice, 
dlaloglcal language, education, or teaching was not her speech's point. 
Her argument posed the problem of paradigms of voice and their 
consequences as an issue for her and her audience to Investigate 1n 
these few moments together and then to continue working on 1n future 
deliberations. 
A new paradigm for voice and the changes 1t would necessitate as 
Royster was describing 1t could not have been a universal value touted 
1n her speech, given the diversity of thinkers who might have been 1n 
her audience that morning—CCCC 1995 participants Including Beale and 
Miller, Klnneavy and Swales, Clark and Sullivan, whose disagreement 
about rhetorical theory and practice this dissertation has cited. (It 
1s interesting to speculate about the ways 1n which taxonomlsts 1n 
Royster's audience might have measured her explicitly persuasive use of 
this "epidelctlc" occasion.) That her argument was not built of straw 
1s also recognizable 1n the larger context of her speech. It was 
addressed to audience members who are currently 1n the midst of 
conversations and conflicts persisting at Institutional levels among 
high school, two- and four-year colleges, community colleges, and public 
and private colleges and universities about the teaching of language. 
Furthermore, the ethnic and racial diversity of her audience 1s 
noteworthy, especially given the speech's emphasis on the relationships 
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among non-white and white voices. Her audience Included African 
American, European American, Native American, Middle Eastern, Hispanic, 
and Oriental members about whom 1t would be naive to. assume a complete 
agreement on the ways that ethnic and racial similarity and difference 
guide and should guide American classrooms. Royster exposed this 
diversity, noting that as an African American woman, she spoke as other 
African American women have "with a rather bold agenda" and "1n the face 
of challenge" (2). She cited The Bell Curve (Herrnsteln and Murray, 
1994) as recent disturbing evidence of differing world views "1n our 
very own field" (6) and, as well, she spoke to people of color who need 
to "set aside [their] rights to exclusivity 1n [their] own home 
cultures" (7). 
Thus, unlike traditional ep1de1ct1c, Royster's speech aimed to 
persuade people Inclined to assent to her words as well as those who 
might dissent from 1t. Her audience was a diverse, not homogeneous, 
group of respondents. Nevertheless, the speech did not aim to 
propagandize its message or coerce Its audience. She acknowledged each 
auditor's option for participation 1n active response, speaking to "any 
person who 1s at all inclined to listen to what I have to say" (1). 
Rather than laying claim to all people for all time, the speech aimed to 
"make a positive difference for somebody, somewhere, sometime." The 
auditor's choice between active and passive response was reiterated 1n 
the speech's conclusion to "members who are listening" (19). Royster's 
comments were common senslcal for this rhetorical occasion's text and 
context. Given the tradition of ceremonial discourse, 1t would have 
been highly unlikely that everybody who attended this opening session of 
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CCCC 1995 assumed that Its keynote address could or would make a 
difference in their or other persons' lives should they, Indeed, listen. 
As one optimistic yet skeptical audience member, I attended the 
opening session hoping for a meaningful experience 1n Its keynote 
address. I wanted something to think about, something to Inspire and 
provoke my teaching, something to enrich and strengthen Its philosophy 
and practice. I did not want praise or Hp service. I was ready to be 
an assenting reader 1f the orator gave me something worth assenting to. 
As soon as Royster began speaking, I began taking notes. These were 
ideas I would want to think about further; they were worth noting. I 
wrote down points as she made them, sketching bits of her evidence and 
snippets of direct quotes. I also began a dialogue of sorts with her. 
I glossed her comments 1n my own words, summarizing and synthesizing 
them as if Royster and I were talking to each other. She, for Instance, 
valued the principle of "good use"; I wrote 1n my notes "(prag)" 1n 
order to remember to think about the pragmatic Ideology of this speech. 
She placed herself 1n the tradition of African American women, four 1n 
particular, and I wrote "(notice It's [a] traditionally] marginal voice 
[speaking here])" 1n order to think further about who is allowed to be a 
ceremonial orator in ostensibly inclusive contemporary rhetorical 
scenes. Her aim for a "visceral" and "Intellectual" experience I put 1n 
rhetorical terms: "(pathos + logos)." As she spoke of her chosen role 
as "negotiator" among disparate voices, I recognized 1t as a description 
of my own role, although I had never articulated 1t 1n that way for 
myself. Thus I noted "(my OWQ v1sc[eral] and Intellec[tual] response) 
as the way I position myself among other teachers of writing. 
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Additionally, my notes were punctuated throughout with asterisks, 
underlines, exclamation points, and question marks as Indicators of my 
making meaning of this speech. I emphasized her comment about the need 
to "talk but also listen}": I noted she encouraged teachers to "talk 
with deans + legislators" (rather than to them); she argued, I 
highlighted, for voice to be "well spoken afld well heard*." 
A portion of Royster's speech talked about her concern that 
"story" is not Integrated well enough as a legitimate method of 
interpretation 1n English studies. It 1s often seen as a way to 
"delight" but not to be "transformative" and is therefore rendered as 
'"the droppings of birds,'" as she quoted Audre Lorde (11). Her 
comments prompted me to think about one of my concerns about oral public 
discourse, one that I thought needed to be more pointed 1n her argument 
about voices being genuinely "heard" and "believed" and "believable" 
(12). Similar to Royster's complaint that her scholarship has been 
reduced to delightful storytelling by her auditors and by traditional 
voices who have spoken before her, my own scholarship has been reduced 
to performance for performance's sake by some of my listeners and by 
voices who have been less eloquent than mine. I recalled occasions 1n 
which I have presented conference papers and afterward auditors have 
commented about the formal aspects of my delivery, about what a "good 
speaker" I was. But what about my argument. I wanted to ask. Was this 
nothing more than momentary eloquence? Their praise was well-
intentioned, I know, but too narrowly focused to convince me that they 
had actively deliberated my point. I would not mind so much that they 
disagreed with my point or decided 1t was ill-made, 1f I could at least 
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gain their conscious consideration of 1t. As Royster talked, I thought 
about wasted moments among teachers and scholars 1n academic conferences 
occurring dally across the nation. I made a note, wondering what 
Royster, as a dramatic and riveting presence at the podium, would say 
about this Issue of voice and ceremony. 
One of the key Issues 1n Royster's argument for a new paradigm of 
voice was to affect the limits still constraining non-white voices. Her 
value of genuinely shared, equal status of voices among all races 1s one 
that I shared with her as I entered Into this ceremonial occasion. Her 
speech, however, did not serve merely to remind me of a belief I already 
held and to let 1t go at that. As she talked, I began to pull up scenes 
from my teaching and to re-evaluate them 1n terms of Royster's titular 
theme, "When the First Voice You Hear Is Not Your Own." I thought of 
several of my black students and my sense that something attributable to 
our racial difference had been askew between them and their liberal 
white teacher. Why was Dee so withdrawn? Tanya so belligerent? Anne 
so aggressive? Tyrone so appeasing? I thought about class discussions 
on racial issues. What kept so many white, black, and other non-white 
students from entering into these discussions? What accounted for the 
sense of embarrassment in the room? What was the significance of Kris 
and Mary expressing weariness at the suggestion of racial problems? 
What transpired when Chuck blurted out how s1ck-and-t1red he was of 
hearing about black people's problems 1n the face of white men's 
difficulties and Therina scrawled 1n her journal during that class, 
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" . . .  a n g r y  u p s e t  m a d  f u r i o u s  I g n o r a n t  p e o p l e  h a t e  d i s l i k e  e v i l  d e a t h  
sorrow life . . ." and then would never write about the Instance and her 
reaction to 1t again, although I kept encouraging her to do so? 
Royster's speech was asking me to re-negot1ate my teaching as 1t 
had and would unfold, and I was doing 1t. As a teacher who herself 
argues for a dlalogical, dramatist1c philosophy of language, I became 
more conscious of the Implications of this argument as a result of 
actively deliberating Royster's. At the end of Royster's speech, I was 
less satisfied with the way that voices speak and are listened to 1n my 
classroom. Although I believed that I Invite all views and all voices 
to be shared, I was more Intent on observing for moments 1n which I 
silence unintentionally, assume erroneously, and miss opportunities 
unknowingly as I work to create a dlalogical classroom 1n which all 
voices, whether they agree or disagree, can move toward a peaceful 
consensus for living together. Since CCCC 1995, I have continued to 
think about the Implications of Royster's words for my teaching. Rather 
than walk away from that ceremony just as I had walked 1n, assenting to 
the concept of an Inclusive paradigm for voice, my teaching values and 
methods were strengthened, invigorated, challenged. This ceremonial 
speaker—this human being and her words—mattered and matter to me. I 
left that meeting room, as Royster aimed for me to, having had an 
intellectual and visceral experience whose Incipient acts will be played 
out more overtly as time goes on. Because I was willing and able to 
deliberate consciously, rather than unthinkingly assent to a speech that 
said things I generally agreed with, Royster's hope was realized. Her 
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words would "make a positive difference for somebody, somewhere, 
sometime" (1). 
Unlike the silence which Pericles commanded at the end of his war 
eulogy, Royster concluded the keynote address by Inviting her auditors 
to speak because "voicing at its best 1s not just well-spoken but also 
well-heard" (19). Admitting the absence of a "formal mechanism for 
members who are listening to talk back," she Informally extended the 
invitation by providing her mailing addresses, repeating the Information 
for anyone who was late 1n finding pencil or pen. "Thank you for 
listening," she closed. "I look forward to hearing from you soon." As 
the inveterate note-maker, I was prepared to record Royster's address 
when she provided it. Moreover, as a deliberative listener, I was ready 
to continue my active response and "talk back." In a chance crossing of 
paths 1n a hotel lobby a day after her speech, I Introduced myself and 
advised Royster of her words' meanlngfulness for me and that she could 
expect to hear from me. My response, of course, was not universal. 
During the address, I had glimpsed people around me to observe their 
responses. A couple of women in front of me were softly "amenlng." Two 
women to my right sat stiffly with tight lips. The woman to my left 
said that the speech was "wonderful" as we stood and applauded; she had 
been reading student papers the last third of Royster's words. 
Royster's epidelctlc 1s enabled by a theory and practice of 
language, like her own argument about voice, that seeks cooperation 
rather than coercion among Its people, language, and world. It 1s no 
coincidence, then, that Royster's introduction implicitly argues for a 
new paradigm for ceremonial discourse; that she embraces rather than 
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evades a persuasive purpose 1n her speech; that she crosses the 
boundaries between ep1de1ct1c and deliberation erected by theoretical 
taxonomies that would keep her from making her argument, asking her 
questions, and Inviting her audience's deliberation. Mar eulogists have 
much to learn from orators such as Royster 1f they are to transform 
their occasions from death-denying to life-creating ones, as Royster 
enabled one ceremonial moment to thrive.22 
The composition classroom also can be a site for constructive 
rhetoric. I taught my three sections of English 102 1n the spring and 
fall of 1994 with a belief, like Royster, in the dlaloglcal nature of 
language and with strategies to implement practices underglrded by that 
belief. Although most of my students did not enter these classrooms 
with convictions like my own, some of them did experience growth from 
deadly display to lively authentic writing. Mary (03), for Instance, 
did not meet some of the basic requirements of the rhetorical situation 
1n her first essay. By semester's end, she went above and beyond what 
the situation asked. In her first piece of finished writing, an 
interview of one of her colleagues, Mary did not even learn how to spell 
the name of her peer, Sara, correctly. The essay consisted primarily of 
easily-attained facts displayed 1n simple subject-verb sentences: 
"Sarah [] was born on. . . . She and her family have lived 1n. . . . 
Sarah told me her most valuable characteristic 1s. ..." The surface 
level of the Interview and the monotony of the prose fulfilled the law 
but not the spirit of the assignment. In contrast, Mary gathered and 
synthesized data for her final research study from three sources via 
three research methods (an interview of a county official, a survey of 
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two groups of high school students, and on-site observations of two high 
schools). Her study led readers Into an Investigation of her topic with 
this writing: 
Because I felt that equal funding 1s so Important, and also 
because I did not think the funding of our county's schools was 
equal, I decided to speak with. . . . The allocation of state and 
local funds 1s therefore not based on the wealth of the students 
but on the number of students per school on a per pupil basis. 
After Interviewing [] and realizing my Initial Impression was 
inaccurate, I decided ... to Investigate two high schools, one 
comprised of a lower income district and another of a higher 
income district and to determine whether there are disparities 
between the two schools. 
Mary makes clear the study's point and rationale 1n order to ensure that 
her readers will understand and get Involved, too. Mary, her teacher, 
and her colleagues got to know about county funding 1n a way that we 
never got to know Sara. The writing was real. 
Ben (02) also wrote authentically, overt about the relevance of 
his research for him and his colleglal readers 1n the Initial paragraphs 
of his study: 
As you read this essay there 1s homosexual bashing both physically 
and verbally all over the world. ... Xt happens and we all know 
1t, but who 1s 1t that does it? . . . As we had our discussions 
in class about gender myths and homosexuality I . . . realized 
that the homosexual issue was one that most of the guys who spoke 
1n class felt really strongly about. ... We, as men [,] acted 
like we couldn't be persuaded to look at the homosexual myth 1n a 
different outlook as we might be able to be coaxed Into a 
different view about gender myths. This made me think about doing 
a study that might benefit the class and maybe help me to also 
change my outlook on homosexuals. 
A significant accomplishment of Ben's writing 1s that, 1n fact, 1t did 
change his thinking. In a journal entry written at the completion of 
his research project, he wrote: 
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I, before, this essay, was one of those males that would have 
circled yes I'm prejud1ce[d] against homosexuals. My research 
helped me to realize that there 1s no need to be prejud1ce[d] 
against them and be so empty minded. I feel that these papers 
benefitted me in the respect of my attitude towards homosexuals. 
I still don't understand them, so now I need to research why they 
are what they are. 
Ben's self-directed Interest in further research 1s quite different from 
the form-fill1ng he expected to perform at the semester's beginning. In 
his first journal entry, he wrote: "I basically entered this class 
because 1t was under my options to fill a requirement. ... I also 
looked at my past English classes and realized that those have been 
basically mv best performance classes" (my emphasis). 
Mary and Ben's authentic writing can be explained 1n part by the 
research project assignment occasioning 1t. Prior to Spring 1994, I had 
taught English 102 for three semesters. According to departmental 
guidelines Informed by rhetorical taxonomies, I required my students to 
write three, discrete "persuasive" essays (or "deliberative" or 
"argumentative" essays as they are synonymously called) for their major 
writing. A third of the way into the Spring 1994 semester, I could not 
persist with this pattern. As usual, my students and I were rushing to 
finish one piece of writing in order to get on to the next one. I knew 
by the time we got to the third essay, nobody would have the time to 
discover an argument they genuinely wanted to make, much less the energy 
to make it. The pressure of finished writing was putting my students 
and me 1n the position of faking it; they did not want to write and I 
did not want to read. Rather than persuading, they were displaying 
persuasion, and I was asking for the harmful epidelctic—performance for 
performance's sake—that my dissertation was arguing against. 
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After discussing the problem with Dr. Roskelly, I devised the 
research project assignment. Students' authority was enhanced by the 
assignment requiring them to be the researcher and therefore primary 
knower about that which they were writing. They observed and 
Interpreted their own creations 1n the various kinds of data they 
gathered. They put secondary research 1n the service of their own 
primary work, rather than treat 1t as the onerous task of summarizing 
what anybody or everybody else has said. They discovered actual rather 
than arbitrary connections between their writing and the classroom of 
people and ideas in which it occurred. Small group readers got to know 
the projects of their colleagues, commenting on wr1t1ng-1n-progress from 
the research's proposal to final reporting. Suggestions for the project 
came from their small group members and me throughout Its development as 
ideas were brainstormed, research questions were revised, secondary 
readings were assessed, options for organization were considered, and 
interpretations were made that often yielded unexpected findings. 
Evaluative comments as well as final grades were given to each of 
the three major parts of the project, but the writing took on meaning 
beyond the grade—the proposal needed to be written 1n order to do the 
study; the secondary research needed to be done 1n order to 
contextual1ze the primary research; the research needed to be reported 
1n order to convince the class of what the writer had discovered. 
Persuasion became a matter of Inviting deliberation. They saw their 
words doing something. Unlike previous semesters of English 102, these 
composition classes did not fixate on the completion of products—three 
"persuasive" essays—and did attend to the development of process. Thus 
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both process and product became more manageable and meaningful. It had 
not been impossible for authentic writing to emerge 1n earlier classes, 
but 1t became significantly more probable with the Spring ig94 re­
vision. 
More than anything, I think, the research project assignment gave 
students time, time that writers need for Invention, drafting, revising, 
and editing. The work of Invention, crucial to authentic writing, 
likely benefitted their projects the most. Because the assignment 
allowed students time for discovering their arguments, writers 
subsequently had a real reason for finding out how other people's Ideas 
were similar to and different from their own and, further, how they 
might begin—and want to begin—communicating about those Intersections 
and diversities. Just as Royster 1n her epldelctic discourse argued for 
her voice to be heard 1n a speech arguing for a re-v1s1on1ng of voice as 
an "instrument of transcendence, transformation, even liberation," so, 
too, did the students and teacher 1n these classrooms put voices and 
ears to "good use."23 
The constructive and destructive consequences Illustrated 1n these 
chapters on epideictic discourse suggest priorities for all rhetorical 
practice. Practice needs to be more comfortable with the chaos of 
writing and thinking processes. Pedagogy needs less emphasis on graded, 
finished pieces of writing 1n the same way that culture needs to give 
less attention to wrapping an event, completing Its spin, or explaining 
away a deeper, ever-developing understanding of 1t. Essays and eulogies 
ought to want less praise and agreement 1n order to gain more Insight 
and ideas. They need to open up, not shut down, inquiry. Mary Rose 
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O'Reilly describes the way that a primary concern with process leads to 
meaningful products with constructive outcomes 1n the classroom and, 
therefore everywhere else: 
But I want to suggest, once again, that the things we do 1n the 
classroom are not morally neutral. When we taught 'the old way,' 
we would tell our students to, 1n effect, go home, lock the door, 
take 1n a lot of caffeine, and produce five hundred words on the 
life cycle of some Australian mammal; when we did that, we were 
shaping a certain kind of intellectual life. If we, by contrast, 
respect the Inner world of the student, try to help her gain 
access to it and to express 1t with power and authority to a 
community of listeners, we are crafting a different future. (52) 
Practice needs to stop protecting power and start sharing 1t. 
"The word in language 1s half someone else's," Bakhtln advises rhetors 
and readers (293). Therefore, they need to navigate the power of 
communication together in order to change both writer and reader, rather 
than perceive argument as the aggressive supplanting of one's world view 
as the Truth over all others'. Unlike the banking concept of education 
which Frelre criticizes for its objectifying of students both Inside and 
outside of school (57), rhetorical practice ought to look beyond static 
traditions that guide cultural and pedagogical purposes 1n order to see 
dynamic aims in which teachers and students are learners, speakers and 
listeners possess reasoning minds and beating hearts, and 1n which 
persuasion and deliberation are mutually Inclusive acts requisite to the 
negotiation of any symbolic act. It ought to embrace change rather than 
fear it. 
Culture and pedagogy should count on more difference than sameness 
in the contexts of texts. Every language 1s a world view, and "[e]ach 
word tastes of the context and contexts 1n which 1t has lived Its 
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socially charge life" (Bakhtin 293). Common scenes, such as funerals 
and classrooms, will occur again and again. Their eulogies and essays, 
however, do not have to repeat their predecessors by rote. The best way 
that practice can Inform future scenes 1s by embracing the relationship 
between language and Hfe. "To exist, humanly, 1s to name the world, to 
change 1t," as Frelre expresses 1t 1n his pedagogy for the oppressed 
(76). To silence the conversation within and among the dynamics that 
constitute use of language—Agents, Purposes, Agencies, Scenes, and 
Purposes—is to breed adversity. "To silence 1s to sow the seeds of 
further tumult," O'Reilly warns (131). 
The foremost place to acknowledge and assume responsibility for 
words as deeds is the classroom, which serves dally as a microcosm for 
the other cultures students Inhabit and will Inhabit. Students' 
conscious enactments of words as deeds are crucial not only 1n the 
composition classroom, but 1n all classrooms. In O'Reilly's work for 
peace inside and therefore outside the classroom, she notes that "second 
only to what happens between parent and child, what happens 1n the 
classroom determines the shape of culture and evolution of 
consciousness" (7-8). Following the advice from John Woolman, 
eighteenth century Quaker abolitionist, to "begin by making peace within 
our small spheres of influence," O'Reilly points to "the seeds of war 1n 
the Interactions of the typical classroom"; for Instance, 1n the ways 
questions are asked, discussions invited, and grades given, all of which 
Imply destructive, war-Uke attitudes about power and authority (21-22). 
In any classroom, the language with which meaning 1s conveyed and 
constructed can be studied and practiced in its real rhetorical 
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situations with literal consequences. True writing across the 
curriculum means writing within rhetorical situations, such that writers 
learn to negotiate different meanings 1n different ways for different 
readers or, as Johnstone puts it, such that they come to understand that 
"meaning 1s always by someone and meaning to someone" (64). Thus 
students see writing as communication shaped by what they are saying to 
whom, rather than see "good writing" as some abstract ideal with a 
definition that changes every time they change teachers. When, for 
instance, a literature professor describes the pieces of literary 
criticism that he is requiring his students to write, they understand 
that their teacher is not re-def1n1ng the abstract, but talking about 
the concrete writing that will count as effective communication for the 
student's literary readers, purpose, Interpretation, and context. 
Classrooms provide occasions for students to reason together about 
what their words and the words of others do and can do. In these 
classrooms, symbol-users demonstrate the who, what, when, where, how, 
and why of language as symbolic action. In any course of study, 
students can write exploratory pieces, talk about ideas for potential 
development, and share wr1ting-1n-progress as they make the subjects 
they study matter. Through writing, reading, talking, and other modes 
of thinking, students can discover reasons for their coursework beyond 
the circumstances of school and grades. By virtue of observing a 
variety of arguments in process and a collection of arguments diversely 
completed, they illustrate for themselves the rhetorical nature of 
language use. They see what Johnstone sees 1n the nature of narrative: 
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"Since all stories create versions of truth, all stories are rhetorical, 
whether overtly so or not" (130). 
When Mary Rose O'Reilly was in graduate school, a professor asked 
her group of teaching assistants, "'Is 1t possible to teach English so 
that people stop killing each other?'" (9). It 1s a question to which 
neither she nor I can stop answering "Yes" or at least "Maybe so" or 
"Let's try." If we are going to teach in a way that helps people stop 
killing each other, then students must learn to negotiate the deeds they 
advocate through words. The way they communicate in the classroom 
informs the ways they will communicate the rest of their lives. Writing 
in school, for instance, models what they as speakers and listeners will 
"do" in the ceremonial eulogies occasioned by their country's wars. The 
need for students to learn the dialogical nature of language and reality 
and to shape their discourse accordingly becomes increasingly apparent 
daily. Classrooms are situated 1n a world of too much violence and too 
little understanding of rhetoric. From international scenes to local 
settings, people unconsciously overlook language's power 1n Its myriad 
instances and thus fail to use it to resolve violence. Still others 
consciously, though not always admittedly, accomplish violent ends 
through uses or near lack of use of language: 
— In a three-year-old war increasingly referred to as unwlnnable, 
Bosnian-Serbs shell civilian and military locations and take United 
Nation troops hostage; fighting fire with fire, United Nations' 
"peacekeepers" bear arms and N.A.T.O. forces conduct alrstrlkes over 
Bosnia-Herzegovina; disparity grows between U.N. talks of peace and 
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N.A.T.O's acts of war; Bosnians warn they are preparing militarily to 
oust Serbs and "peacekeepers" alike. 
— A year after war between Tutsi and Hutu African tribes results 
in the deaths of half a million Rwandans, most of them among the Tutsi 
minority population, similar slaughter threatens neighboring Burundi as 
Tutsi accelerate retaliations against Hutu. As in Rwanda, Hutu are the 
majority population 1n Burundi; unlike 1n Rwanda, Tutsi command the 
armed forces. In the face of Tutsi use of weapons, onlooklng nations 
count on this split of power, Tutsi weapons and Hutu population, to 
stalemate massacres of extraordinary numbers, and political discussions 
are few and have failed thus far. 
— On the fiftieth anniversary of Europe's victory 1n World War 
II, the "good war" of American lore in which an estimated 40 million 
warriors and civilians died and the idea of global violence became 
immeasurably costly and practically unthinkable, the words of England's 
Queen Mother typify idealistic commemoration: '"I do hope all of you 
will remember with pride and gratitude those men and women, armed and 
unarmed, whose courage really brought us to victory'" (Pederson 31). 
— Within days after the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P. 
Hurrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, G. Gordon L1ddy, host of 
America's number two radio talk show, 1s reported to have advised his 
listeners that 
. . .  i f  f e d e r a l  a g e n t s  i n v a d e  t h e i r  h o m e s ,  t h e y  s h o u l d  s h o o t  a t  
their heads because of the agents' protective vests. On Tuesday 
he reconsidered. The head is too hard to hit. 'So you shoot 
twice to the body . . . center of mass. And if that does not 
work, then shoot to the groin area.' (Lacayo "Moment" 45) 
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Meanwhile, Rush Limbaugh, America's most well-known talk-show host, 
counters accusations that radio commentary such as Uddy's and his own 
may motivate terrorism. He worries that "we're 1n danger of losing the 
language—the words that convey thoughts, that lead to Ideas, that 
produce progress," yet concludes that he 1s "offended that we've spent 
the last week talking about people who weren't even there, who had 
nothing to do with what happened'" (39). 
— Time Warner executives deflect public acknowledgement of their 
own responsibility and deflate public conversation about shared 
responsibilities for Warner Music's controversial rap and alternative 
music with comments such as Chairman Gerald Levin's assertion that 
'"music is not the cause of society's Ills'" (Zoglln 37); Robert 
Friedman's response, as an executive in Warner's film division, that 
'"It's not a movie issue. . . . It's more a music issue'" (Zoglln 38); 
and a record executive's defense that if Time Warner drops all Its 
controversial music, '"[I]t won't do anything to change what kids are 
exposed to. It will just shift profits from one company to another'" 
(Zoglln 39). Simultaneously, Time Warner prepares to develop "an 
explicit code of behavior for artists and distributors" (Zoglln 38), 
following the jurisprudent model to legislate rather than negotiate the 
relationship between freedom of expression and responsibility for 
communication. 
— "Closer," the fifth cut on alternative rock group Nine Inch 
Nails' latest disc The Downward Spiral (on one of Time Warner's labels) 
begins: "you let me violate you, you let me desecrate you / you let me 
penetrate you, you let me complicate you" (Reznor n.p.). Reznor, the 
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song's writer and performer, notes 1n a Rolling Stone Interview, "I 
probably rely too much on sexual imagery as a metaphor for control, but 
I'm totally Intrigued by it" (Gold 52), and his Interviewer concludes 
after a Detroit concert: "You haven't really lived, I think, until 
you've heard a gang of Wayne State sorority sisters moan, 'I want to 
f— you like an animal,' the chorus to 'Closer'. ... All of them 
sound as 1f they mean 1t" (52). 
— Lion King. Disney's highly-popular animated film promoted 
primarily for children's "entertainment," advocates the food chain as 
the model for a class-based society (justifying the stronger "animals" 
eating the weaker ones because the weak eat the carcass-fertilized grass 
when the strong eventually die); 1t promotes idolatrous subservience to 
monarchy as the model for government; 1t measures manhood by the choice 
to fight as if there are no other recourses for justice, and womanhood 
by the ability to fight along with men. 
— The commencement speaker for the 1994 University of North 
Carolina at Asheville graduation, Dudley E. Flood, Executive Director of 
the North Carolina Association of School Administrators, opens his 
remarks with a typical joke about brevity and humor being the most 
appreciated qualities of a commencement speech; his vapid if sincere 
message depends on the overworked image of Jonathan Livingston Seagull 
to inspire new graduates to learn from Jonathan's lessons of flight. 
— A University of North Carolina at Greensboro senior, writing 1n 
the student newspaper, the Carolinian, argues against "politically 
correct" language and "cultural sensitivity" by concluding: "Words do 
not have power" (Wagner n.p.). 
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— Some graduate students at the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro perpetuate display rhetoric by perceiving an English 
dissertation as a "hoop to jump" or a "seminar paper on steroids" or a 
"game" or a piece of writing that should say "whatever your committee 
chair wants it to say." 
— University professors and administrators across the country are 
identified as the intellectual leaders and policy makers that hold many 
of the keys needed to unlock doctoral writing from the debilitated and 
debilitating status of display rhetoric—as revealed 1n a roundtable 
discussion on dissertations among graduate students at the 1995 
Conference on College Composition and Communication (Welch). . . . 
The impulse of this dissertation is as hopeful as 1t is urgent. 
Other instances of human relationship and communication Illustrate 
people using language, more often consciously than not, as a productive 
and powerful instrument. Pacifistic means are engaged and peaceful ends 
are accomplished: 
— After more than two decades of violence, Ireland and England 
negotiate conditions—including a ceasefire—for talks among all 
political parties Invested in the future of Northern Ireland, and 
bloodshed has been reduced significantly as talks move forward. 
— Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk, representing two seemingly 
irreconcilable world views, dismantle apartheid 1n South Africa with 
conference rather than conflict and the '"rainbow nation at peace with 
itself and the world,'" as Mandela calls 1t upon assuming the 
Presidency, persists a year later in its work for an economically and 
socially equitable life for all its citizens (Masland 37). 
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— A memoir about growing up 1n Czechoslovakia during World War II 
occasioned by the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day concludes with a 
recollection of the dead that could prevent acceptance of future 
violence for maintaining world order. Karsten Prager cites the 
inscription on a small church monument standing today 1n his homeland, 
"IN ETERNAL MEMORY OF THOSE WHO DIED IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR," and 
interprets Its significance: "The words embraced all: winners and 
losers, soldiers and civilians, the Innocent and the guilt. . . . [I]t 
seemed the appropriate, conciliatory epitaph" (56). 
— In a June 1995 public opinion poll for Time/CNN on popular 
culture, the majority of respondents explicitly advocate personal 
responsibility and implicitly favor education, not legislation, for 
"reducing the amount of sex and violence in entertainment," believing 
that the greatest responsibility lies with the "American consumer" and 
the least with the "government" (Lacayo "Violent" 26). They recognize 
their own power in active responses to language. 
— Don Henley, sustaining a popular music career of over twenty 
years marked by personal and professional sociopolitical commentary and 
action, argues for ethical rhetoric 1n his song "If Dirt Were Dollars": 
"We got the bully pulpit / And the poisoned pen / We got a press no 
better / Than the public men / . . . These days the buck stops nowhere 
/ No one takes the blame / But evil is still evil / In anybody's name" 
(9). 
— After years of silent cowboys and clever-tongued detectives 
most remembered for killing easily and often, Clint Eastwood creates 
Unforgiven. a movie that talks about and demonstrates violence 
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realistically, demystifying the heroes and heroics that previous movies 
idealize. 
— At the 1995 graduation commencement of Simmons College 1n 
Boston, Stacy Kabat, founding director of Peace at Home, an organization 
for the resolution of domestic violence, reflects on her experience as 
the daughter of an abusive father, informs her audience of the things 
theory explains and does not yet explain about this violence, and 
deliberates with these few hundred Simmons graduates about what they 
need to do together 1n order to transform the home and therefore the 
world into a place of peace. 
— A University of North Carolina freshman with significant 
writing difficulties 1s given the entire semester 1n English Composition 
I to complete one essay, as he learns about writing and gains confidence 
1n his ability to write. In the subsequent semester, his 
accomplishments lead him to write an argument published 1n the 
Carolinian, and his teacher, one of my colleagues, cherishes his 
success. 
— As a University of North Carolina at Greensboro graduate 
student, I work through many of my struggles with a school and social 
history that trained me to be a "good student" and do or "display" 
whatever my teacher asks, and I write a dissertation that 1s an argument 
I genuinely believe and want my readers to deliberate. 
— In follow-up to the 1995 roundtable, a workshop for the 1996 
Conference on College Composition and Communication 1s proposed 1n order 
to articulate problems and pose solutions that will enable dissertation 
writing to be re-interpreted as authentic writing throughout rhetoric 
and composition studies and beyond (Welch). . . . 
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Bakht1n claims that "we must deal with the life and behavior of 
discourse 1n a contradictory and multl-languaged world" (275). As 
suggested by these few illustrations of lost and found moments for 
making words matter for peaceable living, we must and furthermore we can 
live and communicate 1n a multi-languaged world. Current peace studies 
in psychology believe that because war is constructed 1n the minds of 
human beings, so too can peace be constructed there. A peace studies 1n 
the disciplines of rhetoric and composition similarly could say that war 
and likewise peace are constructed 1n the language of human beings. 
Psychology's peace studies are guided by a "vision of the world 1n which 
violent means of reacting to conflict are replaced by peaceful ones" 
(Schwebel 2). So, too, are rhetoric and composition guided. Burke's 
"Dialectician's Hymn" sings: 
If the soil is carried off by flood, 
Hay we help the soil to say so. 
If our ways of living 
Violate the needs of nerve and muscle, 
May we find speech for nerve and muscle, 
To frame objections 
Whereat we, listening, 
Can remake our habits. (Language 56) 
Bakhtin understands: "The word is born 1n a dialogue as a living 
rejoinder within in" (279). Booth asks: "Is this 'poem' morally, 
politically, or philosophically sound? Is it likely to work for good or 
ill in those who read 1t?" (Company 5). Berthoff believes: "It 1s not 
too much to claim that the composition classroom is a place where 
students can discover their humanity in both a moral and a political 
sense" (Making 22). And Freire explains: "Authentic education 1s not 
carried on by 'A' for 'B' or by 'A' about 'B,' but rather by 'A' with 
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'B'" (82). These thinkers neither deny nor submit to the presence of 
conflict in language. They argue for its transformations 1n order that 
lives may be lived more constructively. 
Rhetorical theory and practice can decrease violence 1n the world 
and Increase understanding of the power of words. Its challenge lies 1n 
the very pragmatic and real work of exposing the idealism and 
romanticism of violence that for centuries have convinced Individuals 
and societies that war, in its myriad manifestations, 1s the way of the 
world. Or, as O'Reilly expresses the pacifist's challenge: "Violence 
1s easy. Nonviolence, by contrast, takes all we have and costs not less 
than everything" (31). Therefore, 1f the word and the world are to move 
together with and toward more peaceful means and ends, no lesson could 
be more consequential than for teachers and students to educate each 
other in the right and responsibility of negotiating words as deeds. 
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NOTES 
1My discussion of Burke's philosophy of language 1s primarily 
shaped by my study 1n his books Counter-Statement. A Grammar of Motives. 
A Rhetoric of Motives, and Language As Symbolic Action. Although the 
tenets I highlight here run throughout Burke's corpus, the following 
11st identifies some of the more explicit sections related to the 
principle concepts I discuss. Dramatism: A Grammar of Motives 
"Introduction: The Five Key Terms of Dramatism" (xv-xx111) and 
"Container and Thing Contained" (3-20); Language as Symbolic Action 
"Termin1st1c Screens" (44-62). Language as symbolic action: A Grammar 
introduction (xv-xxii1); Language "Definition of Man" (3-24). Incipient 
acts: A Grammar "'Incipient' and 'Delayed' Action" (235-46); A Rhetoric 
"Persuasion" (49-55). Identification, addressedness, and the rhetorical 
nature of all language use: A Rhetoric "Introduction" (xi11-xv), 
Section I "The Range of Rhetoric" (19-46), and Section II "Traditional 
Principles of Rhetoric (49-65); Language "Poetics in Particular, 
Language in General" (25-43). Form and appeal: Counter "Lexicon 
Rhetoricae" (123-83); A Rhetoric "Formal Appeal" (65-69) and "Rhetorical 
Forms at Large" (69-78); Language "Poetics in Particular, Language 1n 
General" (25-43) and "Rhetoric and Poetics" (295-307). Pragmatic 
ideology and moral implications: A Grammar Section IV "Agency and 
Purpose" (particularly 275-91); Language "Definition of Man" (3-24), 
"Term1n1stic Screens" (44-62), and "Cor1planus—and the Delights of 
Faction" (81-97). 
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zBeale refers primarily to the work of J. L. Austin 1n his 
foundational work 1n speech act theory How to Do Things with Words. 
Austin's three main categories for speech acts are: 1) locutlonary (an 
utterance), 2) 11locutlonary (an utterance attempting to do something), 
and 3) perlocutionary (an utterance achieving the doing of something). 
Burke, 1n a discussion of Austin's theory entitled "Words as Deeds," 
acknowledges the fundamental difference 1n a theory such as Austin's (or 
Beale's) semiotics and his own dramatlsm. One example of the 
difference, he notes, 1s the "quietly jolting" compartmental1zaton of 
persuasion into the one perlocutionary speech act category (157), which 
is also the only category discussed in terms of "consequence" (159). 
Burke's "rhetorical" concept of incipient action runs counter to this 
semiotic or "grammatical" approach (161). 
3Carolyn R. Miller also questions the term "aim" 1n discourse 
theory. In her influential argument "Genre as Social Action" published 
in 1984, she critiques Klnneavy's system: "James L. Klnneavy has 
classified discourse on the basis of 'aim,' an apparently pragmatic 
basis, but he also arrives at a closed system with four members: 
expressive, persuasive, literary, and referential discourse. . . . This 
scheme suggests a substantive rather than a pragmatic classification" 
(155). Interestingly, she cites Beale's critique of Klnneavy's theory 
as further evidence of this "fundamental problem" with aim. Yet five 
years later, Beale asserts a theory with the same limitation for which 
both he and Miller have criticized Kinneavy's project. 
4AS Burke's work does, Wayne Booth's arguments 1n literary theory 
and criticism have permanently blurred these generic boundaries that 
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Beale erects between literature and rhetoric (or Poetic and Rhetorical). 
In The Rhetoric of Fiction. Booth studies rhetoric 1n fiction, Its 
"overt and recognizable appeal," and fiction as rhetoric, "a total act 
of communication" (415). In his study of ethics and fiction, The 
Company We Keep, he emphasizes consequences rather than kinds of 
discourse. We ought to concern ourselves "with what a novel might <Jfi to 
a student" (4). We ought to ask "Is this 'poem' morally, politically, 
or philosophically sound? Is it likely to work for good or 111 1n those 
who read 1t?" (5). These are Burkean questions of motive concerned with 
what people do to and with each other through their words. 
Similarly, recent studies in a variety of scientific disciplines 
counter Beale's Scientific and Rhetorical divisions. Herbert W. Simons, 
for instance, introduces a collection of essays on the rhetoric of 
inquiry in the human sciences with this observation: "... the common 
thread 1n the rhetoric of Inquiry movement is Its rejection of the 
conventional split between Inquiry and advocacy" (4). He concludes that 
"virtually all scholarly discourse 1s rhetorical" (9). Likewise, 
Charles Bazerman's Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity of 
the Experimental Article in Science locates science dramatistlcally 
within "the large realm of situated, purposeful, strategic symbolic 
activity" (6). "Rhetorical analysis," Bazerman notes, "has become the 
grounds for radical critique and epistemological ponderlngs" 1n a 
multitude of academic fields 1n recent years (11), which underscores the 
importance of Burke's philosophy of language and its argument for the 
innately Intentional—the rhetorical nature—of all language use. 
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5In his theory of the reader, first advanced 1n The Implied 
Reader. Iser accounts for dlalogical relationships among reader, writer, 
text, and context. The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response 
continues this work, providing a concise description of the Implied 
reader in its first chapter (27-38). 
"These, then, are the categories by which Beale's theory defines 
discourse. As I have mentioned, Beale's model also accounts for kinds 
of reality. It is an important point 1n terms of the scope of his 
project, but Its details are less central to this discussion. Briefly, 
he constructs a quadrad that parallels the axes and alms of language. 
Burke analyzes world views through the lens of his pentad. 
7Genre or discourse theory is currently a mult1d1sc1pl1nary field 
moving away from a concept of taxonomy as a product by which discourse 
is prescribed and, alternatively, toward taxonomizing as a process by 
which discourse is described. It often couples descriptions of 
discourses that have been written with advice about ways that similar 
practice can be most fruitfully taught for particular writers and 
readers. Swales investigates the teaching of academic and research 
English. Less constructively, George L. Dillon's work determines 
"academic discourse" as a genre different from non-academic discourse. 
Charles Bazerman's research illustrates genre theory working at a more 
local level—the report of experiment 1n physics. Campbell and 
Jamieson, whose Form and Genre: Shaping Rhetorical Action did much to 
insure genre theory's continuance in present rhetorical studies, 
continue their research of presidential rhetoric, which Illustrates the 
ways in which generic analysis "studies the links between function and 
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form" 1n order to discover "whether a given speaker chose the best from 
among the available means of persuasion" (Deeds 8, 13). Miller 
expresses for genre theory the importance of keeping form from obviating 
other essential aspects of discourse: "Good technical writing becomes, 
rather than the revelation of absolute reality, a persuasive version of 
experience" ("Humanistic" 616). 
8In Aristotle's Rhetoric. 1358b and 1359a (Book I, Chapter 3) and 
1367b and 1368a (Book 1, Chapter 9) are the especially relevant 
sections. James Berlin's discussion of the political circumstances 
under which Aristotle wrote Rhetoric provides a contextual explanation 
for the contradictions in this treatise. 
9Chapter two of Dale L. Sullivan's dissertation provides one 
detailed historical review of epldeictlc. 
10Theodore Burgess' turn-of-the-century discussion of epldeictlc 
(rare because of Its book length) articulates conventional wisdom about 
epldeictlc, elevating it as lofty when associated with literature, 
poetry in particular, and demoting it as inferior when compared to 
deliberative or forensic rhetoric. Until the 1960s, epldeictlc was by 
and large left to Its classical tradition, as explicated in histories of 
rhetoric such as George Kennedy's or classical textbooks for modern 
students such as E. P. J. Corbett's, which acknowledges the 
insufficiency of Aristotle's "praise-or-blame" catch-all category but 
nevertheless advocates its study and emulation as discourse that "is not 
so much concerned with persuading an audience as with pleasing or 
inspiring it" (40). 
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11Perelman's final book, The Realm of Rhetoric, maintains the 
theory of epldelctlc advanced 1n these earlier studies. He asserts that 
the goal of epldelctlc 1s adherence; any revolt should be punished (20). 
12The variety of discourse that critics explore through the lens 
of epldelctlc 1s evident 1n this sampling of titles: "A Likely Story: 
The Autobiographical as Epldelctlc" (Boyle), "Epldelctlc Speaking 1n the 
Post-C1v1l War South and the Southern Experience" (Braden), "Ep1de1ctic 
Rhetoric and the Renaissance Lyric" (DeNeef), "Arguers as Value 
Adjusters: Ep1de1ctic Discourse 1n the Environmental Movement" 
(Jaehne), In Praise of Aeneas: Virgil and Epldelctlc Rhetoric 1n the 
Earlv Italian Renaissance (Kallendorf), "Korean President Roh Tae-Woo's 
1988 Inaugural Address: Campaigning for Investiture" (Lee and 
Campbell), "Donne's Epideictlc Personae" (Lewalski), "Paradigm, Persona 
and Epideictic: The Lovesongs of Eurythmics" (Oglesbee), and "A Dear 
Searcher into Comparisons: The Rhetoric of Ellen Goodman" (Scott and 
Klumpp). A few recent dissertations have studied epideictlc 1n the 
writings of Chaucer (DiLorenzo), John Dryderi (Bady), John Wesley 
(Jenson), William Wordsworth (Ginsberg), and Ralph Nader (Benkendorf). 
13When I began my research 1n contemporary epideictlc theory, I 
concentrated on theories most available for application 1n rhetorical 
analysis. Therefore, I did not Investigate closely theories 1n 
unpublished dissertations that had not yet been followed up in published 
forums. Recently, the argument Gregory Clark launches in his 
dissertation ("Timothy Dwlght's Travels in New England and New York and 
the Rhetoric of Puritan Public Discourse") has begun to receive public 
press (for instance, his article "Rescuing the Discourse of Community"). 
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His argument and my own concur 1n their concerns about the latent 
violence in epldeictlc as it currently is theorized and practiced, and 
we share reservations about the constraints that Sullivan's theory 
places on epldelctic persuasion and deliberation. My argument does not 
share, however, the Idealization of nineteenth century American 
epldelctic advanced 1n his and Michael Halloran's recent essay 
collection, Oratorical Culture in Nineteenth Century America: 
Transformations in the Theory and Practice of Rhetoric. In this study 
of a century's worth of changes 1n the American Identity, they present 
epidelctic as an unchanging, traditionally conceived discourse "whose 
end was to 'teach and delight,' to pass on the established values of the 
culture and thus to sustain the common ground upon which arguments about 
particular issues could be conducted" (2). 
14Poulakos' representation of hermeneutics does not accurately 
describe the work of all hermeneutics. For instance, the interpretive 
anthropology of Clifford Geertz informs the most humane of social 
transformations that could proceed from "seeing ourselves amongst 
others" (16). Roy J. Howard's overview also suggests a more complex 
view of hermeneutics as an Interpretive heuristic and eplstemology than 
does Poulakos' rendering of it. The good Intentions of Poulakos' 
socialist stance require a more thorough-going politics of 
transformation 1n order to move through the Imprisoning oppositions he 
resists. Paulo Freire's discussion of the relationship between the 
oppressor and the oppressed warns of the risks 1n inverting power 
structures (Chapter 1, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed). 
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15John E. Zlolkowski's study of ancient funeral orations, 
Thucvdldes and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens, provides a 
helpful assessment of scholarship on Pericles' war eulogy. Ziolkowskl 
discusses the heavy debate surrounding this speech's author, date, and 
alliance with or departure from the tradition of funeral orations. He 
argues that the oration is Thucydldes' revision of Pericles' words, that 
its date is 431 B.C., and that 1t essentially falls within the tradition 
of funeral oration as he defines the genre. More recently, Cheryl Glenn 
makes an interesting case for Aspasia, Pericles' intellectual and 
influential lover, as the chief collaborator and perhaps ghost writer of 
this famous eulogy. 
16Pac1fism and feminism share a dlaloglcal, relational world view 
that is, as I intend these terms here, the only essential characteristic 
of either ideology. The possibility of Aphasia, Pericles' lover, as the 
ghost writer or co-author of the "Funeral Oration" points to gender or 
sex as an oversimplified, erroneous defining characteristic of feminism 
or pacifism. Clearly one of the striking differences between ancient 
Athens and contemporary America is the blurring of "men's" and "women's" 
business, a crucial transformation for the inclusive work of pacifism. 
17In order to preserve student anonymity, the actual section 
numbers and names of students have been changed. Appendices for this 
chapter have been modified to meet University guidelines for margins. 
18Although these three sections are treated as one pool of data 1n 
this project, comparative study across several variables might also 
yield interesting insights. For Instance, there was a greater 
percentage of display or primarily display writers in -02 (80% compared 
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to 50% and 58% 1n sections 14 and 06, respectively) and, as well, a 
greater percentage of male students (63% compared to 24% and 20% 1n 
sections -01 and -03, respectively). A cross-reference of course grade 
and range of display or authentic writing 1n each section Indicates that 
more "B" students were fully authentic writers than students receiving 
other letter grades. Although the difference in grading systems from 
Spring to Fall semesters reveals no crucial anomalies, this variation 
also invites comparison, particularly given the Influence of grading on 
students' perception of their writing. 
19A disagreement between Gregory Clark and Dale Sullivan about the 
teaching of writing articulates the difference between writing in school 
and the "school writing" I argue against. In a CCC Interchange prompted 
by Clark's earlier article "Rescuing the Discourse of Community," 
Sullivan summarizes their teacher, Michael Halloran: "The 
conversational model [for teaching writing] sees discourse as a means to 
an end; the declamatory model depicts discourse as an end 1t Itself" 
(386). The declamatory model suits the classroom better, to Sullivan's 
mind, because it 1s a place where "students expect to give 
performances," and since all writing requires "a mask," students are 
"simply practicing the art of performance." Clark responds with an 
emphasis on communication as an "Interaction of Individual and 
collective fortune"; therefore, "it is the quality of human 
relationships that is at stake" 1n the writing class (388). Rather than 
declamatory teaching, in which "what 1s at stake for students in a 
simulated performance tends to be their own reward" (387), Clark presses 
for the greater yet more difficult task of making the classroom an 
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occasion for communication in which students "learn to do 1t by doing 1t 
for real" (388). 
20One way to see the difference 1n a hierarchical and a 
transformative theory of rhetoric 1s to look at how they play out 1n 
composition textbooks. Categories of discourse are often the dominant 
strategy for teaching writing. Timothy Cruslus and Carolyn E. 
Channel!'s text, The Aims of Argument. Indicates the extent to which 
taxonomies can go 1n differentiating discourse. Intending to make the 
definition of argument clearer to students, Crusius and Channel 1 divide 
the category of rhetoric into four smaller ones: 1) arguments that aim 
"to inquire," 2) arguments that aim "to convince," 3) arguments that aim 
"to persuade," and 4) arguments that aim "to negotiate" (v11; the first 
chapter develops these definitions). It is not hard to imagine the 
wrinkled brows of teacher and student alike who try to get clear about 
whether they are, say, "convincing" or "persuading." In the tradition 
of Klnneavy's and Beale's theories and textbooks, The Alms of Argument 
directs a writer's attention to a categorical end in which the goal of 
writing becomes something like "I am now going to write an argument that 
negotiates." 
Unlike the ordering of the Crusius and Channell textbook, Peter 
Elbow and Pat Belanoff's A Community of Writers 1s organized around 17 
workshops designed to help students become better writers. Whereas the 
first chapter of The Alms of Argument defines kinds of argument for 
students to learn, the first chapter in A Cotwnunitv of Writers describes 
different processes for students to experiment with 1n order to get 
words on paper quickly and with confidence. A Community of Writers 
223 
emphasizes dlaloglcal relationships; for Instance, between form and 
content ("language 1s Inherently both" 141), writers and readers 
(explaining persuasion as "sensing the other person and somehow reaching 
out and getting the other person to listen" 213), audience and purpose 
("The goal of this workshop 1s to help you learn to shape your writing 
better by thinking more pointedly about what you want your words to do. 
and to whom" 420), and, as Its title suggests, between the individual 
and the collective. Taxonomy-based textbooks such as The Aims of 
Argument become prescriptions for writing; otherwise, they are obsolete 
as soon as the categories change. Descriptions of writing process and 
situatedness such as those in A Community of Writers provide a more 
flexible, durable, and productive invitation to writing. 
21The text from which I quote is Royster's actual speech, which 
will be revised and published for readers in a forthcoming issue of 
College Composition and Communication. I appreciate Dr. Royster 
allowing me to Illustrate transformative epideictlc with her oral text. 
22War eulogies remain entrenched in the patriarchal world view 
that informs the warring behavior occasioning them and that their 
responses perpetuate. They are what Bakhtin describes as "authoritative 
discourse," which "1s, so to speak, the word of the fathers. Its 
authority was already acknowledged in the past. It 1s a prior 
discourse" (342). It is discourse working against the heteroglosslc 
nature of language. Royster's speech represents what Bakhtin calls 
"internally persuasive discourse," in which the word is "half-ours and 
half-someone else's" and "1s able to reveal ever newer ways to mean" 
(345, 346). It is discourse that invites uses of language by persons 
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not given authority to speak 1n patriarchal settings. It 1s also no 
coincidence, then, that Royster, as a feminist speaker historically 
margirial 1 zed, chooses a way of communicating that 1s different from 
Pericles, a speaker from dominant culture. Royster's speech breaks Into 
the "culture of silence," to borrow Frelre's term, that Pericles' 
oration maintains. 
23My description of what happened as my students conducted their 
research projects makes these classes sound more wonderful than, of 
course, they were. English 102 sections 01, 02, and 03, were not 
Utopias; however, small significant steps were made with a number of 
students and larger, more significant ones with several others. Indeed, 
in classes in which I as the teacher was consciously and conscientiously 
inviting authentic writing, two-thirds of the students were not willing 
or able to accept the Invitation fully as they clung to display writing. 
Their resistance was certainly not entirely (perhaps only minimally) 
their "fault," and it most likely could be explained by a school history 
and cultural mentality that had trained them to find out what the 
teacher wants and do it. As Mary Rose O'Reilly reminds teachers, "One 
of the teacher's hardest jobs is to break conditioning. You can't just 
open the cages, as do some of my friends 1n the animal liberation 
movement, and hope the poor beasts will run free. . . . Set free in the 
wide world they will desperately try to run mazes" (69). Change 1s 
slow. 
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APPENDIX A 
WRITER'S QUESTIONNAIRE (SPRING 1994) 
In many ways, you are the experts on how writing should be taught 1n the 
college composition classroom. Please share your Insights with me by 
responding to these eight questions. If you need more room, feel free 
to continue your answers on another sheet of paper. Take whatever time 
you wish. 
1) One of my concerns about teaching writing 1s that writing in school 
doesn't seem like real writing. We do 1t just to get a grade. What 
have we done this semester that made your writing feel fake? What have 
we done that made 1t feel real? 
2) Although I think that writing for a grade can mess up our writing, I 
also am concerned that if school writing 1s not graded, then students 
will not do it, or do it with enough commitment. How has the grading of 
your essays, portfolios, and journals influenced the writing you've done 
this semester? Other than your grade, what has encouraged you to do any 
of this writing? 
3) How did you feel about the second and third essays being connected? 
Did it affect your writing in any way? Did writing these two related 
essays feel different in any way from writing the first essay? 
4) In your portfolio writing, sometimes 1t sounded like you really got 
Into your responses, but other times 1t sounded like you were doing busy 
work. How did the portfolio help and/or not help your writing and 
thinking? 
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5) What were the advantages and disadvantages of keeping a journal this 
semester that required you to think about yourself as a writer and about 
how you write? 
6) I want students to be able to write about things that they are 
Interested in, and I also want us as a group of writers to read, talk, 
and write about the same general topic of Importance (which for us was 
the myths we discussed). How did thinking about a general topic 
together help and/or hinder your writing? 
7) Now that we've done them, how do you assess our readings and 
discussions on gender myths and on myths of individual opportunity? 
What made them Interesting? What could have made them more interesting? 
8) What would you have liked for us to do this semester that we did not 
do, and/or that we could have done better? 
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APPENDIX B 
WRITER'S QUESTIONNAIRE (FALL 1994) 
In many ways, you are the experts on how writing should be taught 1n the 
college composition classroom. Please share your Insights with me by 
responding to these questions. If your response repeats something you 
have said on the UNCG evaluations, that's okay. If you need more room, 
feel free to continue your answers on the back. Take whatever time you 
wish. 
1) I gave you evaluative comments on each of your first four essays and 
one letter grade on the whole Portfolio. In what ways did this grading 
system affect your writing—both Its process and product? 
2) What recommendations would you give me about this system? 
3) The last three pieces of finished writing you did this semester were 
related to each other—the Study Proposal, Annotated Bibliography, and 
Research Project. In what ways did grouping these writings affect your 
writing and thinking? How did this compare to writing the four essays 
during the first half of the semester? 
4) What recommendations would you give me about putting together this 
kind of research assignment? What helped you get 1t done? What did you 
need more help with? 
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5) One of my concerns about teaching writing 1s that writing 1n school 
doesn't seem like real writing. We do 1t just to get a grade. Were 
there times this semester when your writing felt real to you? When 1t 
felt fake? Describe one or two of those moments. 
6) In your journal writing, sometimes 1t sounded like you really got 
into your responses, but other times 1t sounded like you were doing busy 
work. What do you think? What recommendations would you give me about 
journal writing? 
7) How do you evaluate our readings and discussions on learning this 
semester? What made them interesting? What could have made them more 
interesting? 
8) What was 1t like writing for a teacher as your reader? What was it 
like writing for your colleagues as your readers? 
9) What was 1t like being a reader for your colleagues? 
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APPENDIX C 
CONSENT FORM (SPRING AND FALL 1994) 
ENGLISH 102 
Age 
Class year (eg sophomore) 
Sex 
Race 
Year graduated from high school 
Name, city, and state of high school 
I give my permission for Marsha Holmes to study my writing and report 
her findings 1n her composition research. I understand that she will 
keep my identity confidential. 
(Print name) 
(Signature) 
(Date) 
THANK YOU 
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APPENDIX D 
VARIATIONS OF EPIDEICTIC IN THREE COMPOSITION CLASSROOMS 
STUDENTS 
Display Writers 
Authentic Writers 
Primarily Display Writers with 
Emerging Authenticity 
Primarily Authentic Writers with 
Lingering Display 
102-01 
n=20 
5 
2 
SECTIONS 
102-02 
n=15 
6 
1 
102-03 
n=14 
4 
3 
Total 
n=49 
15 
6 
15 
13 
